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Abstract 
With increasing resource use pressure, land degradation in China has become 
increasingly severe in the past few decades especially in North West China. The 
Conversion of Cropland to Forest and Grassland Program (CCFGP), also known 
as the Grain for Green Program, was formally launched in 2002 to address the 
land degradation issue. Under the CCFGP, participating farmers are supported by 
the Government to grow trees and grass on land previously used for annual 
cropping. With government funding for the CCFGP drawing to an end in 2007, 
increasing attention amongst the Chinese policy makers, as well as the wider 
Chinese and international communities, has been devoted to the long-term 
sustainability of the land use changes triggered by the CCFGP. Question also 
remains as to whether there are better ways to deliver the anticipated policy 
outcome. 
In this thesis, a cost benefit analysis of the CCFGP is conducted to justify 
government intervention in providing the environmental goods and services 
through public finance. The potential efficiency gain of the Program is examined, 
based on which the sustainability of the land use changes under the Program 
together with the cost-effectiveness of the Program is explored. This partial cost 
benefit analysis of the CCFGP is conducted over a 20-year time period in the 
North West Provinces of China. Costs and benefits included in the analysis 
encompass the welfare impact of the land use changes on agricultural production 
and the environmental costs and benefits arising from the land use changes under 
the Program. Due to the limitation of data availability, some components of the 
environmental benefits and costs of runoff reductions are not included in the 
analysis. 
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It has been found through this research that the livelihoods of participating farm 
households are improved by the CCFGP and the Program has positive impact on 
the social welfare of the local communities. The biophysical changes under the 
Program bring about both on-site and off-site benefits and costs. While the 
Program has been found to generate significant non-market environmental values, 
it also causes economic losses from reduced agricultural production arising from 
runoff reductions. Overall, the CCFGP improves the social welfare of people 
across Northern China over a 20-year time period since its implementation. 
Conclusion is drawn that government intervention through the CCFGP can be 
justified and the Program should be supported by the Chinese Government. 
Theoretically the sustainability of the Program can be achieved. However, 
sustainable land use changes will also depend on the implementation and design 
of the CCFGP. Future financing of the CCFGP is needed for some areas where 
the Program is found to decrease the social welfare of the local communities. 
Finally, there is room for better environmental targeting of the Program to 
improve the cost-effectiveness of the Program. The institution of an auction 
mechanism to allocate CCFGP funds more efficiently offers one potential 
solution. 
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Introduction 
With the World's largest and ever-increasing population and a relatively low 
resource base per capita, the pressure of natural resource use in China is 
becoming more and more intense. This has been exacerbated by a lack of clearly 
defined and well enforced property rights regime over land and natural resources 
as well as the government policy of self-sufficiency in agricultural production. 
As a result, there is growing evidence that land and water degradation is 
occurring in China, leading to more intense environmental deterioration and 
consequential economic losses. This is especially the case in the western 
provinces of China, where over 70 per cent of land has a slope of more than 25 
degrees and where the two main river systems in China, the Yellow River and 
the Yangtze River originate. The deterioration of the natural environment as well 
as the economic loss generated has become an issue of concern for Chinese 
people, their governments and the international community. 
To address the environmental degradation issue, the Chinese Government 
initiated a number of policies and programs in the past two decades. Of these, the 
one with the greatest financial commitment was the Conversion of Cropland to 
Forest and Grassland Program (CCFGP). Formally launched in 2002, the CCFGP 
(also known as the Grain for Green Program and the Sloped Land Conversion 
Program), involves the world's largest expenditure on a single environmental 
services program after the US Conservation Reserve Program (CCICED 2002; 
Xu et al 2004a). This land use policy featured the conversion of steep-sloped and 
degraded cropland to forest and grassland by millions of small landholders in 25 
provinces and autonomous regions across China with the provision of cash and 
grain subsidies to participating farmers as compensation for their lost agricultural 
production. The Government anticipates that through water and soil conservation 
measures such as afforestation in upstream areas, local land degradation issue 
can be tackled and the negative off-site environmental impacts can be reduced. 
The CCFGP is essentially a government initiative to provide environmental 
goods and services to the Chinese community through the mobilisation of public 
funds. 
Economic theory suggests that the public good nature of environmental goods 
and services makes it impossible for them to be supplied optimally through a 
pure market system of economic organisation. The market failure so generated 
pervades economic discussions of environmental and natural resource 
management and the concept has been presented as a general justification for 
government intervention. Even though government intervention offers the 
possibility of realising efficiency gains, it would be wrong to conclude that all 
government intervention in the functioning of a market economy is either 
desirable or effective. Government intervention involves resource reallocation 
which is subject to rent seeking. Moreover, government intervention has its own 
transaction costs, which parallel those of market transactions. Whether 
government intervention outperforms market transactions and results in effective 
natural resource management needs to be analysed case by case, taking into 
account all the costs and benefits (including transaction costs) that the policy 
change has brought about to the society. 
A cost benefit analysis (CBA) of the CCFGP, based on the criterion of economic 
efficiency, is therefore required to justify the government intervention through 
the implementation of the Program. However, such a CBA is not available in the 
CCFGP literature. There have been a number of studies which focus on the 
financial impact of the CCFGP on the livelihoods of participating farmers. Other 
studies have examined the cost-effectiveness of the CCFGP and the problems 
associated with the Program's implementation and design. No firm conclusion 
about the efficiency of the CCFGP can be drawn from their findings because 
these studies have not taken account of the overall impact of the Program on 
social welfare. Furthermore, the time span for some of the evaluations has been 
limited to the first few years of program implementation. A lack of knowledge 
about the welfare impact of the CCFGP has resulted in a number of policy issues 
being left unresolved. 
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On one hand, it has been acknowledged that the CCFGP shows the commitment 
of the Government towards a sustainable society which embodies environmental, 
social and economic goals. On the other hand, there are concerns that the CCFGP 
may not be sustainable given the Government's budget constraints and the 
uncertainty as to whether the Program generates adequate income to participating 
farmers to maintain their land use changes. In addition, issues remain unknown 
as to whether the Program will achieve its environmental goals, whether the 
environmental goods and services are provided at minimum cost, and whether 
the Government is able to collect sufficient revenues from those enjoying the 
environmental goods and services provided to cover the subsidy costs of the 
Program. The prospects for improving the cost-effectiveness of the CCFGP 
through innovative market approach remain largely unexplored. 
To tackle these unresolved policy issues, the implementation of the CCFGP will 
be assessed comprehensively in this thesis through a CBA of program 
implementation in the North West Provinces of China, where the severe 
ecological deterioration is the main policy concern of the CCFGP. The CBA will 
be conducted over a 20-year time period given that alternative livelihood sources 
developed under the CCFGP will start to generate financial returns to 
participating farmers by then and the long-term impact of the Program will be 
fully revealed. Whether the CCFGP will bring about efficiency gain to the 
Chinese community will be investigated through its welfare impact both on-site 
and off-site in North China. As many related costs and benefits associated with 
the Program will be included in the CBA as is feasible given constraints of time 
and resources. These broadly include the welfare impacts of the land use change 
on agricultural production and the environmental costs and benefits arising from 
the land use change under the Program. The results of the CBA will provide 
indicators of the appropriate direction for the land use change policy. 
Consequently, policy alternatives to achieve sustainable land use change under 
the Program will be explored in this thesis. 
A feature of this thesis is the environmental valuation of the CCFGP, especially 
in the context of the development of Chinese policy. Environmental goods and 
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services have direct impact on social welfare. However in many cases these 
environmental impacts and their associated benefits and costs fail to be included 
in the social welfare function defined by government when developing policy. 
This has become a prominent issue in policy making and evaluation process in 
China, as public policies with a goal of maximisation of social welfare can hardly 
be justified without including environmental costs and benefits. Both the market 
and non-market environmental values generated by the CCFGP will be included 
in the CBA. 
This thesis is structured as follows. In the first chapter, background information 
about land use management in China is provided, with a focus on land and water 
degradation and the policy framework used by the Chinese Government in 
sustainable land use management. The new land use policy that incorporates the 
CCFGP, is briefly introduced. Chapter 2 provides a theoretical basis to justify 
government intervention through the implementation of the CCFGP and outlines 
the efficiency criteria based on which such intervention may be justified. A CBA 
is called for to justify the CCFGP and to answer a number of unresolved policy 
issues. The research issues that will be addressed by this thesis are also put 
forward in this Chapter. In Chapter 3, the overarching hypothesis of this research 
is specified in terms of the efficiency impacts of the CCFGP. A number of sub-
hypotheses are developed to address the various aspects of the welfare impacts of 
the Program. The methodologies adopted to test each individual sub-hypothesis 
are then briefly outlined. In particular, the theories and techniques of 
environmental valuation are detailed in this Chapter. This is followed by Chapter 
4 in which the valuation methodology used in this research to estimate the non-
market environmental goods - choice modelling - is discussed. 
Chapters 5 through to 10 provide the welfare assessment of the CCFGP and its 
policy implications. Bio-economic modelling is established to link the 
environmental restoration action of the CCFGP to its impacts on the Chinese 
community in North China. Both market and non-market values brought about 
by the CCFGP are estimated. It should be noted that the CBA reported in these 
chapters is still partial as not all the environmental benefits and costs are 
included in the analysis due to the lack of scientific information to establish the 
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full links between biophysical changes and economic impact. In Chapter 5, 
biophysical modelling is used to identify and predict the biophysical changes 
brought about by the CCFGP along the Yellow River in North China. These 
biophysical changes encompass runoff reductions along the Yellow River and the 
improvements in air quality, water quality, landscape aesthetics and biodiversity. 
Chapter 6 outlines the market values of the CCFGP which include two main 
components. The first involves the social welfare impact of the Program on local 
agricultural production as a direct result of the land use change incurred. The 
second component involves the welfare change brought about by runoff 
reductions in the Yellow River Basin. 
The next three chapters focus on the non-market valuation of the environmental 
improvements predicted to arise from the CCFGP. The choice modelling (CM) 
approach is used to estimate the non-market environmental values of the 
Program. As CM is survey-based, the development and design of a relevant and 
well-structured questionnaire is a crucial part of its implementation. Chapter 7 
therefore addresses the critical issues in developing the CM questionnaire used in 
this research. In Chapter 8, the survey and its results are discussed. Different 
choice models are estimated to infer the willingness to pay of the sampled 
Chinese urban households for the environmental improvements under the 
CCFGP. This is followed by Chapter 9 in which value estimates of the samples 
are extrapolated across different populations to provinces, autonomous regions 
and municipalities in North China. The total non-market value held by urban 
households in North China is thus derived to be included into the CBA. 
Finally, in Chapter 10, both the market and non-market costs and benefits 
associated with the implementation of the CCFGP are integrated. The CBA of 
the CCFGP is conducted to justify government intervention and to inform further 
policy development. Policy implications of the Program such as its efficiency, 
sustainability and cost-effectiveness are discussed, and policy guidance for future 
implementation of the Program is provided. The potential of developing markets 
for the environmental goods and services provided by the CCFGP is also 
explored, with a focus on achieving improved cost-effectiveness of the Program. 
The thesis concludes with a summary of the main research findings and the 
5 
limitations of this study, and suggestions on some important issues for future 
research on the CCFGP are made. 
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Chapter J 
Land Use Management in China 
1.1 Introduction 
China accounts for 22 per cent of the world's population but has only seven 
percent of the world's arable land. Hence, despite its large land area, China has a 
relatively low resource base per capita. In 1989, the per capita fresh water, 
cropland, forest and grassland of China comprised 28.1, 32.3, 14.3 and 32.3 per 
cent of the world's averages respectively (PRC 1994). In contrast, mountainous 
terrain accounts for about two-thirds of the country's total territory (Huang 2000). 
The combination of resource endowment and population implies resource use 
pressure, particularly in a country where self-sufficiency in agricultural 
production has been an expressed government policy objective. With growing 
evidence of land and water degradation, more and more attention is being given 
to the ways in which natural resources are being managed. 
In this chapter, attention is given to the issue of land use management in China. 
In the next section, the current state of the Chinese land and water resources is 
briefly described. Section 1.3 provides an overview of land and water resource 
degradation with an emphasis in North China. This will be followed by an 
outline of the consequences of land and water resource degradation. Section 1.4 
features the Chinese Government's response in tackling the problem of land 
degradation and land use policy initiatives introduced by the Government. This 
chapter concludes with Section 1.5. 
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1.2 Land and Water Resources in China 
China has a total land territory of 960 million hectares. Cropland, grasslands, and 
forests, being the three main terrestrial land systems, cover about 82 per cent of 
China's surface area (World Bank 2001; CCICED 2002; PTFDSSD 2003). 
Mountainous terrain accounts for about two-thirds of the country's total territory 
(Huang 2000). 
Table 1.1 Major Land Types in China 
Land Type Area (million ha.) 
Cropland 132 
Grassland 
Forestland 
400 
263.3 
Percentage ( % ) 
13.75 
41.67 
27.43 
Sources: adapted from World Bank 2001, CCICED 2002 and PTFDSSD 2003. 
China's cropland area is small relative to its population. The total cropland area 
is about 132 million hectares (World Bank 2001). Furthermore, China's land is 
of relatively low productivity. For instance, China has 6.07 million hectares (91 
million acres) of land with a slope of more than 25 degrees. Over 70 per cent of 
this steeply sloped land is located in the western half of the country. The area of 
cropland with water available and/ or irrigation facilities established covers 40 
per cent of the total cultivation area (WRI 2003). Cropland with medium to low 
productive capacity makes up 79 per cent of the total cropland area (CCICED 
2002; MLR 2000). In addition, as Table 1.2 indicates, the area of cropland in 
China declined from 1987 to 1995. The loss of cropland was largely due to 
conversion of land from cultivation to other forms of primary production and 
urban construction (Heilig 1999; World Bank 2001). 
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Table 1.2 Additions and Losses of Cropland 1987-1995 
Year Total Increase Decrease Net Change 
(1,000 Ha) (1,000 Ha) (1,000 Ha) (1,000 Ha) 
1987 132,835 372 676 -304 
1988 132,530 388 417 -29 
1989 132,501 446 346 100 
1990 132,601 425 448 -23 
1991 132,578 412 707 -295 
1992 132,283 302 625 -323 
1993 131,960 347 785 -438 
1994 131,522 389 798 -409 
1995 131,113 
Total 3,088 4,804 -1,722 
Source: Adapted from Heilig 1999 in World Bank 2001. 
China's grassland resource amounts to 400 million hectares, which covers about 
40 per cent of the nation's area, making it second only to Australia in the extent 
of its grassland resources. As Table 1.3 shows, the majority of the grasslands are 
found in the Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang Autonomous Regions and in 
Qinghai Province (MOA 1999). These autonomous regions and province are 
located in arid and semi-arid regions in north China, northeast China, northwest 
China, and west China. Grassland can also be found in the mountains, hills, and 
coastal belts of the humid and semi-humid areas of southern and eastern China. 
An estimated 317 million hectares of grassland, or about 80 per cent of the total, 
is considered suitable for livestock grazing (World Bank 2001). According to the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MOA 1999), about 34 per cent of all grasslands in 
China are moderately to severely degraded and about 90 per cent are degraded to 
some degree. 
Table 1.3 Grassland Resources and Degradation in China 
Provinces Grassland Area Grassland Area Moderately 
(million Ha) _________ to_S_e_v_e_re_l_,,,_y_D_e__,_gL....r_ad_e_d_ 
(million Ha) (per cent) 
Tibet 82.4 21.4 26 
Inner Mongolia 79.1 45.9 58 
Xinjiang 56.4 26.0 46 
Qinghai 36.0 10.8 30 
Sichuan 21.1 6.1 29 
Gansu 17.6 8.4 48 
Yunnan 15.2 0.5 3 
Other Provinces 117.8 17.7 15 
Total 393.6 136.7 34 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture 1999. 
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According to the Sixth Forest Resources Census conducted during 1999 to 2003, 
by 2003 China had a forest cover of 18.21 per cent of its total land territory (SFA 
2004). Forest areas in China totalled 174.9 million hectares. The total standing 
stock of timber was 12.5 billion cubic metres. Even though China ranks fifth in 
its forest area and seventh in its stock volume in the world, the per capita forest 
area and stock are about 21.3 per cent and 12.5 per cent respectively of the world 
averages (PTFDSSD 2003). Table 1.4 shows that despite an initial decline in 
forest area during the 1970s, the trend has been reversed since the 1980s due to 
major programs of reforestation, afforestation, and shelterbelt establishment. 
However, it should be noted that the State Forestry Administration's definition of 
"forests" has changed over the years and this has contributed to the seemingly 
large increase in forest area. Moreover, the state of natural forests in terms of 
volume and the share of mature forests continued to decline right through to the 
mid 1990s (Shi and Xu 2000; World Bank 2001). 
Table 1.4 Changes of Forest Area 1976-98 
Forest 
Area 
1st census 
(1973-76) 
(mHa) 
2°d census 
(1977-81) 
(mHa) 
3rd census 
(1984-88) 
(mHa) 
4th census 
(1989-93) 
(mHa) 
5th census 
(1994-98) 
(mHa) 
61h census 
(1999-2003) 
(mHa) 
Total 121.9 115.3 124.7 133.7 158.9 
Source: State Forestry Administration 2004. 
China has an uneven distribution of precipitation both spatially and temporally. It 
receives 5762 billion cubic metres of precipitation annually, most of which is 
concentrated in eastern and southern parts of the country. The amount of 
precipitation decreases progressively from south eastern coastal areas to north 
western inland areas. About 45 per cent of the country's territory falls into the 
category of arid and semi-arid region with an annual rainfall less than 400 mm. 
Precipitation is also uneven among different years. The amount of precipitation 
between July and September makes up over 50 per cent of the annual total, 
which gives rise to frequent flood and waterlogging disasters (MWR 2005). 
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River runoff in China totals 2711.5 billion cubic metres and ground water 
resources amount to 828.8 billion cubic metres. The underground water resources 
are unevenly distributed, with the southern region being rich, and northern and 
western regions being poor (China Internet Information Centre 2004). On a 
yearly basis, the total availability of water resources in China amounts to 2812.4 
billion cubic metres. Even though China ranks fourth in the world in terms of the 
total volume of its water resources, its per capita water resources is less than one 
third of the world average, at about 2200 cubic metres (MWR 2005). 
In addition, China boasts a large number of rivers, about 1500 of which has a 
catchment area of over 1000 sq km each. The Yangtze River - 6300 kilometres 
long - is China's largest river. It originates in the Kunlun Mountains in the south 
western section of Qinghai Province. It flows generally south through Sichuan 
Province into Yunnan Province then northeast and east across central China to its 
mouth in the East China Sea. The second largest river in China is the Yellow 
River with a length of 5,463 kilometres. It originates in the north of the 
Bayankala Mountains in Qinghai Province, flows through nine provinces and 
autonomous regions and eventually empties into the Bohai Sea in Shandong 
Province (China Internet Information Centre 2002). 
China is vulnerable to land degradation due to its climate and geography (Li et al. 
1997). In particular, China's unique topography with two thirds of its total 
territory being mountainous terrain also makes China more vulnerable to land 
and water degradation processes (Huang 2000). 
1.3 Land and Water Resource Degradation 
As land use change in North West Provinces of China will have an impact on 
land and water resources in North China, land and water resource degradation is 
discussed here with a focus on this region. In this section, an overview of land 
and water resource degradation in China is provided. This will be followed by a 
detailed discussion of the biophysical settings and major resource degradation 
issues in North China. 
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1.3 .1 Overview of Land and Water Resource Degradation 
According to the World Bank (2001), land degradation m China can be 
categorised into three main types: soil erosion, desertification, and salinisation. 
Using the percentage of eroded land to the total land area as a measure of the 
extent of the land erosion problem, China is one of the most seriously soil-eroded 
countries in the world (Huang 2000). The existing area of soil erosion 1 in China 
is 367 million hectares, accounting for about 38.2 per cent of the national 
territory. This is more than three times higher than the average for the world of 
about 12.3 per cent (Huang 2000). Most of the soil erosion problems in China 
occur in four regions: the Loess Plateau, the Red Soils area in Southwest, the 
North China Plain, and the Northwest Grasslands. Together these regions cover 
70 per cent of China's land area (Huang 2000). About 45.4 million hectares of 
cropland are eroded. This is 25 per cent of the total eroded area and nearly 50 per 
cent of total cropland (Huang 2000). 
Among these eroded lands, water erosion affects 179 million hectares. About 
half of the nation's water eroded land is located in the Extended Loess Plateau 
(Huang 2000). Elsewhere, water erosion is taking place on marginal cultivated 
land and 'barren lands' that are not cultivated and have not been allocated for any 
use. According to the World Bank (2001), the total area of land in China 
moderately to severely affected by water erosion increased by an estimated 20 to 
30 per cent over the 20-year period from 1975 to 1996. Water erosion also has 
significant off-site impacts, including reducing the hydraulic capacity of river 
systems. 
The total desertified2 area in China has more than doubled since the 1950s, and 
the rate of desertification had accelerated during both the 1980s and the 1990s 
(Jia 2003). An estimated 331 million hectares - roughly a third of China's total 
area - is prone to desertification. Of this total, desertification is occurring on 
1 Soil erosion is a physical process and refers to the wearing away of the land surface by rainfall, runoff or 
wind as well as to the reduction in soil productivity due to physical loss of topsoil, reduction in rooting 
depth, removal of plant nutrients, and loss of water (Enters 1998). 
2 The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification defines desertification as 'the degradation of 
land in arid, semi-arid, and dry sub-humid areas' and 'a gradual process of soil productivity loss and the 
thinning out of the vegetative cover because fo human activities and climatic variations' (UNCCD 2003). 
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about 262 million hectares, with an annual expansion of 2.46 million hectares 
(ADB 2003). According to the World Bank (2001), China has the highest ratio of 
actual-to-potential desertified land in the world. The two main geographical areas 
where significant desertification is occurring include: a) the agro-pastoral 
transitional zone in northern China; and b) areas surrounding agricultural oases 
on the internally draining river systems of north western China (World Bank 
2001). 
The area of salinised3 land in China is estimated at 82 to 100 million hectares, 
including about seven to eight million hectares of cropland. The area of salinised 
cropland increased by about 10 per cent over the 20-year period ending in 1996 
but the rate declined from 1.1 per cent in the 1970s to 0.65 per cent in the 1980s 
and 0.3 per cent in the 1990s (Huang 2000). Most of the salinised cropland in 
China is located in three geographical regions: the water-scarce and ground water 
irrigated areas in the North China Plain and Northwest Dry Region, the Extended 
Loess Plateau and the Northeast (Huang 2000; World Bank 2001). Farmland 
salinisation can cause significant reductions in farm productivity. Salinisation has 
already become a severe problem in major grain production regions such as 
North China Plain and Northwest China (Rozelle et al 1997). 
In addition, deforestation has exacerbated soil erosion and the loss of biodiversity. 
Deforestation in China is regional and structural. Forestland is divided into two 
categories in China: natural forests and plantation forests. While natural forests 
located in the Northeast and Southwest account for 92 per cent of standing wood 
volume, plantations account for only 10 per cent of standing volume since most 
of them are newly established (World Bank 2002). Although there has been has 
experienced an increase in plantation forests and hence a growth in both forest 
area and forest stock volume by the early 1990's, harvesting of natural forest has 
continued. 
3 Salinisation is the build-up of salt within the soil and is mainly a problem associated with poorly designed 
and/or managed irrigation development in arid and semiarid zones, but it is also a natural phenomenon 
(Huang 2000). 
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China is the third largest timber consumer in the world and faces a widening 
imbalance between supply and demand for wood products. This deficit is being 
made up by imports but still 500,000 hectares of natural forest area are being 
harvested each year (World Bank 2002). Structural change in China's forest 
resources is represented by the decline of the share of mature forests most of 
which are natural forests under the jurisdiction of state owned enterprises (Shi 
and Xu 2000). The loss of protective vegetation through deforestation makes soil 
vulnerable to being eroded by wind and water (UWC 2001). Deforestation leads 
to biodiversity loss by damaging the habitats of animals and plants (IUCN 2004). 
Besides land degradation, problems associated with water resource degradation 
have also increased because of the substantial increase in demand for water 
caused by rapid economic growth. These water use problems include shortages, 
pollution, falling groundwater tables, and flood/drought damages (World Bank 
2001). These problems are particularly acute in northern China, and even more 
so in the catchments of the Huai, Hai, and the Yellow Rivers (World Bank 2001 ). 
1.3.2 Resource Degradation in North China 
North China can be divided into three broad regions: the Upper Reach of the 
Yellow River in North West China; the Middle Reach of the Yellow River where 
the Loess Plateau locates; and the North China Plain (NCP) which is the 
downstream area of the Yellow River. The Yellow River Basin (YRB) sits within 
these three broad regions. 
The Yell ow River Basin 
The Yellow River Basin (YRB) has a total area of almost 800,000 K.M2 and is 
home to 110 million people. If the flood zone in the surrounding lower reach 
were included, the figure would rise to around 190 million people or 15 per cent 
of China's total population (Giordano et al. 2004). 
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Figure 1.1 Map of the Yellow River Basin. 
Yellow 
River 
Source: Adapted from Xu 1999 and Pye 1987 in Hessel 2002. 
500 kilometres 
According to the plan of the Yellow River Conservancy Commission, of the total 
runoff of 58 billion CUBIC METRES per year, 37 billion CUBIC METRES is to 
be used for irrigated agriculture and municipal and industrial purposes, while the 
remaining 21 billion CUBIC METRES is to be used for sediment flushing in the 
lower reach of the Yellow River (Hugo 2000). However, Giordano et al (2004) 
note that over the last 10 years, runoff has averaged less than 50 billion CUBIC 
METRES, sediment loads have been closer to one billion tons, and the Yellow 
River delta is retreating rather than expanding. 
The Upper Reach of the Yell ow River 
The Upper Reach of the Yellow River locates in North West China which 
consists of three provinces - Shaanxi, Gansu and Qinghai - and three 
autonomous regions - Ningxia Hui, Xinjiang Uygur and Tibet. It is far away 
from the sea, has dry weather with moderate precipitation ranging from 300-600 
mm per year (World Bank 1993). In the upper reach of the Yellow River as 
defined in this research which is the section before the river moving northward 
from Lanzhou, relatively low population densities, agricultural development and 
industrialisation limit in situ water usage (Giordano et al. 2004). 
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The northwest provinces in particular have the most severe land and water 
degradation in China. Water shortage, soil erosion and biodiversity loss are 
considered by researchers as well as in policy circles to be major environmental 
concerns in the area (PTFDSSD 2003). An estimated 40 per cent of China is 
affected by moderate to severe erosion, mostly in the north and west (ADB 2003). 
In Qinghai Province alone where the Yellow River originates, the area of water-
induced soil erosion has reached 7 .5 million hectares, accounting for 17 .5 per 
cent of the total erosion area in the Yellow River Basin (Si 2001). Runoff from 
Qinghai province takes up 49.2 per cent of the total water volume of the Yellow 
River. In Maoduo County of Qinghai Province where the Yellow River 
originates, more than 1000 lakes dried out among the total 4077 lakes (Si 2001). 
As a result, the outflow from Qinghai Province decreased by 22.7 per cent and 
the main stream in the source area in Qinghai Province dried out for a period of 
eight months in 1999 (Si 2001; Huo 2000). 
For two decades, the North West has been lagging behind China's coastal regions 
in market-oriented reforms and openness to trade and investment. Ecological 
deterioration in this area has been very severe (PTFDSSD 2003). Altogether, 
Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai and Xinjiang provinces and autonomous 
regions in North West China make up one third of the national territory, yet they 
have a forest cover of only 3.34 per cent of their total land territory, while 
historically forest cover in this area was around 10-20 per cent (PTFDSSD 
2003). Xinjiang, Qinghai and Ningxia in northwest China have the lowest 
percentage of forest coverage in China with 1.57, 2.65 and 4.2 per cent 
respectively (Wang and Pei 2004). About 80 per cent of water erosion and 90 per 
cent of desertification in the country takes place in this area (PTFDSSD 2003). 
The annual sandstorms originating in west China are increasingly impacting 
neighbouring and more distant states. 
The Loess Plateau Region 
Loess is defined as a terrestrial windblown silt deposit that forms in semi-arid 
continental climates (Hessel 2002). The Loess Plateau lies in the central west of 
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China, in the middle reaches of the Yellow River (see Figure 1.2). It has an arid 
to semi-arid climate and covers large parts of the Gansu, Ningxia, Shaanxi and 
Shanxi provinces. Having an area of 667,000 KM2, it is a heavily dissected 
landscape consisting of unique loess hills, sand-loess hills and loess tableland, 
with many gullies (Mc Vicar et al. 2002). 
Figure 1.2 Locations of the Loess Plateau and the North China Plain 
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Runoff from the Loess Plateau contributes 24 per cent of the current river 
volume in the Yell ow River. Average annual rainfall ranges from 650 mm (in the 
southeast) to 200 mm (in the northwest), with over 60 per cent of this occurring 
in the summer monsoon season from July to September. As rainfall is low and 
variable, water is the most important factor limiting agricultural production in the 
region. Winter wheat and summer corn are the main crops, with several orchard 
fruits recently becoming increasingly important, and extensive grazing in the 
north west part of the plateau (Mc Vicar et al. 2002). 
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With the low proportion of vegetation cover and intense summer monsoon 
rainfall, soil erosion has become a severe problem on the Loess Plateau. The 
Chinese Academy of Sciences estimated that a total of 2.2 billion tons of topsoil 
are washed away every year on the Loess Plateau, with 70 per cent flowing into 
the Yellow River (Huang 2000). This equals to an average of 1.6 billion tons of 
sediment being carried each year by the Yellow River in recent decades. The 
Loess Plateau is the source of about 90 per cent of all the sediment that enters 
into the Yellow River (Hessel 2002). Sediment concentrations in runoff on the 
Loess Plateau are over 1000 grams per litre (Hessel 2002). Of the total sediment, 
only about 25 per cent is carried through to the sea, and the remainder is 
deposited in the river bed and flood plains (Girodano et al. 2004). 
The North China Plain 
The North China Plain (NCP) is the downstream area of the Yellow River (see 
Figure 1.2). It is one of the greatest plains in China, comprising the alluvial 
plains of the Yellow, Huai and Hai Rivers. It includes five provinces - Hebei, 
Henan, Shandong, Anhui and Jiangsu - and two major cities - Beijing and 
Tianjin. It is a low-lying area of 303,585 KM2, supporting a population of over 
300 million. Annual precipitation in the region ranges from 550 to 650 mm, of 
which 50-75 per cent falls between July and September (McVicar et al. 2002). 
Some of the most fertile and densely populated lands in China are in the lower 
reach of the Yellow River, mainly in Henan and Shandong Provinces (World 
Bank 1993). An annual double-cropping system is based on winter wheat and 
summer com, with other summer crops including millet, soybeans, sorghum, 
peanuts, cotton and several other non-grain crops. Small plots of intensively 
managed market garden vegetables are grown throughout the year (Mc Vicar et al 
2002). 
Major resource degradation issues in the NCP include severe flooding, water 
shortage, poor water quality and low level of ground water. The flooding threat 
posed by the Yellow River is caused by a major peculiarity: its unparalleled 
sediment content, which has caused rapid sedimentation in its lower course. This 
in tum has led to regular major changes in its course in the past. Continuing 
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sedimentation has raised the river bed to several metres above the surrounding 
landscape, so that breaching of the dikes results in severe flooding (Hessel 2002). 
For instance, the severe soil erosion from the sandy hilly region of the Loess 
Plateau has partly filled the Sanmenxia Dam, a major dam on the Yellow River 
constructed in the 1950s for flood control. The reduced capacity of the 
Sanmenxia Dam has meant that the dam gates are opened in times of flood. The 
opening of the dam gates impacts downstream on the North China Plain, where 
the Yellow River bed in parts is 10 meters above the surrounding plain, due to 
the high sediment load carried by the Yell ow River (Mc Vicar et al 2002). 
While the possibility of flooding remains a key issue in the management of the 
YRB, water scarcity especially in the downstream area has become an issue of 
public concern in recent years (Zhu et al 2004). Large amounts of water are 
extracted from the river for irrigation. Yellow River 'dry-out' has become more 
and more severe since the 1990s (Huo 2000). In 1997, more than 90 per cent of 
the lower reach of the Yellow River with a total length of 704 kilometres stopped 
water flow and there were 226 days without water flowing into the sea (Huo 
2000). In addition, with reservoirs in the downstream area filling up with silt, 
water is less well regulated, which results in reduced water being available for 
irrigation. As a consequence, downstream agriculture and ecosystems suffer from 
water shortages. 
As the rainfall is low and variable, agricultural productivity is low without 
irrigation. With no reliable surface water for irrigation, groundwater is used. This 
has, in tum, caused groundwater levels in the region to fall. Water supply for big 
cities like Beijing and Tianjin and for industries is also very limited (World Bank 
1993). The average water resource per capita and per area is about 14 per cent of 
the average for China and the amount of groundwater available for irrigation is 
decreasing (McVicar et al. 2002). Moreover, low discharge in the Yellow River, 
combined with increased pollution loads, has resulted in a poor water quality 
(Giordano et al 2004). Degradation of water quality has severe consequences for 
the ecology of the Yell ow River delta and the coastal and marine environments 
of the Bo Hai Sea as well as their commercial fisheries (Giordano et al 2004). 
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Historically, floods played an important function in controlling the ecology of the 
Yell ow River delta as well as the wetlands along the river's banks. The natural 
wetlands in the lower reach of the Yellow River support a rich array of aquatic 
species, provide habitats for migrating birds, and serve as the basis for 
economically valuable industries such as fisheries. Giordano et al (2004) argued 
that due to the success of flood control, this natural function of floods has come 
to an end. Reduced river flow and the resultant lack of sediment output has 
caused a retreat of the shore-line, saltwater intrusion, and increased salinity in the 
Bo Hai sea estuary further impacting fish production. 
1.3 .3 Consequence of Land and Water Degradation 
Land and water resource degradation has not only had the on-site effect of 
reduced farmland productivity, but also off-site effects. These off-site effects 
include flooding of lowland agricultural lands, siltation of irrigation systems, 
diminished storage capacity and damage to physical plant in hydroelectric power 
generation schemes, increasingly frequent sandstorm events with decreasing air 
quality, water quality deterioration affecting drinking water supplies and the 
productivity of inland and coastal fisheries (Mahendrarajah et al 1999: 180). 
Land and water resource degradation has the potential to slow economic 
development. It has been estimated that reduced grain yield due to nutrient loss 
was at 5 per cent per annum for the period 1976-89. This is equivalent to 6 
million tons of grain with a value of $700 million (Huang and Rozelle 1995). 
Floods in the lower reaches of the rivers have brought severe destruction to 
farmlands and cities, threatening the lives of thousands of people and causing 
billions of dollars of damage (World Bank 1993). It has been estimated that 
major floods on the Yellow River could threaten the lives of 90 million people 
(Giordano et al. 2004). In the North China Plain, for instance, efforts in fighting 
floods have been made by building up the levees which have to be raised every 
10 years at a cost of about $2 billion each time and have to be maintained every 
year at a cost of $70 million (World Bank 1993). 
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Most provinces in China have been affected by land degradation, with an annual 
national soil loss estimated at 5 billion tons (ADB 2003). A wide area is affected 
by dust storms, including Beijing, where the nearest shifting dunes are less than 
100 kilometres away. Sand invasion and dune movement have buried some 
670,000 hectares of arable land and 2.35 million hectares of range land and 
steppe areas (ADB 2003). About 15 to 20 per cent of fauna and flora species in 
the upper reach of the Yellow River are being threatened by the deteriorating 
environment (Si 2001). In addition, poor degraded areas are also characterised by 
severe health impacts in terms of malnutrition, disease resulting from poor water 
quality and respiratory diseases from dust and other contaminants (Berry 2003). 
As Table 1.5 indicates, total direct costs of land degradation at the national level 
are estimated at US$ 7.7 billion per year in 1999, or 4 per cent of GDP, while 
indirect costs are around US$ 31 billion a year (Berry 2003). 
Table 1.5 Economic Costs of Land Degradation 
Direct 
Indirect 
Breakdown 
Water Erosion 
Wind 
Salinisation 
Sand Storms 
Source: Berry 2003. 
Economic Cost (US$ billion) 
7.738 
30.952 
4.8 
0.43 
2.24 
0.16 
1.4 Government Response: the New Land Use Policy 
Although China has experienced strong economic growth in recent years, this 
growth is coupled with the growing intensity of environmental degradation. Land 
degradation and ecosystem malfunction are among the numerous environmental 
problems that China is now facing. The Chinese Government has indicated an 
awareness of the resource degradation issue and has announced a shift in its 
policy emphasis to long term development (PRC 1994). 
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1.4.1 Overall Policy Framework 
Since the 1980s, the Chinese Government has considered two policies, family 
planning and environmental protection, to be fundamental to its modernisation 
process. Environmental protection has been included in annual and medium-term 
plans for national economic and social development. The Government has 
formulated and implemented a series of laws and policies concerning 
environmental protection. This is especially the case after the United Nations 
Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED), held in 1992, when 
the China Agenda 21 was drafted and approved by the Chinese Government. The 
China Agenda 21 states that the Government will aim to coordinate the 
relationships between economic and social development, resource utilisation and 
environmental protection (PRC 1994). 
According to China Agenda 21, the sustainable utilisation of resources and 
preserving a healthy environment are to be major components of China's 
sustainable development strategies (PRC 1994). It states that 'the country is 
obliged to shoulder the following obligations: protect all life supporting systems; 
protect the integrity of ecological systems and biodiversity; address major 
ecological issues such as soil erosion and desertification; protect natural 
resources; maintain sustainable supply capabilities; reduce damage to fragile 
ecological systems; extend forest coverage; improve urban and rural 
environmental conditions; prevent and control environmental damage and 
pollution; reclaim and restore damaged and polluted environments; take an active 
part in international cooperation in the fields of environmental and ecological 
protection' (PRC 1994). Sustainable land use management thus can be seen as a 
vehicle to achieve the strategy of sustainable utilisation of resources and 
preserving a healthy environment. 
1.4.2 The Legal and Regulatory Settings 
China has established a basic regulatory framework for environmental protection. 
Political and institutional mechanisms for addressing the interrelated 
environmental, social and economic problems have been constituted. By the time 
China Agenda 21 was approved in 1994, four environmental laws, eight resource 
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management laws, more than 20 administrative regulations on the environment 
and resource management and more than 260 environmental standards had been 
established, to form the basis of the legal system for environmental and resource 
protection (PRC 1994). 
Some of the laws and regulations were reviewed and amended in 1998 to adapt 
to the changing conditions caused by rapid economic and social development and 
also to comply with the ecological orientation of the Government's new 
undertakings. New laws have been adopted. In August 2002, the National 
People's Congress adopted the Rural Land Contracting Law. Under the new law, 
rural households' land use rights and their rights to transfer, exchange, and assign 
their land use rights to other households are reiterated (Rural Development 
Institute 2002). The Government has indicated that full consideration will be 
given to the environmental consequences of China's entry into the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) when new laws and regulations are enacted. In addition, the 
Environment and Resources Protection Committee of the National People's 
Congress has been formulating a new law on the comprehensive utilisation of 
natural resources (China Daily 2000). 
Laws and regulations related to land use management and environmental 
protection in China include the Land Administration Law, the Land Management 
Law, the Forestry Law, the Grassland Law, the Water Law, the Water and Soil 
Conservation Law, the Desertification Control Law, and a suite of relevant 
regulations such as the Regulation on the Implementation of the Land 
Management Law, the Regulation on the Protection of Basic Farmland, the 
Regulation on the Rehabilitation of Land, the Provisional Regulation on Land 
Appreciation Tax, and Measures for Management of the Construction-used Land, 
etc. Moreover, illegal land use was included in the revised Criminal Law of the 
People's Republic of China. In addition, related local laws and regulations have 
been enacted by local governments accordingly. Land management monitoring 
and inspection systems have been gradually established and completed, thus 
bringing land management onto the realm of legal administration (China Internet 
Information Centre 2002a). All of these efforts are intended to provide a 
powerful and legal guarantee for the strengthening of land management, the 
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protection of cropland as well as ensuring the rational utilisation of land 
resources. 
1.4.3 Major Strategies and Policies 
Since the China Agenda 21 was adopted in 1994, the establishment of the 
market-based natural resource management system has become a maJor 
government policy orientation. In addition, major strategies and policies for 
sustainable land use management in China include some key ecological policy 
programs implemented in the late 1990s. These include the Great West 
Development Program, the Natural Forest Protection Program (NFPP) and the 
Conversion of Cropland to Forests and Grasslands Program (CCFGP). Both the 
NFPP and the CCFGP were incorporated into the Great West Development 
Program. These new ecological undertakings were mainly driven by the 1998 
Yangtze River flooding and the 1997 Yellow River dry-out. These events 
heightened public awareness of the severity of the ecological degradation in 
China and its potential environmental and economic consequences (World Bank 
2001). These policies and strategies are outlined below. 
Market-based Natural Resource Management Systems 
In China, natural resources belong to the state. Confusion between the ownership 
and the use rights of these resources and a lack of clear guidelines defining the 
economic relations between the central government, the local government and 
various economic entities have resulted in the inefficient allocation and use of 
natural resources (PRC 1994). In order to accelerate the establishment of a 
market-based natural resource management system, the Government has taken 
actions to achieve the following objectives (PRC 1994): 
a. To establish and clearly define the property rights for natural resources and to 
ensure the transferability of the rights; 
b. To identify the roles to be played by the central government, enterprises and 
individuals with respect to the ownership, obligations and rights over the use 
of natural resources; 
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c. To introduce a market mechanism for the use and allocation of natural 
resources which would follow the 'user pays' principle to facilitate the 
efficient use of natural resources in favour of the environment; 
d. To improve the existing legal and management system based on the 
principles of a market economy; 
e. To apply economic instruments and market incentives as an important 
supplement to legislation, and to ensure appropriate government intervention 
in case of market failure and price distortions. 
The Great West Development Program 
Since the mid 1990s, the development of China's western provinces has been a 
priority of the national development strategy (Liu et al 2001). The ecological 
system in this area has been deteriorating (see Section 1.3.2 for a detailed 
discussion), and this highlights the urgency for an environment-friendly 
development program. 
Through the Great West Development Program, the sustainable development 
concept was introduced into the rural development. The main policy options of 
the program focus on: (1) poverty alleviation through the promotion of local 
sector development; (2) sustainable management of natural resources, including 
the control of environmental degradation; and (3) provision of an improved 
infrastructure and local institutional capacities, including the capacity for dealing 
with natural and social vulnerabilities. Protecting vegetation of pastoral land in 
the up-reaches of the Yellow River and Yangtze River has also become a key 
issue (Liu et al 2001 ). 
The Natural Forest Protection Program (NFPP) 
The NFPP was initiated in 1998 to counter the impacts of deforestation. The 
program featured a logging ban on the 30.38 million hectares of currently 
existing natural forest area in the upper reaches of the Yangtze and upper and 
middle reaches of the Yellow River. For the 30.38 million hectares of planted 
forest and unplanted forestland in that region, the government adopted a policy 
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of 'closing mountains' or 'complete stoppage' of logging activities. For degraded 
lands in regions that are appropriate for afforestation, trees and grasses will be 
planted. For other state-owned forest regions, the policy has been lightened to a 
logging reduction. 
Measures to counteract the economic and social problems resulting from the 
logging ban include reassignment of forestry workers; provision of central 
government subsidies to local governments whose revenues have been impacted; 
tax reductions and subsidies to forest enterprises for reorientation of activities; 
and basic living allowances for laid-off workers (CCICED 2002). 
1.4.4 New Land Use Policy - CCFGP 
Designed specifically to bring soil erosion and frequent flooding under further 
control, the Chinese Government initiated a new land use policy in 1999 started 
on a pilot basis. The Conversion of Cropland to Forest and Grassland Program 
(CCFGP), also known as the Grain for Green Program and the Sloping Land 
Conversion Program, was originally designed to return cropland of over 25 
degrees to forests and grasslands along the Upper Reaches of the Yangtze River 
and the Upper and Middle Reaches of the Yellow River (SFA and SDPC 2000). 
It was implemented to combat deforestation and degradation of grassland which 
is considered by the scientific community as well as those in policy circles to be 
the main immediate bio-physical cause of the increased frequency of flooding 
and serious sandstorms experienced in the 1990s (PTFDSSD 2003). Specifically, 
the planting of annual crops and the grazing of livestock on devegetated lands 
with a slope of over 25 degrees has caused accelerating rates of soil erosion. 
China has 6.067 million hectares of steep sloping croplands of over 25 degrees, 
with over 70 per cent of this located in the Yangtze River and Yellow River 
Basins in the West (SFA 2000). This is found to be the main source of about two 
billion tons of silt being released into the Yangtze and Yell ow Rivers annually 
(SFA 2003). 
In addition to erosion control and watershed protection goals, the CCFGP has 
other targets: forest ecosystem services and timber value provision, forest 
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rehabilitation and landscape restoration (SFA 2003). The Program was first 
initiated in the western Shaanxi, Sichuan and Gansu Provinces on a pilot basis in 
1999. When the CCFGP was formally launched in 2002, its scope was expanded 
to more than 2000 counties across 25 provinces and autonomous regions to cover 
four types of land: land that has severe water-induced soil erosion; steep slope 
land where degradation threatens the condition of rivers; lands where 
desertification threatens; and land that is of ecological significance yet with low 
grain yield (State Council 2002). It also calls for the simultaneous afforestation/ 
greening of barren mountains and lands. 
For the planned retired area, 75 per cent is slated for 'ecological forests' for 
ecological protection purposes, while 25 per cent for 'economic forests' which 
refer to orchard crops or trees with medicinal value (SFA 2003). The definition 
of forestry plantings as either for commercial or for ecological protection 
purposes are set out in the Technical Measures of the Conversion of Cropland to 
Forest and Grassland Programme (SFA 2001). The definition primarily rests on 
differences in planting densities in different areas. Tree species used for 
ecological plantings may also yield commercial gain in order to increase the 
income available to farmers. However, the density of plantings necessary to 
qualify for ecological purposes is higher than commercial densities. 
The main feature of the CCFGP is that the Chinese Government provides free 
grain and cash payments for participating farmers in exchange for their changed 
land use practices. The annual grain payment made to participants in the Yangtze 
River Basin and other southern regions is 150 kg per annum per mu of converted 
land. In the northern regions and in the Yellow River Basin, the payment 
amounts to 100 kg per annum per mu. This regional differentiation was based on 
estimates of regional grain yields to reflect opportunity costs from foregone 
agricultural production. The amount of the cash payment is 20 yuan per annum 
per mu of cropland converted. In addition to cash and grain subsidies, farmers 
who convert their farm back to trees or grassland cover are also provided with 
free seeds and saplings for reforestation activities (CCICED 2002). 
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The duration of payments made under the Program is limited. The payment of 
grain and cash for the conversion of cropland to grassland is made for two years 
whilst for the conversion of cropland to forests comprising commercial species 
the period of payment is five years, and where forest plantings are defined as 
being for ecological benefit, payments will be made for eight years. Funds for the 
CCFGP are provided by the Central Government (State Council 2002). In 
addition to the grain and cash subsidies, participating farmers are provided with 
other incentives in terms of the assignment of related use rights. Farmers who 
plant trees or grass under the CCFGP hold the property rights to the trees or grass. 
The duration of the tenure extends to 70 years (State Council 2002). Furthermore, 
the use rights associated with CCFGP plantings can be inherited and/ or 
transferred. At the end of the 70 years, the farmer has the option of continuing 
the contract over the land. As an additional incentive, all income derived from 
the forests and grasslands planted as part of the CCFGP is to be exempted from 
taxation (SFA 2003). 
Although China has long made efforts in water and soil conservation, the 
CCFGP is a major initiative to integrate water and soil conservation with 
agricultural restructuring, poverty reduction, and sustainable development. It is 
the largest land retirement program in the developing world (Bennett 2006). The 
implementation plan of the CCFGP stipulates that retirement of cropland is to 
take place until 2010, with the subsidy period extending to 2017 (SFA 2003). 
Under the CCFGP, the SFA plans to convert around 14.67 million hectares of 
fragile cropland to forests, 4.4 million of which will be land with slopes of 25 
degrees or above. It also plans to afforest a roughly equal area of wasteland by 
2010 (SFA 2003). Total area for conversion is about equal between the two 
watersheds of the Yangtze River and the Yellow River. 
As such, the CCFGP involves millions of small landholders and includes a broad 
set of government agencies and a great diversity of land-use types. It has enrolled 
15 million farm households in just the first five years (Bennett et al 2004), and it 
has been estimated that upon completion it will affect 40-60 million rural 
households (Uchida et al 2004). It will represent an almost 10 per cent increase 
in current national forest area upon successful completion (Hyde et al 2003). The 
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Program has a total budget of CNY 337 billion, of which around CNY 50 billion 
has been spent by the end of 2003 (Bennett 2006). By the end of 2003, almost 
7 .2 million hectares of land have been converted under the Program, indicating 
that already half of its goals have been met. Moreover, about 4.92 million 
hectares of barren land had been afforested under the Program by 2003 (Xu et al 
2004a). 
The CCFGP is essentially a public payment scheme for environmental services 
from private farmlands (CCICED 2002). As the duration for the payment period 
is limited, it is anticipated that farmers will be able to gain economic benefits 
from timber and other forest products as well as grazing industry in the long run 
from converted land. It is also anticipated that the development of local 
enterprises and off-farm employment induced by the agricultural restructuring 
under the CCFGP will be able to sustain converting farmers' livelihood and the 
local economy. 
1.5 Conclusion 
Land use represents a critical intersection of the economy and the environment. 
Although China has experienced rapid economic growth in the past two decades, 
the evidence shows that land degradation is serious and appears to be worsening. 
The Chinese Government has recognised that land degradation and the 
consequential environmental degradation will be an obstacle to the country's 
further economic development. To address this issue, the Government has 
prioritised sustainable natural resource management and rural development in its 
policy agenda, and has initiated a number of key ecological programs in the late 
1990s to help protect the fragile natural environment and reduce rural poverty. 
The CCFGP is a land use policy being implemented to tackle land and water 
degradation and bring soil erosion under control. However, the long-term 
sustainability of the Program is in doubt once the government stops its 
subsidisation. There are also a number of unresolved issues associated with this 
government initiative that threatens its on-going viability. These will be further 
discussed in the following chapter. If these unresolved issues are not addressed, 
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the effectiveness of the Program may be undermined and sustainable land use 
management may not be achieved. A comprehensive assessment of the economic 
implications of the Program would provide a better basis for decision-making 
and the further improvement of policy. 
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Chapter2 
Towards Sustainable Land Use Management 
2.1 Introduction 
Land degradation has become an issue of concern not only to the Chinese 
government but also to the broader Chinese and international communities. Even 
though the Chinese Government has allocated substantial resources to 
'ecological construction' work in recent years, the effectiveness of the work is at 
question. This is because a lot of such work places more emphasis on treating the 
symptoms rather than addressing the underlying social and economic causes of 
land degradation. This weakens the effectiveness of the implementation of the 
ecological programs (World Bank 2001). 
The fundamental causes of land degradation in China share common 
characteristics with many other countries. Research work has demonstrated that 
besides increasing demand for food and associated pressure on agricultural land, 
agricultural price policies, imperfect markets, government intervention and even 
macroeconomic mismanagement intensify land degradation (Mahendrarajah et al 
1999: 6; Groom et al 2006). In many parts of the world, incomplete or unclear 
property rights and the breakdown of authority to ensure compliance with those 
rights may be the basic cause of land and resource degradation (Mahendrarajah et 
al 1999: 6; Groom et al 2006). 
Land and water resource degradation undermines the provision of environmental 
goods and services yielded by these resources. Very often these environmental 
goods and services are public goods where property rights do not exist or are not 
clearly defined. There are missing or incomplete markets to allocate them 
efficiently. In these circumstances, government intervention is called for to 
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correct market failure and ensure the socially desired amount of environmental 
goods and services. The initiation of the CCFGP is an example of government 
intervention through public policy. As outlined in the previous chapter, under the 
scheme, the Chinese Government subsidises farmers to provide environmental 
services desired by the wider community. 
In this chapter, a need to justify the government intervention in China's land use 
management is discussed based on economic theories. In the next section, the 
main theoretical issues in environmental and natural resource management are 
outlined. These include the argument of market failure as a general justification 
for government intervention and the more recent property rights and transaction 
costs approach embedded in the Coase Theorem. Section 2.3 examines the 
causes of land degradation in China in the light of property rights and transaction 
costs implications and the context in which the CCFGP was implemented. In 
Section 2.4, the need to justify government intervention through the CCFGP is 
discussed, and the efficiency criterion for such justification is presented. This is 
followed by a literature review of CCFGP studies in Section 2.5 based on which 
the unresolved policy issues are identified. Consequently, research issues that 
will be addressed by this thesis are put forward in Section 2.6. This chapter 
concludes with Section 2.7. 
2.2 Theoretical Issues in Natural Resource Management 
Environmental and natural resource problems can be viewed as externalities 
where costs are not borne by the producer, or as an issue arising from competing 
demands for the use of resources. Different perspectives have different 
implications for policy prescriptions. While the market failure paradigm seems 
entrenched in the conventional wisdom of the economics discipline, the property 
rights and transaction costs approach embedded in the Coase Theorem has 
gained more recognition since 1960 (Randall 1983). Underpinning these different 
perceptions of environmental and natural resource problems is the concept of the 
fundamental institutions of property rights. 
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2.2.1 Property Rights 
Institutions, according to North, are 'the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction' 
(1990: 3). They structure incentives in human exchange. Institutions can be both 
formal - such as laws and regulations - and informal - such as conventions and 
codes of conduct (North 1990: 3-6). The rules that govern human interactions 
over scarce resources include property rights, rules of inheritance and rules of 
exchange, and norms of good behaviour or politeness (Wills 1997: 20-1 ). 
Property rights are fundamental institutions. They originate from the desire to 
avoid wasteful contests between would-be users when assets are scarce. They not 
only minimise conflicts over assets, but also affect incentives to protect or 
maintain or produce scarce assets (Wills 1997: 21-2). More importantly, property 
rights give the property owner the control of a benefit stream (Bromley 1991: 15). 
The ownership of property can be characterised as 'the right to possess, the right 
to use, the right to manage, the right to the income, the right to the capital, the 
right to security, transmissibility, absence of term, the prohibition of harmful use, 
liability to execution, and the right to residuary character' (Honore 1961: 113-28). 
It is considered that the more complete is the presence of these characteristics, 
the more thorough a right can be regarded as one's ownership of something 
valuable (Bromley 1989: 190). 
Different property regimes create different incentives for resource use. Bromley 
(1991: 21-31) defined four types of property rights regimes: state-property 
regimes; common-property regimes where the property is jointly owned and 
managed by a specified group of co-owners with specific rules to govern the use 
of the property; open access in which no one owns or exercises control over the 
resources; and lastly private property regime. 
Cheung (1970) defines non-attenuated rights as being exclusive, transferable, 
enforceable and in no way inconsistent with the marginal conditions for Pareto 
optimality. A well-defined property right that embodies these characteristics is 
considered to produce efficient resource allocations in a well-functioning market 
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economy (Bromley 1991: 14-39). It will give the owner of the resource the 
incentive to put the resource into its best use. For instance, land is a productive 
asset of economic and political significance. The advantage that flows from the 
ability to exclude others from a piece of land reveals the importance of the 
structure of its property institutions (Bromley 1989: 190). Farmers who own the 
land have an incentive to manage the land in a way that the resulting increased 
production raises income level. Further, when the property rights to land are 
exchanged in the market, this exchange facilitates efficiency by ensuring that 
land is employed in the use that generates the highest marginal value. It is 
important to note that the viability of any property regime depends on 
compliance which is protected and reinforced by an authority system. If this 
authority would not be exercised, state property, common property and private 
property would degenerate into open access (Bromley 1991: 27-8). 
Even though private ownership provides an incentive for sustainable resource use, 
it may be inappropriate for certain kinds of resources where the cost of 
establishing and enforcing private property arrangements are too high (Randall 
1983). According to Randall (1983), the high exclusion costs might not always 
be caused by large numbers, but rather are usually attributable to peculiarities in 
the physical nature of the resource itself, notably non-excludability. For instance, 
the costs of specifying and enforcing exclusive property rights in individual units 
of ambient air and water are prohibitive, in that they exceed the anticipated gains 
from market deals. 
In addition, Wills (1997: 69-70) argued that for property rights to be meaningful, 
it must be possible to identify the owner and users of an asset, to measure asset 
use, and to enforce penalties on illegitimate users. Hence the costs of specifying 
property rights include physical exclusion measure, monitoring of use and 
penalising of unauthorised users. It is partly the result of limitations of the 
current science and technology, which make it costly to identify and measure 
resources, resource use and consequent impacts on others (Wills 1997: 61-78). 
With high transaction costs involved, it will not be efficient to have exclusive 
property rights over some of the resources. 
34 
2.2.2 The Market Failure Paradigm 
The market failure approach pervades economic discussions of environmental 
and natural resource management and the concept has been presented as a 
general justification for government intervention (Freeman et al 1973; Dorfman 
and Dorfman 1977; Davis and Kamien 1970). Based on this approach, 
environmental problems are perceived as an outcome of the nonexclusiveness 
and non-rivalry nature of the environmental goods and services. With a lack of 
well-defined and clearly established property rights, these goods and services are 
often termed as 'externalities' or 'public goods', even though rigorous definitions 
of the concepts are not readily available in the literature and the imprecision and 
confusion caused by the terms have been documented (Buchanan and 
Stubblebine 1962; Demsetz 1967; Randall 1983). 
Classic economic theory suggests that the public good nature of the 
environmental goods and services makes it impossible for them to be handled 
properly by a pure market system of economic organisation. First, the 
nonexclusiveness characteristic prevents the creation of property rights in such 
assets because of the potential high transaction costs involved. Without property 
rights, market transactions could not proceed. Second, these public good 
resources are indivisible when one person's consumption does not diminish the 
amount available for others. Once the resource is provided, even those who fail 
to pay for it cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits it confers. Putting it 
another way, public goods will not be supplied voluntarily at optimal levels 
because of the presence of free riding associated with positive externalities. Each 
person is able to become a free rider on the other's contribution without having 
to pay for the goods or services. This tends to diminish private individuals' 
incentives to contribute, and even if they do, the contributions are not sufficiently 
large to finance the efficient amount of the public good. 
In the absence of markets for public goods, there is no feedback and control 
mechanism to inform and motivate individuals to take account of all of the 
effects of their actions on others, and hence externalities arise. An externality is 
said to occur when parties to market transactions fail to take into account the 
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effects of their actions on third parties who bear costs for which they are not 
compensated or reap benefits for which they do not pay (Anderson 2004a). 
Externalities takes various forms - external economies and diseconomies, 
divergences between marginal social and marginal private cost, spill-over and 
neighbourhood effects, and collective or public goods, and the concept has been 
central to the neo-classical critique of market organisation (Buchanan and 
Stubblebine 1962). 
With externalities, market demand and supply curves no longer reflect all the 
benefits and costs of consumption and production, and hence inefficiency results. 
For instance, the environmental goods and services derived from land 
improvements are public goods that are not being traded through markets, and so 
will not have market price. In such circumstances, the positive externalities 
generated from the environmental services cannot be internalised through market 
mechanism. In other words, there is a lack of reward associated with these 
positive externalities. Private sector producers (landowners who undertake land 
improvements) will not supply public goods to people because they cannot be 
sure of making an economic profit. Price signals fail to reflect true social benefits 
of these positive externalities, and the market fails to supply the socially desired 
amount of the environmental services. 
Because optimal social outcomes will not result from purely uncoordinated 
individual decision-making, in many cases governments step in to correct market 
failures and provide direct incentives for the provision of public goods. Without 
government intervention, these environmental goods and services are always 
under supplied. Following the treatment of Pigou, the policy prescription for 
inefficient market transaction and natural resource misallocation is to regulate the 
quantity produced, to tax transactions, to subsidise production, to have the 
government take over production, or some combination of all four (Meade 1952; 
Bator 1958). However, it has been shown that it seems too simple a notion to 
deal with the resource allocation effects of divergences between marginal social 
and private costs by imposing a tax or granting a subsidy equal to the difference 
(Coase 1960; Davis and Whinston 1962; Buchanan and Stubblebine 1962). The 
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core of the argument against market failure approach is derived from the study of 
transactions. 
2.2.3 The Property Rights and Transaction Costs Approach 
The property rights and transaction costs approach developed mainly after 
Coase's 1960 article on The Problem of Social Cost. In his article, Coase 
demonstrates that demanders competing for scarce resources will be able to 
resolve their competing demand through voluntary bargaining or contracting if 
property rights are well-specified and transaction costs are sufficient low. Coase 
emphasised that because one use precludes the other, social costs are reciprocal. 
How the rights are assigned will affect who bears the costs, and depending on 
transaction costs, may affect resource allocation and consequently, wealth 
distribution. 
One implication of the Coase Theorem is that the problem of social costs is best 
characterised in terms of competing uses for resources for which property rights 
are not clear (Anderson 2004a). It also helps to analyse how transaction costs 
determine the initial distribution of rights or how contracting costs will affect the 
final allocation of resources. As Coase (1960) recognised, transaction costs such 
as the costs of defining, enforcing and exchanging property rights are not 
necessarily low. As a result, efficient market exchanges will not always be 
forthcoming. As such, the conditions for a bargaining solution to break down are 
identified, allowing for the design of better institutions that determine resource 
allocation. 
Following Coase, other economists have also challenged the notion of market 
failure and externalities (Cheung 1970 and 1973; Dahlman 1979; Randall 1983; 
Anderson 2004a and 2004b). Randall (1983) argued that public goods are an 
incoherent classification for public policy purposes, and called for more precise 
terminology based on notions of nonexclusiveness and non-rivalry. He pointed 
out that the rejection of the market failure approach has led to the use of the 
paradigm toward 'a sharper, more precise and more sophisticated analysis'. 
According to Randall (1983), the non-rivalry related concept refers to 
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fundamental physical characteristics of certain kind of resources, and the 
possibility exists that government, by direct provision, may outperform the 
market. The nonexclusiveness concept represents the interaction of institutional 
and technological factors. A structure of laws and institutions is required to 
establish and enforce exclusive property rights over these resources, but the 
effectiveness of enforcement depends on the available technology of exclusion 
and the costs of implementing that technology relative to the gains from trade 
thereby permitted. 
Demsetz (1967) also recognised the importance of transaction costs in policy 
analysis. He argued that every cost and benefit associated with social 
interdependencies is a potential externality, and the cost of transaction is the 
condition that is necessary to make costs and benefits externalities. In other 
words, the cost of transaction in the rights between the parties (internalisation) 
must exceed the gains from internalisation. 
More recently, Anderson (2004a) argued that asserting an externality implicitly 
assumes a set of property rights and hence a distribution of the social costs, but it 
is precisely a lack of property rights that allows decision makers to ignore social 
costs. These assertions beg the question of how rights are formed, whether those 
rights can be defended, and whether they can be exchanged in voluntary 
transaction, all centring around transaction costs yet being overlooked by the 
externality concept. In addition, by assuming a set of property rights, the 
externality approach overlooks the cause of natural resource misallocation in the 
first place, which is the lack of fully specified enforceable and transferable 
property rights. 
Anderson (2004a) goes further to point out that 'the externality claim makes it 
appear that rights exist but are not enforced or that rights should be 
redistributed. It might be that reallocating the rights will ultimately lower 
transaction costs, but the reallocation itself is a farm of rent seeking, the cost of 
which must be subtracted from any transaction cost savings'. The implication 
that rights cannot be specified and that bargaining will fail 'runs the risk of 
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replacing the tragedy of the commons with the tragedy of rent seeking inherent in 
regulation and taxation' (Anderson 2004a). 
To tackle the problem associated with the market failure approach, the Coasean 
property rights-transaction costs paradigm, which focuses on the lack of property 
rights as the cause of conflict, has been called for (Cheung 1970 and 1973; 
Dahlman 1979; Randall 1983; Anderson 2004a and 2004b). Anderson (2004a 
and 2004b) advocated viewing land conservation and natural resource 
management through 'Coase-colored glasses' and suggested that the crucial 
questions of natural resource and environmental management are who has what 
property rights and transaction costs. By doing so, attention could be better 
focused on how property rights evolve as a result of changing resource demands 
and new technologies, how they influence transaction costs inherent in 
alternative sets of rights, and how those transaction costs affect the potential for 
bargaining to minimise social cost. 
2.2.4 Justification of Government Intervention 
With the property rights and transaction costs approach, there are two 
fundamental aspects that are related to government intervention. First, 
government intervention is essentially a reallocation of resources in terms of 
their property rights structures, and it is subject to the rent-seeking behaviour 
which is one form of government failure. Secondly, justification of government 
intervention should be made on the basis of the magnitude of transaction costs 
arising from the modification of the institutional arrangements under the new 
policy regime. 
Environmental problems can be seen as problems of conflicting rights claims or 
as results of failures of coordination between people in their use of natural 
resources (Bromley 1991: 3; Wills 1997: 14). Public policy is essentially 
concerned with 'modifying the institutional arrangements that situate individual 
economic agents in the larger economic structure' (Bromley 1991: 14). 
Institutional arrangements are continually established (and redefined) in order to 
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determine (and to modify) the scope and nature of the property regime over 
natural resources (Bromley 1991: 22). 
With environmental problems normally characterised by the open access regimes 
governing the natural resource use, the necessary precondition for any successful 
policy prescription is that the property regime be converted away from open 
access (Bromley 1991: 33). Further, when such a process is attempted, the design 
of the change process must take into account both the physical environment and 
the existing socio-cultural systems (Bromley 1991: 33). In some cases a state 
property regime has been introduced to address the resource degradation problem. 
This is evidenced by the rise of governmental authority over the last few decades 
in developing countries for the management of local natural resources through 
central regulatory policies, new legal frameworks, project financing and direct 
administration (Bromley 1991: 34 ). 
Even though governments have an advantage in social coordination in the sense 
that it can coerce contributions from people who would not contribute voluntarily, 
the coercive power of government planning can also be a weakness. Due to 
limited budgets for scientific research and for monitoring and policing of 
resource use, planers often rely on information supplied by interest groups. 
Interest groups can distort values and technical information supplied to planners 
in attempts to get property rights and other rules changed in their favour (Wills 
1997: 104-5). In addition, planners are likely to pursue their own interests 
especially when their rights and responsibilities are not precisely defined and 
enforced. The rent-seeking behaviour of interest groups as well as the principal-
agent problem may lead to environmental problems under central planning (Wills 
1997: 103-9). In some cases, government intervention may even compete with 
private decision-making, which severely undermines the goal of central planning. 
Whether government intervention has resulted in effective natural resource 
management needs to be analysed case by case, in particular taking into account 
transaction costs involved. Institutional arrangements provide the structure for 
exchange and have implications for the performance of economies. North uses 
the theory of human behaviour, combined with the transaction cost theory of 
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exchange and a theory of production to analyse the role of institutions in the 
performance of economies (1990: 27). Based on his analysis, institutions affect 
the performance of the economy by their effect on the costs of exchange and 
production. In other words, the existence and nature of institutions determine the 
transaction and production costs that make up total costs. Specifically, the total 
costs of production consist of the resource inputs involved both in transforming 
the physical attributes of a good and in transacting - defining, protecting and 
enforcing the property rights to goods (North 1990: 27-8). 
Moreover, government intervention will incur agency costs. The role of the 
government is just like the manager of a firm. According to Coase (1937) and 
Cheung (1983), within a firm, owners delegate authority to make production and 
marketing decisions to managers. This entails costs of measuring and monitoring 
the agent to ensure that he is abiding by the contract and making allocation 
decisions that maximise the net value of the output. Following further 
discussions by Cheung (1983), the agency costs rise as the costs of discovering 
prices fall until the point that the marginal gains from saving on price discovery 
costs in market transactions exceed the agency costs of delegation with the firm. 
This implies that government intervention will outperform market transactions 
until transaction costs associated with it exceed transactions costs in the market 
transactions setting, which include costs associated free-riding problems, price 
discovery of environmental goods and services, measuring and monitoring 
actions, and so on. 
With positive transaction costs, resource allocations are altered by property rights 
structures (Coase 1960). As public policy is in essence to redefine institutional 
arrangements and to modify the scope and nature of the property regime over 
natural resources, it is important to take into consideration the magnitude of 
transaction costs associated with the policy change to justify its efficiency in 
resource allocation. In other words, if transaction costs in the market transactions 
setting are low, gains from trade will be possible and markets will result in 
contracts to resolve conflicting uses. In this case, government intervention will 
not be necessary. In contrast, if transaction costs are prohibitive so that markets 
are said to fail (market failure in the under-supply of socially desired amounts of 
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goods and services), then government intervention may be justified (Anderson 
2004b). 
2.3 Causes for Land Degradation 
In this section, the property rights and transaction costs approach is used to 
analyse the fundamental causes for land degradation in China and to explain the 
lack of environmental goods and services provided by land conservation 
activities in China. Land conservation aims at providing many different goods 
and services and has opportunity costs to the extent that their production 
precludes other production from the land (Anderson 2004b ). As long as property 
rights to land are well-defined, enforced, and transferable and the transaction 
costs low, the owner will sell the land to the user who values it most highly. 
However, if the property rights are not well-specified or the transaction costs are 
too high, contracting between the landowner and the demander will not be 
possible. 
2.3.1 Incomplete Land Tenure Definition in China 
The ownership of the land and other natural resources in China has always 
resided with the State or collectives on behalf of the local governments as 
stipulated in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC 1982). 
They are therefore, state-property rights regimes. Under a state-property rights 
regime, ownership and control over use rest with the state. The state may directly 
manage and control the use of natural resources through government agencies, or 
lease the natural resource to groups or individuals who are thus given usufruct 
rights for a specified period of time. State-property rights regimes normally 
remove most managerial discretion from the user, and generally convey no long-
term expectations in terms of tenure security (Bromley 1991: 23). 
This property rights regime has contributed to land degradation in China. 
Property institutions in China have been through two stages since the founding of 
New China in 1949. Before the late 1970s, land in China was owned by the state 
and the collectives and was managed as a production factor under the centrally 
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planned economy. Since 1978, China has gradually moved its policy orientation 
toward what it terms a 'socialist market economy'. This mixes strong 
government intervention with some autonomous price formation in commodity 
markets (USDA 2002). A second stage of property institution evolution was 
marked by the introduction of the Household Responsibility System (HRS) in 
1978. This rural economic land reform featured the decollectivisation of 
communal land and its redistribution among households depending on their 
family size or a combination of family size and labour (Huang 2000). Even under 
the HRS, agricultural land still belonged to rural collectives, and hence, the State. 
Individual farm households do not have the legal titles to the land but instead 
have only the right to cultivate parts of the land under lease. 
Under the planned economy before 1978, the institutional arrangement of 
agricultural collectivisation was adopted to achieve grain self-sufficiency m 
order to support the development of heavy industries. 'People's communes' were 
established with the goal of maximising the productivity of rural resources to 
support industrialisation. Farmers were organised to carry out large-scale 
agricultural production according to production plans set by the Central 
Government. Featuring a high degree of unified management with little 
individual decision-making power and the egalitarian distribution of collective 
income, collectivisation had an adverse effect on farmers' incentives to be 
productive (Lin and Zhang 1998; Brown and Chen 1999). Land productivity was 
further undermined by the state-monopolised procurement and marketing system 
(SMPMS), which featured low prices of grain and oil and the monopoly purchase 
of these products by the government (Lin and Zhang 1998). The lack of private 
property rights over land and the lack of rights to make production choices 
caused disincentives for farmers to use land resources in efficient ways. On the 
contrary, farmers overused land resources for short-term benefits. In addition, the 
centralised decision making took little notice of local resource constraints (Lin 
and Zhang 1998). These factors led to the unsustainable use of natural resources 
and hence land degradation. 
Since the late 1970s, China has changed from a planned and essentially state-
driven economy to a more market oriented, demand-driven economy. The HRS 
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introduced in 1978 brought about fundamental changes towards more 
decentralised decision-making. The HRS for land is a village-based communal 
land tenure system, in which farmers are assigned land use rights instead of 
rights to the land asset itself. For forestland and grassland, trees that farmers 
grow and Ii vestock raised on the grassland belong to individual household (Shi 
and Xu 2000; Banks et al 2003). Land is owned by the collectives rather than 
individual farmers. Farm households now constitute the basic production units 
and they are responsible for individual profits and losses (Brown and Chen 1999). 
Even though the HRS has generated incentives for production by giving farmers 
freedom of decision-making and linking rewards closely with their performance, 
there are limitations and weaknesses inherent in the system. 
First, the frequent redistribution of land due to the changes of family size and the 
'sovereign risks' arising from occupation of farmland for urbanisation or other 
development purposes is a fundamental problem (Chen and Davis 1998). 
Because of this insecure land tenure, farmers worry about the risk of losing their 
land and hence their investment. Therefore, they have little incentive to 
undertake land conservation or to invest in agricultural infrastructure. Instead, 
they tend to over exploit the soil to pursue short-term returns. As Bromley (1991: 
10) explains, in the absence of consistent and coherent institutional arrangements, 
resource use is reduced to first come, first served. Secondly, farmers' land use 
rights are insufficient. Their rights are weakened by the State procurement 
system and distorted prices. In return for the land allocation, farmers are 
obligated to deliver a grain quota that is bought by the state grain bureau at prices 
determined by the government in order to maintain self-sufficiency. Livestock, 
vegetable, and fruit producers may pay cash instead of delivering a quota (USDA 
2002). Thirdly, in some cases farmers are prohibited from transferring their land 
use rights (Chen and Davis 1998). As a result of the ill-defined and poorly 
enforced land use rights, farmers' incentives to take care of their land are 
weakened. 
Recognising the incomplete land tenure issue, the Chinese Government adopted 
a new land use law, namely the Rural Land Contracting Law, which was 
approved by the National People's Congress in August 2002. The new law 
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reaffirms that farmers are entitled to 30-year rights to use the land. For forestland, 
the contracting term is 30 - 70 years and can be extended for special tree species. 
Under the new law, land readjustments according to changes in family size or 
other reasons are prohibited. Farm households are entitled to transfer, exchange, 
and assign their land use rights to other households (Rural Development Institute 
2002). 
However, whether the problems experienced because of incomplete land tenure 
that China has experienced in the past two decades will be fully addressed by the 
new land use law is still uncertain. Unless a clearly defined land tenure 
arrangement is made available, farmers will continue to have limited incentive to 
manage their land resources in a sustainable manner. Land resources will 
continue to be over used for short-term benefits and investment in the long-term 
sustainable use of the resources will be inadequate. Effective land use 
management is in that case unlikely to be achieved and land degradation is likely 
to remain an ongoing problem. 
2.3.2 The Transaction Costs Issue 
The lack of land conservation activities to provide environmental goods and 
services in China may be due to the high transaction costs that are potentially 
involved. Transaction costs for land conservation include costs of charging 
demanders of land conservation for the services they enjoy, the costs of 
negotiating deals for producing conservation amenities, and the costs of renting, 
leasing, or otherwise obtaining partial rights to land for producing conservation 
amenities (Anderson 2004b ). Because the parties are likely to have different 
objective functions, each will have to spend time and effort specifying and 
monitoring the terms of agreement. As Anderson (2004b) argues, so long as the 
willingness to pay for environmental goods and services exceeds the opportunity 
costs of the inputs for the provision of these goods and services from land 
conservation activities, gains from trade will follow provided that 'the 
transaction costs do not create a free-rider problem on the demand side or 
measurement, monitoring, and agglomeration problems associated with input 
use on the supply side'. 
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As in many other countries, the cost of charging beneficiaries who enJOY 
improved environmental services in China is often prohibitive so that the free-
riding problem makes it impossible to raise sufficient funds through voluntary 
transactions to pay the landowner to provide environmental goods and services 
(Chen 2002). Secondly, the fragmented landownership in China makes the 
transaction costs too high for a person or group trying to aggregate many small 
parcels into one that is large enough to produce the desired environmental goods 
and services. Thirdly, the transaction costs of the market transactions are 
associated with the contract between the producer and consumer of the 
environmental goods and services. On one hand, producers of environmental 
goods and services must be able to assess the willingness of conservationists to 
pay for a particular amenity. On the other hand, the producers must be able to 
exclude non-paying free riders from enjoying the amenity. Due to these high 
potential transaction costs, the market for environmental goods and services in 
China has not yet been fully developed. 
2.3.3 Government Failure 
Government failure is another reason for land degradation in China. Despite the 
complex system of legislative and policy tools already in place, compliance with 
environmental and natural resources management regulations remains low in 
China (WRI 1998). According to the report of the World Resources Institute 
(1998), the Government revised its criminal code to punish violations against the 
environment and natural resource use as part of its effort to strengthen 
environmental law enforcement. This has provided law enforcement agencies 
with some power. However, the vagueness of standard in many laws and 
regulations, coupled with the lack of a comprehensive enforcement regime has 
led to a situation where many environmental and natural resources laws still 
reflect deals cut between different sectors. 
Loopholes m existing laws and regulations allow malpractice and 
mismanagement to thrive. For instance, according to China's Constitution, 
farmers collectively own the farmland. The government is authorised to use the 
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land for the sake of the public interest. However, the current Land Management 
Law fails to define what constitutes the 'public interest'. Furthermore, there is no 
strict stipulation on how to secure farmers' interests when land transfers occur. 
Thus, with 'public interest projects' as their excuse, local governments tend to 
take land from farmers at very low prices and then transfer them for commercial 
use in order to make profits. Excessive occupation of farmland has already 
become a major concern of the Chinese Government in its land use management 
policy (China Daily 2004 ). 
The lack of coordination among sectoral policies also contributes to land 
degradation in China. The land use and natural resource management agenda is 
complex. In China, natural resources have been managed by many different 
departments, according to specific environmental elements. Policy making, 
implementation, and coordination related to natural resource management and 
conservation has become the mandate of a range of different departments. The 
major land and natural resource management agencies include the Ministry of 
Land and Resources, the Ministry of Agriculture, the State Forestry 
Administration, and the Ministry of Water Resources. It is common for different 
sectors to have sector-specific initiatives in their development strategies. 
Sometimes policies are not able to complement each other and there are overlaps, 
gaps and even contradictions. The lack of coordination among sectoral policies 
and the failure to maximise synergies and adjudicate disputes regarding the work 
of different agencies have adversely affected sustainable natural resources 
management. 
2.4 Justification of CCFGP 
2.4.1 A need for A Justification of CCFGP 
Even though government intervention offers the possibility of realizing 
efficiency gains, it would be wrong to conclude that all government intervention 
in the functioning of a market economy is either desirable or effective. It is 
crucial to find out all about the benefits and costs (including transaction costs) of 
government decisions to justify government intervention. 
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Command and control instruments have played a key role in land use and natural 
resources management in China. The Chinese Government has allocated 
substantial resources to the implementation of ecological programs in recent 
years. However, the performance of these programs on the ground proves that 
they have not been effective in achieving environmental objectives. This is 
because in most cases these policy instruments have failed to provide an 
incentive framework to encourage sustainable management of natural resources. 
Moreover, pricing of natural resources at levels below marginal costs has 
resulted in destruction and waste and malpractice in managing natural resources 
(World Bank 2001). Growing public deficits and increasing frustration with 
governmental inefficiencies have called for a justification of these ecological 
programs. 
The CCFGP is essentially a government initiative to provide environmental 
services to the Chinese community, with the aim of setting up an incentive 
mechanism for farmers to provide environmental services in their land use 
management. Farmers are paid through public finance to convert their farmlands 
to forests and grasslands. All tax-payers are made to fund public good provision 
to overcome the free rider problem. The lack of clearly defined and well enforced 
property rights over the land in China as well as the potential high transaction 
costs associated with the provision of environmental goods and services through 
land conservation activities in China could possibly justify government 
intervention through the implementation of the CCFGP. However, the 
government intervention has its own transaction costs, which in essence are 
parallel to those of the market transactions. To decide whether the CCFGP will 
outperform market transactions, an efficiency analysis of the new land use policy 
needs to be conducted that takes into account transaction costs associated with 
the policy. 
From the property rights and transaction costs perspectives, the CCFGP has 
modified the property rights structures by introducing a state property regime 
over the environmental public goods. Through the CCFGP, the government 
contracts with land owners for land use. Transaction costs associated with this 
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institutional change involve information costs, contracting costs and enforcement 
and monitoring costs for the implementation of the Program. The CCFGP will 
outperform market transactions until transaction costs associated with it exceed 
transactions costs in the market transactions setting, provided all the other 
benefits and costs associated with the two scenarios are the same. 
Further, to justify the implementation of the CCFGP, a number of questions need 
to be answered. For instance, is the government producing what the communities 
want under the CCFGP? Is the government producing at minimum cost? Is the 
government able to collect sufficient revenues from beneficiaries to cover the 
costs of production? Is there a potential to introduce a market-based approach in 
the implementation of the CCFGP? A cost benefit analysis, based on the criteria 
of economic efficiency, is therefore needed to find out all about these 
information to justify government intervention through the implementation of the 
CCFGP. 
2.4.2 Efficiency Goals of Public Policy 
The success of government intervention depends on its efficiency - a basic 
concept of welfare economics that relates to problems of resource allocation 
(Perman et al 2003:105). 
An allocation is efficient when the net social benefits are maximised and there is 
no way to rearrange that allocation to increase the net benefit. The ethical basis 
for this efficiency is derived from the concept of Pareto efficiency (Perman et al 
2003: 107). Pareto efficiency, defined as 'a state from which it is impossible to 
make one person better off without making another person worse off' (Just, 
Hueth and Schmitz 1982: 16), is the concept and a principle for choices. Here 
'better off' represents an increase in utility, while 'worse off' represents an 
increase in disutility. Pareto efficiency describes the state when all possibilities 
for increasing welfare are exhausted, and such a state is the goal of improving 
economic welfare of a society (Sinden and Thampapillai 1995: 15-6). 
Government policies and strategies should therefore be designed to drive towards 
the goal of Pareto efficiency. 
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However, Pareto efficiency is a state, which in reality can hardly be achieved. 
Therefore, the concept of Pareto improvement had been introduced as the 
associated principle for choice. A Pareto improvement in welfare would occur if 
at least one person is made better off and no one is made worse off by a given 
change in economic conditions (Perkins 1994: 50). An alternative which leads to 
this change is therefore a desirable alternative. However, the practical use of such 
actual Pareto improvement is restricted, as alternatives are likely to disadvantage 
at least one person. To deal with such a limitation to the criterion of Pareto 
improvement, the principle had been modified. The concept of potential Pareto 
improvement, or the compensation principle, had been introduced by Kaldor and 
Hicks. According to Kaldor and Hicks, a change in the allocation of resources 
could potentially improve the economic welfare of the society so long as gainers 
could compensate the losers while still remaining to be better off - irrespective 
of whether or not losers are really compensated (Perkins 1994: 10). Therefore, 
potential Pareto improvement becomes the practical principle for choice, and is 
the justification for choosing policies whose benefits outweigh their costs. If 
government policies and strategies bring in more benefits than costs, they are 
said to improve the economic welfare of the society. This is the fundamental 
underpinning for cost benefit analysis. The potential Pareto improvement 
provides the rationale for choosing policies, strategies and projects whose 
benefits outweigh their costs, even if the people who gain from a project are not 
the same as those who pay for it. 
Even though cost benefit analysis (CBA) provides useful guidance in choosing 
policies, it does not dictate choices. This is because in many cases, policies are 
not based solely or even primarily on the efficiency criterion. Decision makers 
may have other objectives besides economic efficiency such as equity 
considerations, intergenerational effects, the sustainability of resource systems, 
or social risk aversion (Freeman 2003: 10). Also, policy choices are likely to 
involve comparisons and tradeoffs among variables for which there is no 
agreement about commensurate values. Therefore, cost benefit analysis should 
be regarded as a tool for organising and expressing certain kinds of information 
on the range of alternative courses of action. It reduces complex clusters of 
50 
effects and phenomena to single-valued commensurate magnitudes (Freeman 
2003: 12). 
2.5 Unresolved Issues for the CCFGP 
A cost benefit analysis is needed to achieve an improved understanding of the 
overall social impact of the CCFGP and the viability of the continuation of the 
Program. Although the CCFGP offers the possibility of realising efficiency gains 
by eliminating situations of market failure where environmental goods and 
services are underprovided, there are a number of unresolved issues associated 
with the implementation of the CCFGP. These issues focus on the sustainability, 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the Program. The sustainability issue 
involved is whether the CCFGP will result in improvements to the livelihoods of 
the farmers involved. If farmer livelihoods are reduced as a result of land use 
changes, then once the payments of grain and cash cease it could be expected 
that farmers will revert to their prior land use practices. The efficiency of the 
Program concerns if it will bring net social benefit to the society, and it concerns 
the sustainability of the Program from a societal perspective. If the Program 
brings about an improvement in social welfare, there is the possibility for the 
welfare to be redistributed to compensate the farmers for their economic loss. 
Hence the incentives structure can be instituted to encourage participating 
farmers to continue the Program. The cost-effectiveness of the Program concerns 
if the Program's benefits are achieved at the lowest costs. 
A number of studies have focused on the financial impact of the CCFGP on the 
livelihoods of participating farmers to tackle the sustainability issue. Several 
views have emerged from these studies. Some studies found that the CCFGP has 
caused a direct increase in rural household revenue through the subsidy paid and 
the transition of surplus rural labour to off-farm jobs (Li et al 2004; China 
FEDRC 2003/4). Uchida et al (2004) examined the effect of CCFGP on the 
welfare of rural households through a survey of 360 farm households in Sichuan, 
Shaanxi and Gansu Provinces. They found that although poor households were 
not disproportionately targeted, they had benefited from the Program. The study 
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also found that the Program had increased the asset holdings of all participating 
households. 
Other studies argued that the CCFGP will lower farmers' income and they may 
reconvert the land back to cultivation after the Program ends. For instance, Hou 
et al (2002) argued that the CCFGP will decrease farmers' self-sufficiency in 
food, lower their incomes and cause tax revenue reductions for local government. 
Xu et al (2003) and Feng (2002) argued that participating farmers will not be 
able to generate the anticipated revenue because they lack the necessary skills 
and are farming in areas where the natural conditions are not conductive to this 
type of land use. In addition, compared to cropping, participants will face 
increased market and natural environmental risk. Based on information gathered 
from a household survey of Program participants in Ningxia Autonomous region 
and Guizhou Province, Uchida et al (2005) recorded positive findings for the 
current levels of income and for the plots being targeted. However, they 
recognized that their investigation of sustainability hinged on whether these 
higher income levels can be maintained after the subsidies end. 
In addition, some studies have demonstrated that the program impact on 
household per capita income to be insignificant. Wang et al (2003a) argued that 
the CCFGP has positive effects on the animal and poultry husbandry industries 
but has negative effects on the crop sector. Overall the CCFGP is seen to benefit 
the structure of the agricultural sector, but provides no significant effect on 
participating households' total income. Similarly, Xu et al (2003) demonstrated 
that the Program neither increased general income of farm households nor 
improved the structure of income sources. Zhang (2004) argued that the CCFGP 
has an insignificant direct influence on agricultural production and farmers' 
incomes, but it expands the space and time for farmers to engage in other 
economic activities. 
Some studies have examined the cost-effectiveness of the CCFGP. Xu et al 
(2003) demonstrated that the targeting of the Program was reasonable but that its 
cost effectiveness was less than satisfactory. The over-expansion of the program 
at too fast a pace could also reduce the effectiveness of plot targeting, and 
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exacerbate existing problems with the program. Uchida et al (2005) argued that 
while the Program has made a clear attempt to retire plots that are susceptible to 
soil erosion, there is room for better targeting. They also made a preliminary 
comparison between the CCFGP and the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) 
of the United States in terms of program cost-effectiveness. Under the CRP, 
annual rental payments are given to farmers for voluntary retirement of cropland. 
The motivation behind the CRP, which were flooding and dust storms in the 
1920s and 1930s, has certain parallels with the situation of China (Heimlich et al 
2003). Between 1999 and 2001, the land area under the CCFGP is 15 per cent of 
the CRP, yet the annual outlay for the compensation payments is nearly 70 per 
cent of the annual expenditure for the CRP (Uchida et al 2005). 
There are also a number of studies focusing on problems associated with the 
CCFGP implementation and design. For instance, Zuo (2001) and Xu and Cao 
(2001) provide evidence of significant shortfalls in subsidies actually delivered 
due to poor administrative budgeting, high transaction costs associated with 
monitoring and inspection, rent-seeking behaviour of local governments, and the 
neglect of the volunteerism principle of the Program. The volunteerism principle 
of the Program has been neglected due to rent seeking behaviour of local 
governments by increasing their land conversion quotas, either through direct 
negotiation with central government, or by overreaching their quotas and then 
bargaining for more subsidies (Xu et al 2005; Bennett 2006). Thus many 
households have been enrolled in the program against their own will. Further, Xu 
et al (2005) suggested the decision to continue or decelerate the Program be 
made on the assessments of whether the Program is meeting its environmental 
and poverty alleviation goals. 
No firm conclusions about the sustainability and efficiency of the CCFGP can be 
drawn from the above findings. This is because previous studies have not taken 
account of the overall impact of the Program on social welfare and the time span 
for the evaluation has been limited to the first few years of program 
implementation. A lack of knowledge about the welfare impact of the Program 
results in some questions being unanswered. For instance, farmers' Ii velihoods 
can be affected either directly through the grain and cash payments and the 
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change of household revenue structure from agricultural restructuring under the 
CCFGP, or indirectly through the redistribution of social wealth generated from 
the new land use policy. Without knowing the change in social welfare brought 
about by the CCFGP, it is hard to judge whether the possibility for such 
redistribution exists. 
Whether the CCFGP will be sustainable and efficient depends on the balance of 
the social benefits and costs of the Program. In other words, it is crucial to find 
out the potential of the CCFGP to provide improvements in net social well being 
for those people directly involved in its application and for the broader Chinese 
community. Without a full cost-benefit analysis, whether the CCFGP will 
generate socially desirable and economically efficient trajectories of resource 
uses and transformations remains unknown. The possibility of adjusting the 
CCFGP to increase the net social benefit associated with the Program also 
remains largely unexplored. 
2.6 Thesis Research Issues 
2.6.1 Key Issues 
A cost benefit analysis will be conducted in this research to justify the 
government intervention through the implementation of the CCFGP, which is the 
key research issue of this thesis. Whether the Program will bring about efficiency 
gain to the Chinese community will be investigated through its impact both on-
site and off-site in North China. All related costs and benefits associated with the 
policy change will be included in the CBA to the most possible extent. 
With detailed information on the costs and benefits of the Program over a 20-
year time frame, the other related policy issues will also be investigated. These 
focus on the sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the Program. The incentive 
structure facing the farmers living upstream who are directly involved in the 
CCFGP will be assessed through the impact analysis of the Program on their 
livelihood. This will provide an indication of the sustainability of the Program 
especially when the government funding stops. Incentives of the potential 
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beneficiaries living downstream to keep the environmental improvement 
sustainable will also be considered through the estimation of the Program's 
environmental benefits. While those on-site benefits are reaped by the local 
people, most of whom are participating farmers of the Program, the beneficiaries 
of the off-site environmental benefits are mainly non-participants. This has 
implications for the redistribution of the social welfare associated with the 
environmental improvement under the Program. An analysis of the Program's 
impact both on-site and off-site has implications for the future finance of the 
Program as well as for linking environmental service provision to potential 
beneficiaries in order to achieve the cost-effectiveness of the Program. 
Whether the environmental service market will emerge depends on the value of 
the conservation (willingness to pay and other market values) relative to the 
value of land in alternative uses and on the transaction costs. With these 
information available from a CBA, the introduction of market-based instruments 
in the implementation of the CCFGP will be briefly explored in this thesis. With 
the CCFGP, the public goods are currently provided collectively by the 
government and then financed through taxation of individual households and 
businesses. However, it is believed that such fiscal arrangements have a number 
of shortcomings, namely high transaction cost, low efficiency in fund use and 
ambiguity in target beneficiaries. For instance, this command and control 
approach results in a lack of linkage between tax-payers and the beneficiaries of 
the program-targeted environmental services. Because of the weaknesses of the 
public payment scheme, efforts have been made at the international level to 
explore market-based instruments to internalise the externalities of the 
environmental services. Bio-prospecting and carbon trading are examples of 
market-based instruments at the global scale. 
Theoretically such a market-based compensation scheme would require clearly 
defined tenure for the forest and grasslands, measurable benefits of the 
environmental services that the forest and grasslands provide, and low 
transaction costs. This implies a relatively well-developed market infrastructure 
as the basis for such transactions. Studies in this area have been scant in China 
largely because of a lack of information on the demand of environmental services 
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from the Chinese community. With information on the environmental benefits 
derived from the Program available, the establishment of market for 
environmental services provided by the CCFGP can be further explored. These 
policy alternatives will be examined and compared by taking into consideration 
the transaction costs induced by different institutional settings. 
2.6.2 Challenges for the CBA 
A cost benefit analysis is complex, particularly because of the difficulties in 
estimating the expected benefits of the CCFGP given that many of them relate to 
environmental improvements. The primary goal of the CCFGP is to rehabilitate 
degraded land through water and soil conservation activities, specifically by 
increasing vegetation cover in the marginal cropland and also on barren lands. 
Therefore, the biophysical changes brought about by the CCFGP and its 
associated values will be an important and integrated element of a social cost 
benefit analysis of the CCFGP. However, there are a number of challenges 
associated with estimating the potential environmental benefits of the CCFGP. 
First, the linkages between cultivation of sloping and fragile land and the 
consequent environmental damage are not clear-cut, nor that afforesting such 
areas will be the most effective means for environmental improvements. Xu et al 
(2005) further argue that ecological risks are very likely to arise for program 
covered area. According to them, most of the area covered by the Program in 
North West China is arid or semi-arid land suitable only for grass or shrub 
plantation. Timber tree plantation would hamper the water conservation function 
of soil or even lead to further land desertification because timber trees need much 
more water than grass or shrub. Adding to this argument, the low survival rates 
for program-planted trees found in the SFA's 2003 household survey suggest that 
achieving the stated environmental goals of the CCFGP might be difficult. 
Second, the extent of the biophysical change derived from the CCFGP is 
uncertain due to a lack of formal monitoring and evaluation system to determine 
if the Program's basic environmental objectives are being met. The evaluation 
regime predominantly focuses on the direct indicators of implementation such as 
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area retired, number of trees planted, survival rates, and whether or not funds 
have been disbursed. It fails to look at the broader picture of the degree to which 
the Program is achieving its environmental goals (Zuo 2001). This is further 
complicated by the difficulty in identifying the marginal impact due to the 
CCFGP as many other ecological programs are being undertaken at the same 
time or prior to the CCFGP in the same region, such as the Natural Forest 
Protection Program and other watershed management programs. 
Third, the biophysical changes arising from the CCFGP have both market and 
non-market values. While the market values can be inferred from market 
transactions, magnitude of the non-market value that the Chinese people put on 
the biophysical changes is unknown. 
Studies on the environmental services provided by the CCFGP are scant. As 
mentioned earlier, several authors argued that the environmental goals of the 
CCFGP can hardly be met because of problems with program design and 
implementation, low survival rate of trees and a lack of technical support. In 
assessing the cost effectiveness of the CCFGP, Uchida et al (2005) looked at the 
environmental benefits of the Program and weighed the environmental benefits 
against the opportunity costs of converting the cropland, based on which 
conclusions are drawn that program targeting is unsatisfactory. However, they 
took an approach that used the steepness of slopes as a proxy to value the 
environmental benefits of the Program. 
Groom et al (2006) looked at the potential environmental outcomes of the 
CCFGP from the perspective of off-farm labour responses to the Program. They 
argue that environmental externalities can arise from inefficient allocation of 
land and labour, especially in developing countries. By controlling for household 
heterogeneity, their results show that the CCFGP induces participating 
households to reallocate a substantial amount of labour towards off-farm 
employment and participation in the Program reduces households' exposure to 
market failures and institutional constraints. Conclusions are drawn that 
households are enabled through participation in the Program to access income 
enhancing opportunities off-farm and the incentives for environmentally harmful 
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allocation choices are removed (Groom et al 2006). The study does not, however, 
attempt to predict the environmental consequences of the Program nor estimate 
the values so arising. 
There have also been several case studies carried out by the Forest and Grassland 
Task Force of the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment 
and Development (CCICED) to evaluate the ecological impact of the CCFGP. 
However, most of these reports involved only qualitative descriptions of the 
ecological impact and many of the projections of these impacts are poorly 
justified (Ge et al 2001; Shen et al 2001; Du and Guo 2001; Li et al 2001; Zhao 
2001). 
An important component of this thesis, therefore, is to take up the challenge and 
provide an environmental valuation of the CCFGP. First, the biophysical changes 
induced by the land use change under the CCFGP in the North West Provinces of 
China will be projected. Projections are made on the assumption that the 
implementation plan of the CCFGP will be fully achieved. This assumption can 
be justified on the ground that the aim of the research is to provide an estimation 
of the potential environmental benefits achieved under the CCFGP scenario. 
Second, the benefits and costs associated with the projected biophysical changes 
will be identified and valued. The potential environmental benefits will form 
component of the anticipated social welfare change from the CCFGP. 
2. 7 Conclusion 
Land and water degradation threatens the long-term economic growth and 
sustainable development of the Chinese society. A number of government 
policies have been promulgated to achieve sustainable land use management 
especially in ecologically fragile areas in the western part of China. However, the 
policy objectives will not be achieved if the fundamental causes of land 
degradation are not fully addressed. Comprehensive studies are required to assess 
the implementation of these government policies. 
The CCFGP ts a major government initiative recently taken to improve 
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sustainable land use management in China. Once government intervention is 
justified conceptually, the key public policy issue is to find whether the CCFGP 
specifically improves the social welfare of the Chinese community. This can be 
determined through a cost benefit analysis of the Program. 
A cost benefit analysis involves an overall assessment of the welfare changes 
associated with a policy or project. Changes brought about by the CCFGP may 
include several aspects, such as biophysical changes, social changes in factors 
such as employment and environmental awareness, and economic changes at 
various levels. In this thesis, the new land use policy is assessed and justified by 
testing the overarching hypothesis: The CCFGP improves the social welfare of 
people in North China. The results of the cost benefit analysis used to test this 
hypothesis will provide indicators of the appropriate direction for natural 
resource management policy change. The overarching hypothesis will be further 
broken down into several sub-hypotheses to examine different components of the 
social welfare change of the Program. Developing and testing each of the sub-
hypotheses forms the following chapters of this research thesis. In the next 
chapter, these hypotheses will be outlined, together with the methodologies used 
to test these hypotheses. 
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Chapter3 
Research Hypotheses and Methodologies 
3.1 Introduction 
Land use change induced by the CCFGP in North West China has both on-site 
and off-site impacts. The social welfare change brought about by the CCFGP has 
two main components. First, the CCFGP changes the land use pattern in the 
North West Provinces, which in tum has an impact on the social welfare of local 
farmers. This on-site effect of the CCFGP will be assessed using market data. 
Second, the environmental changes arising from the CCFGP have both market 
and non-market values which affect the social welfare of people living both on-
site and off-site. This will be assessed using both market and non-market 
valuation. 
Even though it can be argued that the off-site impacts may extend to southern 
China and even across the national border, in this research the welfare impacts of 
the CCFGP are assessed to include the immediate off-site area which is North 
China. North China is defined as the provinces and autonomous regions along 
the Yellow River. The overarching hypothesis of this research is outlined as 
follows: 
The CCFGP improves the social welfare of people in North China. 
To find out the impacts of the CCFGP on the social welfare of the Chinese 
people, a cost benefit analysis (CBA) will be conducted. This evaluation will 
include the estimation of the off-site environmental and social benefits generated 
by the Program. To address the overarching hypothesis, several sub-hypotheses 
are developed to focus on the economic impacts of the CCFGP on agricultural 
production, the identification of biophysical changes brought about by the 
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CCFGP, and the market and non-market values associated with these biophysical 
changes. 
In this chapter, the research hypotheses that are developed in this thesis together 
with the methodologies adopted to test them are outlined and discussed. These 
form the next section. In Section 3.3, theories of environmental valuation are 
outlined and techniques used to estimate environmental values are reviewed. The 
choice modelling technique which is used to estimate non-market environmental 
values of the CCFGP will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. This chapter 
concludes with Section 3.4. 
3.2 Research Hypotheses and Methodologies 
3.2.1 Welfare Impact on Agricultural Production 
As the impact of land use change under the CCFGP on agricultural production is 
on-site, the geographical boundary to assess the social welfare impact on local 
farmers is set to the Loess Plateau. To enable an examination of the long-term 
sustainability of the CCFGP, the following research hypothesis is developed to 
find out the financial implications of the CCFGP on participating farm 
households and hence the incentive structure for them to adopt the new land use 
practices. 
Hypothesis 1: The CCFGP increases household income for participating 
farmers. 
This hypothesis will be tested by comparing the net profit of participating farm 
households with and without the Program. The before-CCFGP data will be used 
as a proxy for the counterfactual without Program net profit. A timeframe of 20 
years - from the pilot phase of the CCFGP in 1999 to 2018 - is set out in the 
analysis. This timeframe allows the long-term impact of the Program to be fully 
revealed, as alternative livelihood sources developed under the CCFGP will start 
to generate financial returns to participating farmers by the end of the 20 years. 
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Testing this hypothesis will provide a better understanding of the long-term 
impact of the CCFGP on the livelihoods of participating farm households. 
A case study approach will be used to test this hypothesis. Four sample counties 
in the North West Shaanxi and Qinghai Provinces are selected to represent the 
differing biophysical and social conditions existing across the areas on the Loess 
Plateau where the CCFGP has been implemented. A survey questionnaire is 
designed for the study to find out the net incomes generated by land uses before 
and after the implementation of the CCFGP. 
The second hypothesis is developed to assess the social welfare impact of the 
CCFGP on local agricultural production. This involves a partial cost benefit 
analysis that is focused on the well being of the people of the North West 
Provinces. It is an extension of the earlier livelihood analysis and involves the 
calculation of the true costs and benefits of the resource use changes under the 
Program 
Hypothesis 2: The CCFGP has a positive impact on social welfare generated by 
agricultural production on the Loess Plateau. 
To test this hypothesis, the results from the livelihood analysis over the four 
sampled counties are extended to convert the household based information to a 
region wide population basis. To convert the household financial impact analysis 
to an economic impact analysis, shadow prices are used where necessary, 
transaction costs are included and transfer payments excluded, and several 
revenue and costs items are adjusted to reflect the true benefits and costs of the 
resource use. For instance, payments made to farmers under the CCFGP are 
deducted from revenues and instead, counted as a cost of the Program. Once the 
conversion into an economic impact analysis is completed, the counties on the 
Loess Plateau are grouped and the values extrapolated to the regional level. 
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3.2.2 Welfare Impact of Biophysical Changes 
Estimates of the economic values of the biophysical changes under the CCFGP 
are an indispensable part of the CBA and a useful part of the information base 
supporting land use management decisions in China. The CBA to be conducted 
in this research involves information on the biophysical changes arising from the 
CCFGP, the linkages b~tween these biophysical changes and their economic 
values, and the values of these biophysical changes. Value measures must be 
based on knowledge of links between biophysical changes and their impact on 
people. It is therefore important to build up the linkage between biophysical and 
economic models. In this research, bio-economic modelling is used to build up 
such a linkage. Bio-economic models are developed to integrate biophysical 
parameters of the nature with the economic environment faced by agricultural 
producers and downstream users of the environmental goods and services (Enters 
1998). 
The first stage of bio-economic modelling involves the identification and 
· prediction of biophysical changes arising from the CCFGP. The geographical 
boundary needs to be drawn to undertake biophysical modelling. The western 
regions are the origins of the two biggest river systems in China - the Yellow 
River and the Yangtze River, so water and soil conservation in the region is 
especially important. The implementation of the CCFGP in the North West 
Provinces of China aims to tackle the environmental degradation through 
increasing vegetation cover along the Upper and Middle Reaches of the Yellow 
River (SFA and SDPC 2000). Hence, to focus on land use change induced by the 
CCFGP in North West China, this thesis looks into the consequent biophysical 
changes taking place along the Yellow River and their welfare impact on the 
wider area in North China. The following hypothesis is tested to find out the 
biophysical changes. 
Hypothesis 3: The CCFGP brings about biophysical changes to the environment 
of North West China and along the Yellow River. 
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All the changes in environmental and resource service flows have their 
counterparts in changes in the value of the resource-environment system as an 
asset (Freeman 2003: 5). Some of the environmental service flows are linked 
directly or indirectly to markets and hence are responsive to market forces. 
However, many service flows are not properly regulated by markets because of 
externalities, their public good characteristics and other factors (Freeman 2003: 
6). Once the biophysical changes are identified and projected, the potential 
market and non-market values associated with these biophysical changes can be 
established. This will be addressed by Hypothesis 4 and 5. 
Hypothesis 4: There are market benefits and costs associated with the 
biophysical changes arising from the CCFGP. 
Hypothesis 5: There are non-market benefits and costs associated with the 
biophysical changes arising from the CCFGP. 
Different techniques are used to value different types of service flows. The value 
changes that are directly observable from the market place will be estimated 
through market valuation. In contrast, preferences for some significant value 
components associated with the biophysical changes under the CCFGP are not 
revealed directly or indirectly in markets. This is especially true where the non-
use values enjoyed by the wider Chinese community are involved such that the 
demand link is unidentifiable. Non-market valuation techniques will be used to 
estimate these value components. To estimate the non-market values of the 
biophysical changes arising from the CCFGP, Hypothesis 6 is established as 
follows. 
Hypothesis 6: People have a willingness to pay for the biophysical changes 
arising from the CCFGP. 
To address Hypothesis 6, which represents the culmination of the testing of 
Hypothesis 5, the environmental choice behavior of Chinese urban people who 
are the downstream beneficiaries of the environmental improvements arising 
from the land use change on the Loess Plateau under the CCFGP will be modeled. 
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Because the land use changes on the Loess Plateau are predicted to have far-
reaching environmental impacts extending to the coastal area in the east, the 
people considered to be beneficiaries are both on-site and off-site. Downstream 
users and non-users might be able to appreciate the off-site benefits from 
implementing conservation practices upstream and hence have a willingness to 
pay for such benefits. The incentive for the downstream beneficiaries will depend 
on site-specific social, economic and institutional factors (Aylward and Tognetti 
2002). 
Very few studies on non-market valuation of environmental benefits have been 
conducted in the Chinese context. A study conducted by the International 
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) indicates that factors limiting 
willingness to pay for environmental services in China include a low 
environmental awareness, low ability to pay, the lack of a mechanism for 
involving beneficiaries in decisions about payments, and a widespread feeling 
that it is the government's responsibility to look after the environment (Lu et al 
2002). However, it has been acknowledged that the analysis is restricted by a 
lack of written material on the subject (Lu et al 2002). Therefore this research 
will further justify the above mentioned factors that are considered to be the main 
demand constraints for the environmental services in China. 
Because the non-market values encompass both the use and non-use values, the 
choice of evaluation method needs to take into account the aggregation issue. 
The process of putting together categorical estimates (both use and non-use 
values) to arrive at a total economic value (TEV) is subject to misunderstanding 
and debate (Braden and Kolstad 1991: 13). Randall (1991: 303-21) argues that 
either a single value statement encompassing all impact categories must be 
sought or categorical values must be sequenced very carefully, otherwise double 
counting might occur. In general, the only practical approach to composite 
evaluation is the stated preference (SP) technique, which is the easiest way to get 
information that cuts across markets and the only way to elicit nonuse values 
(Braden and Kolstad 1991: 13). In this research, the SP method, in particular the 
Choice modelling approach, is used to model people's willingness to pay for the 
biophysical changes under the CCFGP. After the market and non-market values 
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are estimated separately, the results are integrated to derive the TEV of the 
biophysical changes arising from the CCFGP as a component of a cost benefit 
analysis of the policy. 
As measuring values involves the use of economic theory and technique, both the 
theory and practice of environmental valuation are further discussed in the 
following section. The basic theory of individual preferences which lays the 
foundation for welfare economics, is briefed. This is followed by a description of 
various measures of welfare changes in which justifications are made for the 
selection of compensating surplus as the welfare measure in this research. 
Different types of economic values and various estimation techniques are 
discussed with a particular reference to this research study. 
3.3 Environmental Valuation: theory and practice 
3.3.1 Theory of Individual Preferences 
In welfare economics, measures of values are based on the preferences and 
demand of individuals. The basic theory of individual preferences, also known as 
the principle of consumer sovereignty, suggests that individuals are their own 
best judge of their welfares and that inferences about welfare can be drawn for 
each individual by observing that individual's choices among alternative bundles 
of goods and services (Freeman 2003: 45). Social welfare is a function of the 
aggregation of individual utilities and depends on values that people attach to the 
goods and services that a society provides to them. While increases in 
individuals' utilities are considered benefits, costs take the form of reductions in 
the utility welfare of individuals (Freeman 2003: 43). Hence, the welfare 
measures provide a foundation for the analysis of both the benefits and the costs 
of environmental change. 
The pre-condition for environmental valuation is the assumption that 
environmental services can be treated as arguments in well-behaved utility 
functions (Perman et al 2003: 403). A variety of non-market good and services 
provided by government and the environment should be included in the bundles 
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among which individuals are assumed to have preferences, in addition to all the 
goods and services that can be bought or sold in markets (Freeman 2003: 46). As 
the economic concept of value is anthropocentric, some authors argue that only 
the instrumental value of the environmental goods and services enters into the 
individual utility function through their usefulness to human individuals, whilst 
the intrinsic value of the environmental goods and services is not included in the 
welfare estimation (Hanley and Spash 1993: 121-122; Champ et al 2003: 8-9). 
While this is consistent with economic theory, the anthropocentric definition of 
value can cause different policy prescriptions when considering environmental 
problems such as how to maintain natural capital (Spash and Clayton 1992). On 
the other hand, however, it has been argued that some measures of individuals' 
preferences will capture at least part of intrinsic value, especially in contexts 
where there are either no apparent markets or very imperfect markets (Pearce 
1993: 14-15). 
There are two main properties associated with the ordering of bundles of goods 
and services if individuals are assumed to rank the alternative bundles according 
to their preferences. The first property is nonsatiation, or the 'more-is-better' 
property. The second one is substitutability among the components of bundles, 
which means that if the quantity of one element of a bundle is decreased, it is 
possible to increase the quantity of another element sufficiently to make the 
individual indifferent between the two bundles. The property of substitutability 
establishes trade-off ratios between pairs of goods which in the limit for 
infinitesimally small changes are the marginal rates of substitution between the 
pairs of goods. If these properties hold, the preference ordering can be reflected 
by the following individual utility function: 
U=U(X, Q) (3-1) 
where X is a vector of the quantities of market goods, and Q is a vector of public 
goods and environmental and resource services whose quantities or qualities are 
fixed for the individual (Freeman 2003: 46-47). 
The assumption of individualism and self interest does not preclude altruism or a 
concern on the part of individuals for the well-beings of others. An individual 
may include in his/ her utility function the quantity of the good consumed by 
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another individual. However, the typical practice in applied welfare economics 
has been to assume that interdependence of preferences does not exist (Champ et 
al 2003: 12). 
3.3.2 Measuring Welfare Changes 
The indirect utility function and the minimum expenditure function provide the 
theoretical structure for welfare estimation (Haab and McConnell 2002: 5-6). 
Following equation (3-1 ), the X are assumed available at parametric prices, 
Pi, ... , Pm= P. The individual maximises utility subject to income Y, which leads 
to the indirect utility function: 
V (P, Q, Y) =max {U(X, Q)I P.X~Y} (3-2) 
x 
The minimum expenditure function is derived by assuming that the individual 
minimises total expenditure subject to a constraint on the level of utility attained: 
M (P, Q, U) = min {P.XI U(X, Q)~U} (3-3) 
x 
The solution to the indirect utility function leads to the Marshallian demand 
function. As can be seen in equation (3-2), the Marshallian demand function 
holds income constant and gives the quantity of a good demanded at different 
prices, while allowing utility to vary (Hanley and Spash 1993: 33). For an 
individual, the change in consumer surplus derived from the Marshallian demand 
curve can be treated as a monetary measure of the individual's utility change 
(Perman et al 2003: 403). However, its measure of utility change is valid only 
under some restrictive assumptions, for instance, the marginal utility of income is 
required to be constant. Thus, the practicability of the consumer surplus measure 
will vary depending on the complexity of the analysis at hand (Hanley and Spash 
1993: 32). 
The Hicksian measures of welfare changes, on the other hand, take into account 
the income effect (Perman et al 2003: 403). The solution to the minimum 
expenditure function leads to the Hicksian demand function. As can be seen in 
equation (3-3), the Hicksian demand function is the relationship between the 
quantity demanded of a particular good and the price of that good, holding all 
other prices and utility constant. 
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Changes in environmental quality can affect individuals' welfares mainly in two 
ways. Some forms of environmental change affect people only indirectly through 
their effects on prices of market goods. Individuals' utilities are affected as they 
pay for goods bought in markets or as they receive the price for their factors of 
production. Other forms of environmental change affect people through changes 
in the quantities or qualities of non-market goods such as environmental 
services (Freeman 2003: 43). Theory suggests several alternative ways of 
calculating welfare measures using data on observed behaviour of individuals 
(their demand functions for market goods). 
The compensating variation (CV) and equivalent variation (EV) are two Hicksian 
monetary measures of the utility change associated with a price change, while 
the compensating surplus (CS) and equivalent surplus (ES) are Hicksian 
measures for the utility change implications of changes in the quality or 
quantity, often associated with environmental goods and services (Perman et al 
2003: 405-408). CV and EV are defined as following: 
'The CV is the quantity of money income which, when taken from the 
individual together with the price fall, leaves the individual at his or her 
initial level of utility. The EV is the quantity of money income which, if 
given to the individual without the price fall, would give the same level 
of utility as he or she would have attained if the price fall had occurred' 
(Perman et al 2003: 405). 
Both the CV and EV allow the individual to adjust the quantities of goods 
consumed in response to both changes in relative prices and income levels. 
However, the CS and ES are defined so as to place restrictions on the 
individual's adjustment of the consumption bundles (Freeman 2003: 51). The CS 
and ES measures are relevant for many cases of public good supply as they 
require that the good is indivisible and quantity consumed be held constant. 
Many environmental goods are therefore appropriately measured by these two 
surplus measures (Hanley and Spash 1993: 32-38; Mitchell and Carson 1989: 24-
25). Benefit estimation begins with measurement of net income changes for 
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individuals that is equivalent to or compensate for changes in the quantity or 
quality of public goods. 
Figure 3.l(a) and 3.l(b) show the CS and ES graphically. In the figure, axis E 
represents the environmental commodity which can have both quantity changes 
and quality changes and axis C represents the composite market good with its 
price being unity. Thus, C can be taken to represent income. Suppose the 
in di vi dual has a fixed money income, Yo. 
Figure 3.l(a) Compensating Surplus 
E 
Source: Perman et al (2003: 408-9). 
As Figure 3.l(a) shows, the individual is initially at a utility U0• As a result of 
some policy change, E increases from E' to E" and the individual's utility 
increases. This is equivalent to a reduction in the price of E. The slope of the 
budget line Yod gives the price ratio implicit in the quantity increase, tangential to 
an indifference curve for a higher level of utility, U1, at b. YNe is parallel to Yod 
and cuts the indifference curve for Uo at E". This is not a point of tangency, 
reflecting the fact that the individual is constrained to experience E". The CS is 
bf= Yo-YN, the maximum willingness to pay for the environmental improvement. 
That is, the individual would remain at a constant level of utility U0 if he or she 
experience E going from E' to E" and paid an amount of Yo-YN. 
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Figure 3.l(b) Equivalent Surplus 
g d E 
Source: Perman et al (2003: 408-9). 
As Figure 3.l(b) shows, the increase in E means a move to b with the implicit 
new price ratio given by the slope of Yod. YNg is parallel to the original budget 
line Y of and passes through b. It cuts the indifference curve for U1 at h. The ES is 
ha= YwYo, the minimum willingness to accept (WTA) compensation for the 
prospective environmental improvement not happening. 
The choice of CS and ES depends on the initial property right allocation (Hanley 
and Spash 1993: 38-39). The CS measure takes the initial level of utility as the 
reference point. This presumes that the individual has no right or claim to the 
environmental improvement. In contrast, the ES presumes that the individual has 
a right to the environmental improvement and must be compensated if the 
environmental improvement is not attained. The choice between the two 
measures depends on a value judgment as to which underlying distribution of 
property rights applies. In most cases, the CS measures are preferable for cost-
benefit analysis because they take the status quo as the reference position 
(Hanley and Spash 1993: 64). Table 3.1 summarises the situation in regard to 
monetary measures of the utility changes associated with changes in the quality/ 
quantity of an environmental service. As it shows, willingness to pay measures 
are used to assess the values associated with an environmental improvement. 
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Table 3.1 Monetary Measures for Environmental Quality Changes 
Improvement 
Deterioration 
cs 
WTP for the change 
occurring 
WT A compensation for the 
change occurring 
Source: Perman et al (2003: 409). 
ES 
WT A compensation for the 
change not occurring 
WTP for the change not to occur 
Even though the Hicksian welfare measures are more theoretically justified, they 
are not readily observable from market data. The Mashallian consumer surplus is 
observable, so it is still frequently used in practice on the ground of practicability 
(Perman et al 2003: 403). However, as Willig (1976) argued, in most cases the 
error involved in using the Mashallian demand function with respect to either CV 
or EV will be 5 per cent or less. Moreover, Randall and Stoll (1980) showed that 
the approximation of consumer surplus to CS and ES is likely to hold for small 
quantity changes or small budget items. These suggest the use of Mashallian 
consumer surplus as an approximation to the more theoretically justified 
Hicksian welfare measures (Hanley and Spash 1993: 39; Braden and Kolstad 
1991: 123). In addition, it avoids the problem of having to make a decision about 
the appropriate property rights in order to obtain the specific Hicksian consumer 
surplus measure (Mitchell and Carson 1989: 24-25). 
3.3.3 Economic Values and Benefit Estimation Techniques 
Market Values and Non-Market Values 
Economic values can be broadly classified into market values and non-market 
values depending on whether the values are directly observable from the market 
place. It should be noted that another common classification is based on the use 
of economic values. Use value, option value and non-use value form the total 
economic values (TEV). Use values refer to values related to some use, activity 
or traceable economic behavioral trail (Louviere et al 2000: 330). These may 
include outdoor recreation consumption or values generated from changes in 
scenery or aesthetic attributes of environment. Non-use values, or passive values, 
have no clear behavioral trail and are derived from the mere existence of the 
goods or services (Louviere et al 2000: 330). Individuals are willing to pay for 
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the goods or services even though they may never intend to make any active use 
of them. Motives for these 'existence' and 'bequest' values may include 'concern 
for future generations, the adoption of some "stewardship" role with respect to 
nature, conferment of "rights": to nature, and so on' (Pearce 1998: 20-23). 
Measuring these non-use values, or passive values, has been controversial 
because they cannot be measured from market demand data. There are objections 
that decisions about environmental services are made on the basis of monetary 
valuation of these services. People argue that things like human health or the 
preservation of biodiversity cannot be valued in terms of dollars or some other 
numeraire. However, tradeoffs among such things cannot be avoided in real life 
situations. Individuals' values can be inferred from the choices they make when 
facing with such tradeoffs. Where government policies are involved, these policy 
choices imply value. Without information about values that people place on these 
things, the problem of choice cannot be approached. 
Market values and non-market values require different valuation methods. For 
the estimation of market values, market prices are directly observable and hence 
actual resource values can be directly inferred from the price changes of the 
resource flow (Tietenberg 2004: 34). 
Estimation Techniques for Non-Market Valuation 
There are two basic approaches to the estimation of non-market values: indirect 
or behavioral methods, also known as the Revealed Preference technique (RP); 
and direct or Stated Preference technique (SP). While non-market use values can 
be measured either directly by using SP or indirectly by using RP, non-use values 
can be measured only with SP. 
The RP approach involves the use of actual observable market behaviour to infer 
actual resource values (Tietenberg 2004: 34). In other words, RP data are 
generated by a choice process in the real world. These methods require an 
identifiable link between the non-market goods and some subset of the market 
goods (Champ et al 2003: 47). This forms the basis for revealed preference 
73 
techniques. With these indirect or behavioral methods, the researcher observes 
individual behavior in response to changes in public goods, and from this 
behavior attempts to infer the value of changes in public goods (Habb and 
McConnell 2002: 3). RP methods include the travel cost methods and the 
hedonic pricing methods. 
Travel cost methods are used to value recreational resource use changes through 
information on how much the visitors spent in getting to the site to construct a 
demand curve for willingness to pay for a 'visitor day' (Hanley and Spash 1993: 
83-93). The area under the estimated demand curve is the value of the flow of 
services from that site. Bedonie pricing methods involve decomposition of 
various attributes of value in property into their component parts. Multiple 
regression analysis is conducted to separate out the relationship between property 
values and the environmental components of value. This relationship can then be 
used to produce a willingness to pay for the environmental component (Hanley 
and Spash 1993: 74-81). 
Very often only a partial assessment of TEV can be undertaken using RP 
techniques. Some significant value components are not revealed directly or 
indirectly in markets. Where non-use values are involved, the demand link is 
unidentifiable. In these cases, SP methods are the only means of estimating the 
full array of TEV components. SP methods are survey-based approaches for 
eliciting Hicksian compensating or equivalent values, that is, people's 
willingness to pay or willingness to accept for a hypothetical change in a good or 
program. In SP methods, a contingent market scenario is typically described for 
implementing a proposed change (List et al 2004). Contingent or hypothetical 
questions are posed to respondents to induce responses that trade off 
improvements in public goods and services for money. From the responses, one 
can infer preferences for, or the value of changes in, public goods (Habb and 
McConnell 2002: 3). 
The most commonly used SP methods are the contingent valuation method 
(CVM) and the choice modelling (CM) technique. In CVM, people are asked to 
choose between the 'status quo' situation and one 'proposed' situation. While the 
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CVM can provide useful information about the impacts of changes in aggregate 
variables of environmental demand, it cannot adequately analyse the effects of 
changes in individual attributes that make up an overall environmental change. In 
many cases, an approach that focuses on choices made at a disaggregated level is 
preferred from a policy perspective. CM has thus been widely applied to offer 
this solution. In CM, respondents are asked to make a sequence of such choices. 
Each choice is between a 'status quo' situation and a number of different 
'proposed' situations (Bennett and Adamowicz 2001: 37-69). To describe the 
specific environmental settings in these 'proposed' alternatives and the financial 
burden they impose, attributes need to be developed and defined for a CM survey 
questionnaire. While CM has only been developed in environmental valuation 
since the 1990s, it has been utilised by psychologists since the 1960s and in 
transportation and marketing research since the early 1970s (Garrod and Willis 
1999: 203). 
In addition to CVM and CM, conjoint analysis (CA) is another SP method that 
has been used to measure consumer preferences and tradeoffs in the marketing 
field. CA includes contingent rating, contingent ranking and paired comparison. 
With CA, overall judgments regarding a set of complex alternatives and 
decomposed into the sum of weights on attributes of the alternatives (Morrison et 
al 1996). 
SP methods are often criticised for the hypothetical nature of the questions and 
consequent potential for bias in value estimates. However, SP data can capture a 
wider and broader array of preference-driven behaviours than RP. SP data are 
richer in attribute tradeoff information because wider attribute ranges can be built 
into experiments which allow models estimated from SP data to be more robust 
than those from RP (Louviere et al 2000: 231 ). The RP method avoids the 
criticism of being based on hypothetical behaviour and ensures external validity, 
but it has other drawbacks. As model estimation is based on the current set of 
experiences, the simulation of a new situation would involve extrapolation 
outside the data range used to estimate the model (Adamowicz et al 1994). RP 
methods may also suffer from colinearity among attributes, which precludes the 
isolation of factors affecting choice. In economic welfare analysis, however, very 
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often the separation of these attributes is required for an accurate representation 
of the benefits (Adamowicz et al 1994). The colinearity problem can be 
eliminated by employing an experimental design in structuring an SP approach. 
For instance, an orthogonal experimental design can be developed to produce the 
choice sets for the CM questionnaire which allows the estimation of all main and 
cross product effects of the attributes. 
A large number of studies since 1990 have found that SP experiments and RP 
data sources provide similar information about preferences (Louviere 2001: 18). 
Attempts have been made to combine the SP and RP data to overcome some of 
the difficulties associated with each approach (Adamowicz et al 1994). The 
combination approach is argued to be useful in cases where observed behavior 
information is available (Adamowicz et al 1998). The calibration and re-scaling 
of SP data by integrating RP data can improve the fit of the SP models and hence 
the accuracy of the value estimates derived (Bennett and Blarney 2001: 234-5). 
Apart from the respective strengths and weaknesses of the RP and SP techniques, 
both are challenged by the argument that 'everything is context' so that there is 
no systematic choice model representing human decisions (Adamowicz 2004 ). A 
more structured representation of choice behaviour is needed in which systematic 
relationships between contexts, incentives, constraints and the decision structure 
are developed. It has been suggested that more focus should be put on the 
reasons for the outcomes and models of behaviour should be developed to 
incorporate such outcomes into systematic representations of behaviour 
(Adamowicz 2004). 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter provided the structure and logic for the research reported in this 
thesis. A CBA will be conducted in this research to explore the welfare impacts 
of the CCFGP. The CCFGP is hypothesised to bring about welfare change to the 
Chinese community both through its impact on local agricultural production and 
its environmental benefits. Bio-economic modelling will be conducted to build 
up the linkage between biophysical changes arising from the Program and their 
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impact on Chinese people living in the north of the nation. Several sub-
hypotheses were developed in this Chapter to guide the research process and the 
methodologies to test these hypotheses were briefly discussed. 
An important component of the CBA is the environmental valuation of the 
CCFGP. Without a good understanding of the welfare implications of 
environmental valuation, the task cannot be undertaken properly. Hence theories 
of environmental valuation were outlined in this chapter. The valuation is 
underpinned by welfare measures. The environmental changes have an impact on 
the social welfare, which is a function of the aggregation of individual utilities. 
The CS measures are the preferable monetary measures of utility changes 
associated with changes in the quality/ quantity of an environmental service. This 
provided the justification for estimating people's willingness to pay as 
approximations of the values they attach to the non-market environmental 
benefits arising from the CCFGP. 
The discussion of the economic values and different benefit estimation 
techniques also provided the framework within which the market and non-market 
environmental valuation will be conducted later in separate chapters of this thesis. 
Market values are directly inferred from price changes caused by the 
environmental changes under the CCFGP. The non-market values are estimated 
through the SP methods because of the non-use value component involved. In the 
next chapter, the CM technique which is adopted in this research to estimate the 
non-market values arising from the land use change under the CCFGP, will be 
discussed in detail. This includes the theory, stages involved in CM studies, and 
the strengths and weaknesses associated with the technique. 
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Chapter4 
The Choice Modelling Approach 
4.1 Introduction 
The choice modelling (CM) approach is the methodology used in this research to 
estimate the non-market environmental goods and services brought about by the 
CCFGP. In particular, it is applied to determine how people in the Chinese 
communities living downstream construct preferences for the environmental 
benefits derived from the Program. In the previous chapter, the CM approach 
was briefly described as a newly emerged SP technique which can capture both 
the non-marketed use and non-use values. In this chapter, the technique is 
discussed in further detail to provide a better understanding of its application in 
the CCFGP context which is the focus of Chapter 7 to Chapter 9. 
This chapter is structure as follows. In the next section, the theoretical foundation 
of the CM approach is outlined. This is followed by an introduction of the stages 
involved in the CM studies in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 outlines the principles for 
the selection of attributes. In Section 4.5, strengths and weaknesses of this 
specific technique are discussed. This chapter concludes with Section 4.6. 
4.2 Random Utility Theory 
CM is consistent with Lancaster's theory of consumer choice in which 
consumption choices are determined by the utility or value that is derived from 
attributes of a particular good or situation (Lancaster 1966). Thus, most choice 
experiments are predicated on the assumption that preferences are not based on a 
single attribute but are based jointly on several attributes (Garrod and Willis 
1999: 204). 
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CM is also based on the behavioural framework of random utility theory (RUT), 
which describes discrete choices in a utility maximising framework. According 
to RUT, individuals make choices based on the attributes of the choice 
alternatives along with some degree of randomness. This random component 
arises either because of randomness in the preferences of the individual or the 
fact that the researcher does not have the complete set of information available to 
the individual (Garrod and Willis 1999: 208). To put this into a formula: 
(4-1) 
where ui is the latent, unobserved utility for choice alternative i; vi is the 
systematic, observable or 'explainable' component of the latent utility for option 
i; and Ei is the random or 'unexplained' component of the latent utility associated 
with option i (Louviere 2001: 15). 
Because of the random component, the researcher can never expect to predict 
preferences perfectly. This leads to expressions for the probability of choice: 
(4-2) 
for all j options in the choice set. Different assumptions of the distribution of the 
random error terms yield different models. Assuming that the random error terms 
are distributed independently and identically (IID) and follow the Gumbel 
distribution with scale parameter µ (which is typically assumed to equal one), 
the probability of choosing option i can be estimated using the multinomial logit 
(MNL) model: 
P(i) = exp µV; 
L:expµVj 
jEC 
(4-3) 
The individual's indirect utility function (Vi) in equation (4-3) for a choice 
option can be modelled by way of various specifications. The simplest functional 
form involves an additive structure which only includes the attributes from the 
choice sets: 
Vi= C+ L B k.Xk where i=l, ... ,N and k=l, ... , K (4-4) 
where C is an alternative specific constant (ASC), B is a parameter vector, and X 
is a vector of K attributes from a choice set. The attributes enter the utility 
functions at various levels that are specified by an experimental design. The 
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ASCs show the effect of systematic but unobserved factors on respondents' 
choices. They reflect the differences in utilities for each alternative relative to the 
base when all attributes are equal and can pick up a mixture of status quo bias 
effects and the impacts of unobserved attributes (Bateman et al 2002: 283). They 
pick up the variation in choices not associated with the attributes or socio-
demographic variables. A comprehensive specification of the indirect utility 
function involves the interaction of socio-demographic and attitudinal 
characteristics with either the attributes or the ASCs to include respondent 
heterogeneity into the model (Bennett and Adamowicz 2001: 61). 
(4-5) 
Where C is an ASC, f3 , 8 , <I> and ware parameter vectors conditional on, 
respectively, 
(a) a matrix of k=l, ... K attributes that pertain to choice options, Xk; 
(b) a matrix of p=l, ... P characteristics that pertain to individuals, Zp; 
(c) a matrix of possible interactions of choice option attributes with individual 
characteristics, xk zp ; and 
(d) a vector of possible interactions of individual characteristics with ASCs. 
The MNL model can be used to generate probabilities of choice and estimates of 
marginal value changes for each attribute. In a linear model of the indirect utility 
functions, the 'part-worth' or implicit price of an attribute, which demonstrates 
the amount of money respondents are willing to pay in order to receive more of 
an attribute, is estimated using the following equation: 
Part-worth = - /3NM 
/3M 
(4-6) 
where ~NM is the coefficient of the non-marketed environmental attribute and ~M 
is the coefficient of the monetary attribute. The model can also be used to 
generate estimates of the compensating surplus (CS) for changes between 
different choice profiles. Equation (4-7) allows for the valuation of changes in 
environmental quality where there are multiple alternatives as in the case of 
recreation sites or product choices: 
1 VO VI CS = - - { ln(l:iexp ) - ln(l:iexp ) } 
/3M 
(4-7) 
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where V 0 represents the initial state and V 1 represents the subsequent state. 
Where there is only one alternative under consideration, equation (4-7) reduces 
to: 
(4-8) 
Both the implicit price and the compensating surplus estimates can be used for 
testing the equivalence of different models and for benefit transfer to other case 
studies (Rolfe and Windle 2005; Morrison and Bennett 2004). 
The IID error term assumption underpinning the MNL model has an equivalent 
behavioral assumption. It implies that the relative choice probabilities between 
any two alternatives of a choice set are not affected by the inclusion or exclusion 
of other alternatives in that set. This is the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA) property. It implies that a change in the attributes of one alternative 
changes the probabilities of the other alternatives proportionately, such that the 
ratios of probabilities remain the same. This substitution pattern can be 
unrealistic in some settings (Brownstone and Train 1999). In other words, it 
assumes there is no correlation between the unobserved effects of the alternatives 
(Champ et al 2003: 205). Even though IIA may be achieved by including 
respondents' socio-demographic characteristics as interaction effects in the utility 
function, it assumes the researcher already knows the elements that lead to 
heterogeneity and results in many parameters and potential collinearity problems 
(Champ et al 2003: 202). When the IIA property is violated, MNL parameter 
estimates will be biased. A Hausman-test can be conducted to test for IIA 
violations. The test involves comparing the unrestricted model complete with all 
alternatives to the restricted model with one or more alternatives removed 
(Hensher et al 2005: 519). Other model forms can also be explored to partially or 
fully relax the IID assumption. In this study, both the nested logit model and the 
mixed logit model, also known as the random parameter logit model, are 
explored in addition to the MNL model. 
The nested logit (NL) model represents a partial relaxation of the IID assumption 
of the MNL model. It recognizes the possibility of different variances across the 
alternatives and correlation among partitions of alternatives (Hensher et al 2005: 
81 
482). In a two-level nested logit model, it is assumed that an initial choice is 
made at the branch level. Particular choice alternatives assumed to have common 
error terms are grouped into partitions and choices at the branch level are made 
among these partitions. At the lower or elementary level, choice is made among 
alternatives within the same partition based on specific attributes that determine 
the utilities of those alternatives. Following Champ et al (2003: 204), the 
probability of an individual choosing alternative j in partition m is represented as: 
P(jm) = P(jlm) P(m) (4-9) 
where P(jlm) is the probability of the individual choosing the jth alternative 
conditional on choosing the mth partition of outcome, and P(m) is the probability 
that the individual chooses the mth partition. The joint probability of choosing 
alternative jm can also be expressed as: 
PUm) = _M_e_x_p_a_m_(V_m_+_V_m_• ) __ J_e_x_p_(V~jlm_)_ 
~)expam(Vm. + Vm .• )] ~)exp(Vr1m)] 
m'=I j'=l 
(4-10) 
where V m* is (llam)logLexp(Vjlm) or the 'inclusive value' or 'log-sum' and am is 
the inclusive value parameter. The inclusive value term captures the utilities of 
the elemental alternatives within the utility associated with the upper level 
activity. The inclusive value parameter is the ratio of the scale parameter4 at the 
branch level to the scale parameter at the elementary level (Hensher et al 2005: 
487-493). 
In the nested logit model, the error terms are no longer assumed to be 
independently distributed. Instead, the IIA property holds within the same 
partition but not between different partitions. IIA violations can be tested by 
assessing the inclusive value parameter. An inclusive value parameter 
significantly different from one provides evidence that the IIA assumption is not 
met. In other words, if the inclusive value parameter is equal to one, the nested 
model probabilities collapse to yield the MNL model and there is no correlation 
between the utility functions of alternatives present within the lower level of the 
nest (Hensher et al 2005: 548-9). An inclusive parameter value between zero and 
4 The scale parameter is proportional to the inverse of the variance of the distribution of the error terms and 
it determines the scale of the utilities. 
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one indicates the degree of correlation between alternatives within the same 
partition. 
The mixed logit model, or the random parameter logit (RPL) model represents a 
full relaxation of the assumption of IID. It does not involve the IIA property and 
explicitly accounts for correlations in unobserved utility over repeated choices by 
each respondent 5 (Revelt and Train 1998). The RPL model allows the data 
analysis to find and reflect whatever substitution pattern actually occurs, rather 
than imposing a particular substitution pattern with the MNL and NL models 
(Brownstone and Train 1999). While the MNL and NL models assume that the 
attribute coefficients are the same for people with the same socio-demographic 
and attitudinal characteristics, the RPL model accounts for heterogeneity by 
allowing model parameters to vary randomly over individuals. The form of the 
RPL model is outlined below following Revelt and Train (1998), Revelt and 
Train (1999), and Brownstone and Train (1999). 
Similar to equation (4-1), the utility that a person obtains from alternative i 
amongj options in a choice set is: 
(4-11) 
where Xi is a vector of observed variables, /3' vector varies over individuals with 
density f (~18*) where 8* represents the parameters of the pooled distribution, 
and Ei is an unobserved random term that is distributed IID extreme value, 
independent of /3' and Xi. The variation in /3' introduces correlation in utility 
across choices. The /3' vector can be expressed as the population mean (b) and 
the individual specific deviation from that mean ll· Hence the above utility 
function can be rewritten as: 
(4-12) 
Conditional on /3', the probability that the person chooses alternative i is the 
same as the conditional logit model as shown previously in equation ( 4-3): 
5 As Train (1998) states, 'The variation in coefficients over people implies that the unobserved utility 
associated with any alternative is necessarily correlated over time for each decision maker. This correlation 
is incorporated into the estimation when there are observations on more than one choice situation for each 
person'. 
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~ (,8') = exp,B' ~; 
:Lexp,B xj 
j 
(4-13) 
The unconditional probability that the person chooses alternative i is the integral 
of the conditional probability in equation ( 4-13) over the distribution of ,B': 
(4-14) 
Models of this form are called 'mixed logit' since the choice probability is a 
mixture of logits with f as the mixing distribution. The choice probability cannot 
be calculated exactly, instead, the integral is approximated through simulation. 
For a given value of the parameter 8*, a value of ,B' is drawn from its 
distribution. Using this draw, the logit formula ~(,8') is calculated. This process 
is repeated for many draws, and the average of the resulting ~( ,B' )s is taken as 
the approximate choice probability: 
SPi = (1/R) L ~ (,8') (4-15) 
r=l, ... ,R 
Where R is the number of replications, ,B' is the rth draw, and SPi is the 
simulated probability that the person chooses alternative i. Adding subscript n to 
index sampled individuals, the log-likelihood function Ln ln(PnD is approximated 
by the simulated log-likelihood function Ln ln(SP ru) and the estimated parameters 
are those that maximise the simulated log-likelihood function. 
With a RPL model, it is possible to calculate the parameters of every individual 
in the data set. However, it also has a number of limitations, one being that only 
the tastes of sampled individuals can be determined. In addition, the RPL model 
is not well-suited to explaining the sources of heterogeneity in tastes 
(Adamowicz and Boxall 2001). The RPL model has been considered to be able 
to improve both the explanatory power of models and the precision of parameter 
estimates. However, whether it is the MNL model or the RPL model that 
generates more reliable estimates is situation-specific. While some researchers 
have found similar results between a MNL and RPL model, others have found 
large differences between the estimates, and there are still others who have found 
that estimated willingness to pay differed between a MNL and RPL model for 
84 
some attributes and were similar for others (Bhat 1996 and Revelt and Train 
1996 cited in Train 1998). 
4.3 The Stages of a Choice Modelling Study 
Most applications of CM involve some form of survey where respondents are 
asked to study a series of profiles and then make choices based on their 
preferences for them. As outlined in Adamowicz et al (1998), CM applications 
generally involve the following seven stages: 
Characterisation of the Decision Problem. This involves the identification of the 
problem and the value to be estimated. In CM studies, people are asked to 
compare the outcome of alternative resource management strategies against the 
status quo. It is the change of value 'at the margin' from the status quo to the 
alternatives that the CM research aims to estimate. Therefore, it is important to 
define the value that is to be estimated. Only after the value of interest is defined 
can the status quo and the proposed alternatives be further described. 
Attribute and Level Selection. In CM studies, attributes are used to describe 
different environmental outcomes from alternative management options. In this 
stage, the number of attributes and value of the levels for each attribute is defined. 
The levels should be chosen to represent the relevant range of variation in the 
status quo and the change scenarios. 
Experimental Design. Once attributes and associated levels have been 
determined, an experimental design is developed to produce the choice sets for 
the CM questionnaire. An experimental design comprises the various 
combinations of attribute levels. Normally an orthogonal, main effects design is 
used to allow the estimation of the independent attribute effects on the stated 
choice. With an orthogonal experimental design, attributes can vary 
independently of one another so that their individual effects on respondent's 
preferences could be isolated. Two-way or higher-order interactions between 
attributes could also be integrated into the experimental design with 
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consequential increases in the number of choice sets involved in the fraction of 
the full factorial. 
Questionnaire Development. The development of the CM questionnaire depends 
on the way it will be delivered. The questionnaire can vary from hard copy 
questionnaires to various multi-media modes. The overall presentation of the 
questionnaire requires careful consideration, with the main objective of 
presenting the choice experiment as an approximation of actual choice situations. 
The framing of the issue needs to be appropriate to the decision context. Pre-
testing of the questionnaire is required before the formal survey is conducted. 
Sample Sizing and Data Collection. The sample size should be guided by 
considerations of desired accuracy levels and data collection costs. Total sample 
size is also affected by the total number of choice scenarios and the number of 
choice alternatives in a given scenario. Socio-economic data is gathered to assess 
whether the sample is representative of the general population when eliciting 
non-use values, and representative of visitors if profiles of visitors are available 
(Garrod and Willis 1999:137). 
Model Estimation. A statistical choice model is required to analyse the response 
data. Different models are obtained from different error term assumptions. The 
Multinomial Logit (MNL) model has so far been the most commonly used model 
to analyse choice data. The most common estimation criterion is maximum 
likelihood, with its estimator being the vector of coefficient values that 
maximizes the natural logarithm of the likelihood of the observed sample data 
occurring. 
Policy Analysis. Once the choice model is derived and marginal value for each 
attribute is available, different combination of the attributes that are used to 
describe alternatives can be evaluated. These alternatives can be considered as 
the outcomes of different management options, and the sample estimates can be 
extrapolated to related population. The information so derived can be used in 
policy analysis or as components of decision support tools. 
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4.4 Principles for the Selection of Attributes 
To derive the most appropriate attributes, the following principles apply. First, 
attributes need to be selected according to both demand and supply perspectives. 
Attributes in CM questionnaires are used to describe different environmental 
outcomes from alternative management options. A demand perspective involves 
selecting the attributes that individuals consider important when making choices. 
A supply-driven approach involves attributes being selected primarily on the 
basis of what policy makers, scientists or researchers perceive to be important as 
factors that can be modified by policy (Blarney et al 1997). It would be 
meaningless to include in CM questionnaire attributes that have no relation to the 
preferences of respondents and hence have no influence on choices. Similarly 
there is little point including attributes that are of no relevance to decision-
makers. If the two perspectives do not coincide, reconciliation is required. This 
may involve some give and take from both perspectives. 
Second, CM researchers have discussed the cognitive burden that respondents 
face in choosing among alternatives (Dellaert et al 1999; Swait and Adamowicz 
2001; Deshaozo and Fermo 2004). These studies show that increases in cognitive 
costs increase choice inconsistency and are correlated to increases in the random 
component of logit models built to explain choices. Cognitive requirements 
increase dramatically as the number of attributes in a CM exercise increases. 
Hence, fewer attributes can produce more reliable results. However, results may 
be inaccurate if the omitted attributes are highly relevant to respondents. There 
needs to be a trade-off between including all relevant attributes and complexity 
(Blarney et al 1997). Selection of the most relevant attributes is one key to 
ensuring reliable results. 
Third, causal relationship between attributes needs to be avoided. Selecting 
environmental attributes involves translating biophysical characteristics into 
benefits that matter to people. In the CM survey, some respondents may consider 
causal relations among attributes when assessing the meaningfulness of 
alternatives and the relative importance of the attributes. This is the 'causal 
heuristic' strategy that respondents may adopt in formulating their responses. 
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Greater weight may be assigned to attributes of a more fundamental, causally 
prior, nature. Ways to reduce the use and/ or influence of causal strategies 
include reframing the choice exercise so that respondents no longer employ 
causal strategies, or simply omitting either the causally upstream or downstream 
attributes from the exercise altogether (Blarney et al 1998). In principle, causally 
related attributes should be avoided so as to remove the bias resulting from 
respondents attaching greater value to causally prior attributes. 
Fourth, it is crucial to link the attributes closely to the perceived benefits as 
individuals may then find it easier and potentially more meaningful to make 
choices (Blarney et al 1997). However, the link between such attributes and the 
object of valuation can be weakened because of the scientific uncertainty in 
building up the links. For instance, a reduction in C02 level can be considered as 
a 'physical attribute' and is relatively easier to monitor. The consequent reduced 
probability of respiratory diseases can be considered as an 'effect attribute', 
which although more closely linked to people, may be less accurately measured 
compared to the reduction in C02 level. Using 'physical attributes' instead of 
'effect attributes' may ensure scientific certainty, yet may create another problem 
as respondents are left reaching their own conclusions about changes in benefits. 
There needs to be some trade-off in this regard. 
Finally, quantitative expression of attribute levels has distinct advantages in 
terms of the modelling and valuation potential afforded and should be more 
preferred to qualitative expression in most circumstances (Bennett and 
Adamowicz 2001: 37-69). The range of attribute levels should be chosen to 
encompass the full range of possibilities. Even though these possibilities do not 
necessarily correspond to those actually occurring under policy options, the 
variation of the levels of attributes characterizing the different options permits 
the estimation of the relative importance of these attributes. 
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4.5 Strengths and Weaknesses of Choice Modelling 
4.5.1 Strengths of Choice Modelling 
The SP approach can be categorized into CVM, CM and CA. CA and CM 
techniques share common characteristics6• For instance, both produce estimates 
of the value of unit changes in attributes as well as estimates of the aggregate 
value of changes in the quality of a good (Morrison et al 1996). However, CA 
and CM techniques are fundamentally different in terms of behavioural and 
theoretical underpinning. CA is based on statistical and mathematical 
considerations instead of behavioural theory, and so lacks consistency with 
economic theory in general and economic valuation in particular. Rather it is a 
theory about the behaviour of numbers (ranks) in response to systematic 
manipulation of levels of some set of attributes (Louviere 2001: 24; Adamowicz 
et al 1998). Dubious assumptions have to be made in order to transform ratings 
or rankings into utilities, and the assumptions relate either to the cardinality of 
rating scales or to the comparability of ratings across individuals (Bateman et al 
2002: 274). In many cases, CA tasks simulate behaviour rarely observed in real 
consumers. For instance, traditional CA techniques simulate behaviour in which 
a consumer systematically and deliberately evaluates every option available -
one at a time, while real markets involve multiple and competing choice options. 
CA techniques also have the weakness that estimates are not conditional on 
respondents agreeing to purchase a good. Respondents are not able to express 
opposition to payment for the good, except through providing a low rating or 
ranking. Therefore estimates of value derived from the marginal rate of 
substitution will be biased if respondents would not actually choose to purchase 
the good (Louviere 2001: 26; Morrison et al 1996). Being inconsistent with 
economic theory, data generated from CA techniques can hardly be used to 
predict choices and interpret resulting welfare measures. 
In contrast to CA, CM is based on sound and well-tested behavioural theory that 
has evolved out of the random utility theory. Statistical models are derived to 
approximate choice processes (Louviere 2001: 24-5; Morrison et al 1996). By 
6 See Louviere 2001 in Bennett and Blarney 2001: 24 for a detailed discussion. 
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positing that individuals make choices that maximise their utility and that utility 
is subject to a certain degree of randomness, the choice theory is placed on a 
strong economic foundation. A further advance is the linkage between random 
utility models and welfare economics so that the inclusion of a monetary attribute 
allows the assessment of economic welfare measures such as compensating 
variation (Champ et al 2003: 174). 
Like CM, CVM is also based on the random utility theory. CVM is the most 
commonly applied stated preference technique employed in environmental 
valuation. It is partly in response to criticism of the CVM that CM has emerged 
in recent years. CM is found to outperform CVM in a number of research studies 
(Adamowicz et al 1994; Boxall et al 1996; Morrison et al 1996; Adamowicz et 
al 1998; Bennett and Blarney 2001). In comparing CM with CVM, there are the 
following main advantages of CM. 
First, CM is consistent with attribute-based consumer theory and offers a much 
richer information because it is based on attributes. This allows the researcher to 
value attributes as well as multidimensional situational changes. CM allows 
increased flexibility in analysis. For instance, if there is uncertainty about the 
final attribute levels, the results of CM can be used to determine the values for 
each possible outcome (Garrod and Willis 1999: 203). The tradeoffs among 
attributes in CM analysis make it possible to expand policy options to include 
non-monetary compensation (Adamowicz et al 1998). CM results also have the 
flexibility to allow for the benefit transfer process to proceed (Bennett and 
Blarney 2001: 228). In contrast, CVM provides information on preferences for 
the whole scenario rather than for a specific aspect of it. The concentration of 
CVM exercises on a particular scenario or a particular environmental quality 
change requires adequate information about the scenario for the respondent to 
judge the quality change (Garrod and Willis 1999: 203). This may be a challenge 
for respondents when they make choices in unfamiliar contexts, whereas in CM 
the tradeoff context becomes more familiar through repeated tasks (Adamowicz 
et al 1998). On the other hand, however, this suggests the cognitive burden 
imposed on respondents which may affect the choices they make. This will be 
further elaborated in the section about the weaknesses of CM. 
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Second, the use of CM may decrease concerns over the occurrence of 'yea-
saying' and social desirability bias, whereby respondents have a tendency to 
present themselves in a way that meets the perceived expectations of the 
interviewers or society as a whole (Blarney and Bennett 2001: 179-80). In these 
situations respondents tend to implicitly or explicitly overstate the importance of 
the attributes that are perceived to be socially desirable when formulating their 
responses. Because attribute levels change over the sets of choices in a CM 
exercise, the task complexity and cognitive burden can prevent respondents from 
constructing a pattern of behaviour that is consistently strategic. CM can 
therefore moderate the incidence of strategic behaviour and improve the 
incentive compatibility (Bennett and Blarney 2001: 233). 
Third, CM has the potential to minimise problems of framing. Hence substitution 
effects can be better incorporated within the design of CM. It allows the 
simultaneous presentation to respondents of a pool of alternatives and substitute 
goods which requires respondents to consider complementary and substitution 
effects in the choice process (Rolfe and Bennett 2001: 209). In contrast, the 
CVM concentrates on the estimation of the value for one environmental good, so 
the frame within which respondents consider their preferences may be 
inappropriate to the situation in reality. Instead of relying on a 'framing 
statement' at the beginning of a CVM questionnaire to remind respondents of 
potential substitute and complementary goods, CM can explicitly embed the 
frame within each choice set (Bennett and Blarney 2001: 231). However, it 
should be noted that it is only when a range of different goods is included within 
each choice set (for example different tourism destinations) that the framing 
advantage of CM can be perceived. It is also likely that this range contains only a 
sub-set of all the options that a respondent may consider (Bennett and Blarney 
2001: 237-8). 
In addition to the points mentioned above, the repeated question nature of CM 
allows for internal validity tests through information about consistency of 
individual responses especially when external validity tests are not possible in 
the case of non-use values (Adamowicz et al 1998). 
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4.5.2 Weaknesses of Choice Modelling7 
The task complexity and cognitive burden facing CM respondents is likely to 
exceed that of CVM. In a CM exercise, respondents are asked to make a number 
of choices between multiple alternatives based on their understandings of 
attributes of options, the way these attributes may vary across a number of levels 
and the way various combinations of attributes at varying levels may result from 
alternative resource use options. The task complexity and cognitive burden 
imposed on respondents may give rise to the use of simplified decision strategies, 
resulting in differences in parameter vectors or variance components. In some 
cases, decision heuristics would involve the evaluation of alternatives in ways 
not intended by researchers (Bennett and Blarney 2001: 235-236; Bateman et al 
2002: 274). Deshazo and Fermo (2004) varied the complexity of choice sets to 
evaluate the impact on choice consistency and they found that increased 
complexity induced choice inconsistency. However, their analysis also showed 
that the negative impacts may be mitigated if precautions are taken at the design 
and estimation stages. 
Since SP aims to predict behaviours or determine preferences that are not directly 
observable in the market place, the validity of the measurement can present a 
challenge because of the hypothetical nature of the survey (Champ et al 2003: 
103-104). Respondents may strategically overstate or underestimate their 
willingness to pay for the good in order to influence the policy process. The 
validity of the measurement may also be threatened when respondents are asked 
to value a good that is less familiar and more complex. The value estimates 
obtained are sensitive to study design parameters such as the selection of 
attributes, the levels chosen to represent these attributes, and the way in which 
choices are relayed to respondents (Bateman et al 2002: 273). Further, List et al 
(2004) find that the survey mode with different degrees of social isolation has an 
impact on the SP value estimates, with its magnitudes roughly comparable to the 
degree of hypothetical bias observed. 
7 It should be noted that some of these weaknesses are not unique to CM, but may apply to other SP 
techniques as well. 
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As such, error in the response is likely to occur under these circumstances. If the 
error is random, the validity of the welfare estimate will not be threatened so 
long as appropriate statistical analysis procedures are used. However, if the error 
is overly influenced by contextual factors and is no longer random, the welfare 
estimate is likely to be biased (Champ et al 2003: 105-106). CM is considered to 
be under more validity challenge because of the increased contingencies of its 
value estimates on the circumstances created by the questionnaire (Bennett and 
Blarney 2001: 239). Since all survey-based measures face validity issues, 
choosing the best measure for a given application requires a comparison of 
degrees of validity. The validity of a measure can be assessed through the 
approaches of criterion validity, construct validity and content validity (Champ et 
al 2003: 104-105). 
Another concern with CM as well as CVM is the potential scope effects (Arrow 
et al 1993). In particular, Mitchell and Carson (1989: 250-1) define part-whole 
bias as one type of respondent insensitivity to scope. This happens when 
respondents tend to respond to public goods as global symbols without paying 
sufficient attention to the specific description offered in the survey. Moreover, 
the dimensions of a good that are particularly prone to this misperception are its 
geographic distribution, its benefit composition, and the package of policies of 
which it is a part. The part-whole biases could be due to survey design problems, 
such as vague descriptions of the environmental resource or a lack of credibility 
about delivery of the policy (Smith 1992a; Hanemann 1994). With part-whole 
biases, the value estimates derived from the CM and CVM would be biased. 
Moreover, in CM studies, attributes that characterise the environmental good are 
being valued. In order to estimate the value of an environmental good, it is 
normally assumed that the value of the whole is equal to the sum of the parts as 
shown by the additive utility function. Studies in the transport field have been 
conducted to test for this assumption. It has been found that whole bundles of 
improvements are valued less than the sum of the component values. This is 
known as the 'packaging problem' (Bateman et al 2002: 273). 
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Finally, the potential payment vehicle bias also challenges the validity of the CM 
and CVM results. The payment vehicle provides the context for payment in the 
survey and it affects the way respondents answer the elicitation question. 
Respondents' choices may depend on when payment is due and the way in which 
it is collected (Morrison et al 2000). According to Mitchell and Carson (1989: 
237), payment vehicle bias occurs 'where the payment vehicle is either 
misperceived or is itself valued in a way not intended by the researcher'. 
Payment vehicle bias is very likely to arise unless payment vehicles and payment 
scenarios are selected and designed with reference to the institutional and 
cultural context (Morrison et al 2000). 
4.6 Conclusion 
Because of the non-use value component involved in environmental 
improvements arising from the CCFGP, a stated preference technique is adopted 
in this research to value the environmental benefits of the Program. 
Environmental Choice Modelling, an emerging stated preference technique for 
estimating non-market values, has been introduced in this chapter. The 
theoretical underpinning of the technique, the stages involved in its application, 
and the strengths and weaknesses associated with the technique were detailed. 
The justification for using the CM method to estimate the non-use values of the 
environmental impacts of the CCFGP has been presented. In many cases, an 
approach that focuses on choices made at a disaggregated level is preferred from 
a policy perspective. In CM applications, researchers can break down the 
relevant attributes of the situation and determine preferences over attributes. This 
allows increased flexibility in analysis. The tradeoffs among attributes in CM 
analysis make it possible to expand policy assessment to include non-monetary 
compensation. CM results also have the flexibility to allow for the benefit 
transfer process to proceed. 
Some of these advantages are particularly important to the CCFGP policy 
context. With information on the values of each environmental attribute available, 
different environmental changes arising from specific areas of revegetated land 
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under the CCFGP can be evaluated. This will help with the better 'targeting' of 
land to be converted under the Program. The increased flexibility of the CM 
technique in benefit transfer will also facilitate the extrapolation of the 
willingness to pay estimates derived from sampled households to the wider 
population of beneficiaries of the CCFGP. Because of these advantages, CM is 
applied in this research. 
The theoretical and methodological considerations of the CM will be further 
explored in the case study presented in Chapters 7 to 9. The design of the survey 
questionnaire including the identification of attributes and the testing of the 
questionnaire through focus groups will be presented in Chapter 7. The survey 
arrangement and model specification and interpretation will be presented in 
Chapter 8. The per household willingness to pay in the sampled area is then 
extrapolated to the wider Chinese community in North China and the results are 
presented in Chapter 9. Before the non-market values are estimated using the CM 
approach, it is important to find out the biophysical changes arising from the 
CCFGP. In the next chapter, biophysical modelling is conducted to identify and 
predict the biophysical changes brought about by the CCFGP along the Yellow 
River in North China. This is followed by a market valuation of these changes in 
Chapter 6. 
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chapter5 
Biophysical Modelling 
5.1 Introduction 
Benefits and costs associated with the biophysical changes arising from the 
implementation of the CCFGP are important components of a cost benefit 
analysis of the Program. In order for the economic analysis to be conducted, the 
biophysical or biological process and changes need to be well understood taking 
into consideration spatial heterogeneity. 
There is considerable uncertainty about the complexity of many biophysical 
processes. The biophysical relationships are required to understand the spatial 
and temporal linkages between the environmental restoration action and the 
impacts on people. Lack of knowledge of the relationship between the economic 
concept of value and the biophysical dimensions of the resource system being 
valued may be a major barrier to the empirical estimation of values in some cases. 
If biophysical relationships are misinterpreted or misunderstood, the resulting 
analysis of human preferences is likely to be flawed. 
The description of the resource flow or some measure of environmental quality 
requires the identification of specific attributes or characteristics of the resource-
environment service that are linked to the effects that matter to people (Freeman 
2003: 5-12). In general, vegetation provides the ecological functions of 
regulating the hydrological cycle, protecting watersheds, water flows and soils, 
regulating local and global climate through carbon sequestration, ameliorating 
weather events, and restoring and conserving biological diversity (UNCBD 
2001). This is consistent with the findings from the implementation of the 
CCFGP. Since 2000, the land use change induced by the Program in the North 
West Provinces has brought about observable biophysical changes both on-site 
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and off-site. Increased vegetative cover has changed the appearance of the 
countryside. Wind erosion has decreased with consequential reductions in 
sandstorm severity and frequency. Biodiversity in the revegetated areas has been 
evidenced (Ge et al 2001; Shen et al 2001; Du and Guo 2001; Li et al 2001; Zhao 
2001). Along with these impacts, research conducted by China Institute of Water 
Resources and Hydropower Research (Zhou et al 2006) has found reductions in 
runoff being caused by the CCFGP. All these attributes (landscape, sandstorms, 
biodiversity, water supply and quality) have impacts on people living both on-
site and off-site. 
In this chapter, biophysical changes under the CCFGP are identified and 
projected separately for market and non-market valuation purposes. In Section 
5.2, runoff reductions arising from the CCFGP in the Yellow River Basin in 
North China are modelled. This information will later be used to estimate market 
value changes brought about by the CCFGP. In Section 5.3, environmental 
attributes that are used in the choice modelling (CM) exercise are discussed and 
defined in terms of their biophysical characteristics and ranges within which the 
attribute values vary. This chapter concludes with Section 5.4. 
5.2 Modelling Runoff Reductions 
5.2.1 The Yellow River Basin (YRB) 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the YRB sits within three broad regions. First, the 
Upper Reach of the Yellow River locates in North West China which consists of 
three provinces - Shaanxi, Gansu and Qinghai - and three autonomous regions -
Ningxia Hui, Xinjiang Uygur and Tibet. In the upper reach of the Yellow River, 
relatively low population densities, agricultural development and 
industrialisation limit in situ usage (Giordano et al 2004). Secondly, the Loess 
Plateau lies in the middle reaches of the Yellow River. On the semi-arid areas of 
the Plateau, 25-30 per cent of the natural precipitation is absorbed by individual 
crop in transpiration, 10-20 per cent becomes runoff on the ground surface and 
flows away, and the remaining 55-65 per cent evaporates directly into the air (Li 
and Sun 1999). Actual runoff from the Loess Plateau contributes 24 per cent of 
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the current river volume in the Yellow River. Thirdly, the North China Plain 
(NCP) is the downstream area of the Yellow River. It is one of the most 
important agricultural regions in China, accounting for up to 40 per cent of 
national production for many of the major cereal crops (Mc Vicar et al 2002:22). 
5.2.2 Literature Review 
Land use changes affect the hydrological cycle both qualitatively and 
quantitatively by influencing how precipitation is intercepted, evapotranspired, 
and retailed in soils, which in tum determines the amount and speed of runoff. At 
the scale of river basins, it determines water availability and the intensity and 
frequency of flooding (Fischer 1999). There has been a long debate in the 
scientific community over whether forests can increase or decrease runoff. New 
understanding has been gained in recent years indicating that in both dry and wet 
conditions, evaporation from forests is likely to be higher than that from shorter 
crops. Consequently runoff will be decreased from forested areas, with the 
exceptions of cloud forests and very old forests (Calder 2003). It is also difficult 
to conclude on the impacts of forests on the seasonal flow regime, even though 
general conclusions can be drawn with respect to the impacts on annual flow. 
Different, site specific, often competing processes may be operating, so the 
direction and the magnitude of the impact may be difficult to predict for a 
particular site. It cannot be assumed that it is generally true that afforestation will 
increase dry season flows (Calder 2003). 
In general vegetation protects soil from erosion and reduces surface water runoff 
in many ways. Live plant foliage and forest litter reduce the impact of rainfall 
and increase the absorptive capacity of the soil. Ground covers reduce runoff 
velocity and filter out suspended soil particles during storms. Higher rates of 
water infiltration and water storage capacity of the soil can be increased. Due to 
improved infiltration, the rain water reaches the drainage network mainly 
through subsurface flow, reducing rapid rise of the surface water levels and flood 
hazard (Menashe 2001). 
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Ground covers protect soil by holding soil particles in place through their root 
systems. Shrub and tree roots provide a restraining web that increases soil 
cohesion and stabilises soil. Tree anchoring roots often penetrate deeply into soil 
blocks, increasing soil shear strength and resisting shallow mass soil movement. 
Vegetated watersheds exhibit lower peak flows, lower total discharge volumes, 
and increased lag-time between rainfall and runoff than do watersheds with a 
high percentage of devegetation (Menashe 2001). A general trend of runoff 
reductions had been observed in the YRB during 1956-2000. Table 5.1 reflects 
the recorded rainfall, runoff and rainfall/ runoff ratios along the Yellow River 
over the past 40 years. It can be noted that they were substantially lower in the 
1990s than in previous decades. Runoff has averaged less than 50 billion CUBIC 
METRES, and the Yellow River delta is retreating rather than expanding 
(Giordano et al 2004). This coincided with the time period when major 
ecological programs in the region were undertaken. 
Table 5.1 Rainfall and Runoff in Yellow River Basin, 1956-2000. 
Area Time period 1990s Change 
(000 km2} 1956-70 1971-60 1961-90 1991-00 Average from average 
Upper 366 Rain (mm) 380 374 373 360 372 -3% 
Runoff (bcmJ 35 34 37 28 34 -16% 
Runoff yield (%) 25% 25% 27% 21% 24% -13% 
Middle 362 Rain (mm) 570 515 529 456 523 ·13% 
Runoff (bcm) 29 21 23 15 23 -34% 
Runoff yield (%) 14% 11% 12% 9% 12% -25% 
Lower 22 Rain (mm) 733 689 616 614 671 -6% 
Runoff (be m) 1.5 1 .1 0.6 0.0 0.6 -100% 
Runoff yield (%) 
Basin 752 Rain (mm) 482 451 455 413 454 -9% 
Runoff (bcm) 65 56 61 43 57 -24% 
Source: YRCC 2002 in Giordano et al 2004. 
Because of the many uncertainties in predicting the impact of vegetation on 
surface runoff and seasonal flow regime, ideally site specific models will be 
required to predict these impacts (Calder 2003). These models should take into 
account vegetation and soil physical properties including the conductivity/ water 
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content properties of the soil, and possibly the spatial distribution of these 
properties in order to predict the site specific impacts (Calder 2003). 
However, such information and research work is very limited especially for the 
impacts of the CCFGP. Empirical studies show that the main tree species planted 
in North West China under the Program, namely Black Locust, Caragana and Sea 
Buckthom, have direct impact on surface runoff. After four years of growth, Sea 
Buckthom and Black Locust forests can reduce runoff by 96.7 per cent and 77.5 
per cent respectively as compared to cropland (FEDRC 2004). After these trees 
become closed forests, there will be no soil erosion during the years with normal 
climate conditions, unless unusual storms take place (FEDRC 2004). The finding 
of runoff reductions caused by the CCFGP has been further proved by China 
Institute of Water Resources and Hydropower Research. According to their 
research, the improvement of water holding capacity of soil through revegetation 
under the CCFGP has caused runoff reductions along the Yellow River (Zhou et 
al 2006). 
5.2.3 Sub-regions of the YRB 
A runoff reduction model was developed with the help of China Institute of 
Water Resources and Hydropower Research and is used to find out the runoff 
reductions in the YRB brought about by the CCFGP. In the hydrological model, 
the YRB has been divided into 10 regions based on hydrologic, agro-climatic and 
soil conditions (Figure 5.1). The administrative boundaries and provinces 
included in each region are provided in Table 5.2. Three basic principles underlie 
this classification: 
1. Within regions, natural geographic conditions, water resource development 
and use, and water conservancy development and objectives are sufficiently 
similar; 
2. Distinctions important to different main-stem river sections or tributaries are 
maintained; and, 
3. If possible, the administrative boundaries and catchment areas corresponding 
to major works on the main stem or tributaries are preserved (Heaney et al 
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2005). 
Figure 5.1 Yellow River Basin Water Resource Regions 
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Source: World Bank 1993 and ABARE 2005. 
Table 5.2 Regions of the Yellow River Basin 
Region 
1 
2 
3A 
3B 
4 
5A 
5B 
6 
7A 
7B 
Source: ABARE 2005. 
Provinces Included in Each Region 
Sichuan, Gansu and Qinghai 
Gansu and Qinghai 
Gansu, Ningxia and Shaanxi 
Inner Mongolia 
Shanxi, Inner Mongolia and Shaanxi 
Shanxi and Henan 
Gansu, Ningxia and Shaanxi 
Shaanxi, Shanxi and Henan 
He nan 
Shandong 
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5.2.4 Modelling Approach 
Hydrological modelling may be used to estimate runoff reductions caused by 
water and soil conservation measures. The approach involves the establishment 
of a rainfall - runoff model based on the relationships demonstrated in 
hydrological statistics before the water and soil conservation measures are 
undertaken in the catchment. Once the model is established, precipitation data for 
the period after the conservation measures are adopted are used to predict runoff 
levels without the conservation measures recorded. This prediction is then 
compared with the actual runoff for the period. The difference between the two is 
the total runoff reduction due to the water and soil conservation measures. An 
alternative method based on the results of field experiments involving the 
measurement of surface runoff to derive runoff reduction indicators for each type 
of water and soil conservation measures within the experiment site. These 
indicators were then multiplied by the extent of water and soil conservation 
measures to calculate runoff reductions across the whole catchment (Zhou et al 
2006). 
There are strengths and weaknesses associated with both approaches (Zhou et al 
2006). The hydrological modelling approach has the advantages of directly 
calculating the integrated runoff reduction effect of all water and soil 
conservation measures in the catchment without extrapolating from the 
experiment sites to the wider catchment. The non-linear relationships of each 
conservation measure can also be integrated. However, there are also problems 
associated with this approach (Zhou et al 2006). 
First, large scale water and soil conservation measures have been adopted only 
after the 1970s, implying that for the majority of catchments the 1950s or 1960s 
are used as the base year to establish the hydrological models. Observation and 
measurement started only in the mid 1950s and hence time series data was 
limited. In addition, there were very few hydrological stations in the 1950s and 
1960s which also limited the accuracy and representation of the hydrological 
models. 
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Secondly, water and soil conservation measures were adopted in some 
catchments in the 1950s and 1960s which led to a reduction in runoff. This 
amount of water should be added to the natural runoff when the runoff reduction 
is calculated, but this has not been done in practice. 
Thirdly, the hydrological models are established based on the relationships 
between precipitation and runoff. The precipitation is normally recorded in large 
temporal scale of month, flood season or year, which cannot fully capture the 
year-round precipitation - runoff relationships. 
Lastly, the spatial scale of the hydrological models is catchments. The reality is 
full of complexities. On the one hand, water and soil conservation practices lead 
to runoff reduction in catchments. On the other hand, human interferences such 
as devegetation, reclamation on steep slopes, large scale urban expansion and 
road construction may result in an increase in runoff. Similar to water and soil 
conservation practices, water conservancy may contribute to runoff reduction. In 
addition, both human and natural factors such as precipitation and meteorological 
conditions have an impact on the hydrological cycle. These complexities imply 
that the hydrological modelling approach could only assess the overall impacts of 
all the factors on runoff reduction rather than delineating the specific impact of 
water and soil conservation practices, let alone the impact of the specific water 
and soil conservation practices. 
The biggest advantage of the field experiments approach over the hydrological 
modelling approach is its ability to analyse the runoff reduction impact of 
specific conservation practices. However, extrapolation of site-specific results to 
the wider catchment mainly relies on statistics and comparative studies. This 
could not fully reflect the complexities of the hydrological processes and the 
scale effects of different factors on each stage of the hydrological cycle after up-
scaling. In addition, when results are extrapolated to the catchment level, the 
overall runoff reduction of the multiple conservation practices is derived by the 
linear aggregation of runoff reduction effect of each specific conservation 
practice. The interaction of each specific conservation practices and their non-
linear relationships cannot be integrated into the assessment. 
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In this research, because the rich data set required by the hydrological modelling 
approach is currently unavailable, the field experiments approached is used. 
5.2.5 Data Processing 
The 10 regions are further divided into a number of basic calculation units taking 
into consideration the temporal and spatial variation of the revegetation measures 
under the CCFGP and the runoff reduction indicators. The boundary of the basic 
calculation units does not overlap with the boundary of provinces and 
autonomous regions. The runoff reduction in each basic calculation unit is then 
calculated and the results aggregated over the 10 regions. 
To calculate runoff change, data has been collected on the conversion area during 
2000-2010 in each province and autonomous region within the YRB. The 
conversion area for 2000-2004 is obtained from statistics, while for 2005-2010 
the implementation plan for the CCFGP is referred to. Based on the CCFGP plan, 
all the area suitable for conversion should be converted by 2010. For the food 
security consideration, no land will be converted after 2010. The accumulated 
conversion area between 2000 and 2020 totals 4.87 million hectares (Table 5.3). 
Table 5.3 Accumulated Conversion Area in Provinces and Autonomous Regions in the Yellow River Basin 
Unit: 10,000 ha. 
Province/ 
Inner 
Autonomous Qinghai Gansu Ningxia Shaanxi Shanxi Henao Total 
Region 
Mongolia 
Province-wide 34.19 96.94 37.04 81.37 135.20 48.66 53.28 486.68 
Within the 
Yellow River 26.98 68.91 37.04 14.43 127.52 27.50 9.60 311.98 
Bain 
Proportion(%) 78.9 71.1 100.0 17.7 94.3 56.5 18.0 64.1 
The conversion area falls within each of the 10 regions is derived and projected 
through data processing on the GIS platform. Details of the practice are as 
follows (Zhou et al 2006). 
First of all, the land area that is suitable for conversion is defined. Based on the 
national survey of land utilisation using remote sensing data, land in China can 
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be classified into six main categories and further divided into 31 sub-categories. 
Cultivated land is one of the main categories, with seven sub-categories 
including highland paddy field, highland dry field, tableland paddy field, 
tableland dry field, lowland paddy field, lowland dry field, and sloped dry field 
over 25 degrees. According to the principles of conversion set by the 
Government, sloped dry field over 25 degrees is prone to water-induced soil 
erosion and should be the top priority for conversion. Highland and tableland dry 
field should be converted next. Soil erosion is not severe in lowland, and 
therefore lowland dry field should be converted last. 
Next, based on the principles of conversion, the land use map in the Yellow 
River Basin in 2000 when the CCFGP started is used to define land area which is 
suitable for conversion in each province and autonomous region. The proportions 
of the potential conversion area both within and out of the Yell ow River Basin 
are calculated based on which the conversion area within the Yellow River Basin 
is derived (see Table 5.3). 
Finally, based on the spatial distribution of the potential conversion area within 
the Yellow River Basin, the conversion area in each basic calculation unit is 
derived and aggregated to match the geographical boundaries of the 10 regions. 
The conversion area (assumed for the 20-year time period) in each of the 10 
regions is therefore derived8 and is shown in Table 5.4. Because the inland water 
area is not included, the accumulated conversion area in the 10 regions during the 
20 years amounts to 3.05 million hectares, a little smaller than the accumulated 
conversion area in the Yellow River Basin which is about 3.12 million hectares. 
8 It should be noted that the model assumes that site selection for CCFGP is ideal from the biophysical 
perspective. 
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Table 5.4 Accumulated Conversion Area in the Ten Regions in the Yellow River Basin during 2000-
2020 Unit: 10,000 ha. 
Year I II III-A III-B IV V-A V-B VI VII-A VII-B 
2000 0.07 0.85 1.30 0.12 0.62 0.63 2.93 0.16 0.09 0.00 
2001 0.21 1.83 2.66 0.27 3.22 1.56 6.83 0.42 0.18 0.00 
2002 0.89 6.20 7.81 0.84 15.97 10.38 25.21 2.36 0.66 0.00 
2003 1.77 13.20 20.71 2.32 33.11 17.75 54.50 4.46 1.36 0.01 
2004 1.96 14.47 25.16 3.01 42.80 19.66 67.94 4.88 1.45 0.01 
2005 3.64 25.28 32.00 3.34 54.12 22.97 92.78 6.88 2.46 0.02 
2006 4.15 28.56 34.81 3.58 59.56 23.71 103.07 7.63 2.88 0.02 
2007 4.54 31.01 36.92 3.76 63.64 24.26 110.78 8.20 3.20 0.02 
2008 4.67 31.83 37.62 3.82 65.00 24.45 113.35 8.39 3.31 0.02 
2009 4.80 32.65 38.32 3.88 66.36 24.63 115.92 8.57 3.41 O.o3 
2010-
2020 
4.92 33.47 39.02 3.94 67.72 24.82 118.49 8.76 3.52 0.03 
It can be seen from Table 5.4 that Region I has a small conversion area as it is 
located in the highland frigid zone where cultivation is limited. Inner Mongolia 
has a large conversion area under the CCFGP, with most of it located in Region 
IV where highlands and tablelands dominate while little in the lowland Region 
III-B. Region IV and V-B are the key area where water and soil conservation is 
implemented on the Loess Plateau and accordingly have a large conversion area. 
Rainfall condition is good in Region VI and VII-A with high vegetation cover. 
Soil erosion is not severe in these regions, so there is not much area under 
conversion. Region VII-B is located in the lowland area where rainfall condition 
is very good, so there is almost no need for land conversion. 
5.2.6 Results 
The research work conducted by the Yellow River Sedimentation Change 
Research Foundation (Wang and Fan 2002) has been used to define the runoff 
reduction indicators in this research based on which runoff reductions derived 
from the CCFGP is calculated and projected. Results show that the CCFGP has 
brought about reductions in runoff and this trend will continue. With an 
accumulated revegetation area of 3.05 million hectares in the YRB during the 21 
year period, the cumulative runoff reductions in the Basin will total 7635.2 
million cubic metres, around 1.2 per cent of the total amount of surface water in 
the Basin (Zhou et al 2006). The results are displayed in Table 5.5. As no land 
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Total 
6.77 
17.18 
70.32 
149.19 
181.34 
243.49 
267.97 
286.33 
292.46 
298.57 
304.69 
will be converted under the CCFGP after 2010, it is projected that the runoff 
reductions will remain constant during 2010 to 2020. After 2010, the total annual 
runoff reductions in the YRB are around 450.7 million cubic metres. Runoff 
reductions are relatively little in Region I, III-B, VI, VII-A and VII-B where the 
total land area is small, whereas in Region II, III-A, IV, V-A and V-B where the 
land area is large, runoff reductions are also relatively large. 
Table 5.5 Annual Runoff Reductions under the Conversion of Cropland to Forest and Grassland Program 
(CCFGP) in the Yellow River Basin Region Unit: 100 million M3 
Year I 
0.003 
0.009 
0.036 
0.072 
0.080 
0.148 
0.169 
0.185 
0.190 
0.195 
II 
0.034 
0.068 
0.217 
0.468 
0.512 
0.881 
0.992 
1.075 
1.103 
1.131 
III-A 
0.025 
0.050 
0.145 
0.380 
0.451 
0.599 
0.655 
0.696 
0.710 
0.724 
III-B 
0.002 
0.004 
0.012 
0.033 
0.042 
0.047 
0.050 
0.053 
0.054 
0.055 
IV 
0.008 
0.034 
0.155 
0.325 
0.414 
0.516 
0.563 
0.599 
0.611 
0.623 
Region 
V-A 
O.Q15 
0.033 
0.207 
0.348 
0.381 
0.438 
0.449 
0.456 
0.459 
0.461 
V-B 
0.028 
0.066 
0.248 
0.531 
0.665 
0.906 
1.007 
1.083 
1.108 
1.133 
VI 
0.001 
0.003 
O.Q18 
0.035 
0.038 
0.053 
0.059 
0.064 
0.065 
0.067 
VII-A 
0.001 
0.001 
0.005 
0.011 
0.011 
0.019 
0.022 
0.025 
0.026 
0.026 
VII-B 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
Total 
0.117 
0.268 
1.043 
2.203 
2.594 
3.607 
3.966 
4.236 
4.326 
4.415 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010-
2020* 
0.201 1.159 0.738 0.056 0.635 0.464 1.159 0.068 0.027 0.000 4.507 
Source: Zhou et al 2006. 
*The runoff reductions data in this row are for each year between 2010 and 2020. 
The projections so established are validated through a comparison against the 
study conducted by the Yellow River Sedimentation Change Research 
Foundation (YRSCR). Table 5.6 provides a comparison of the runoff reduction 
results from both this research and the research conducted by the YRSCRF. In 
the YRSCRF studies, the water and soil conservation area for Region I to Region 
V-B totals 7.23 million hectares, among which 4.79 million hectares are 
revegetation area. Water and soil conservation leads to a total runoff reduction of 
1.45 billion CUBIC METRES. In this research, the accumulated conversion area 
in the YRB from 2000 to 2020 totals 3.05 million hectares, with a total runoff 
reduction reaching 450.6 million CUBIC METRES. The results from the two 
research studies are consistent at the Basin level. 
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Table 5.6 Comparative Studies of Runoff Reduction 
YRSCRF research• This research 
Region 
Among this: Runoff Conversion Area Total Runoff Area of Water and Revegetation 
Soil Conservation Area Reduction underCCFGP Reduction during 
( 10,000 hm2 ) ( 10,000 000 during 2000-2020 2000-2020 
hm2 ) million m
3 ) ( 10,000 hm2 ) ( 100 million m3 ) 
I 4.92 0.201 
II 
94.49 .. 41.23 .. 3.3·· 
33.47 1.159 
III-A 39.02 0.738 
III-B 3.94 0.056 
IV 333.2 253.7 4.00 67.72 0.635 
V-A ... 137.0 90.2 8.12 24.82 0.464 
V-B 252.3 135.3 2.41 118.49 1.159 
VI - - - 8.76 0.068 
VII-A - - - 3.52 0.027 
VII-B - - - 0.03 0 
Total 722.5 479.2 14.5 304.69 4.506 
Note: •Data for Region I to III-Bare from YRSCRF (Wang and Fan 2002 Vol. I), with the area for water 
and soil conservation and preserved revegetation area coming from the 1989 statistics and runoff 
reduction being the annual average from 1980-1989. Data for Region IV to V-B are from YRSCRF 
(Wang and Fan 2002 Vol. II), with the area for water and soil conservation and preserved 
revegetation area coming from the 1996 statistics and runoff reduction being the annual average 
from 1989-1996. 
••Data for Region I to Ill-B were collected only for the main branches of the Yellow River including 
Yao He River, Huang Shui River, Da Tong River, Zu Li River and Qing Shui River, etc. 
•••Data for Region V-A involves were only collected for the Fen He River catchments. 
It can be seen from Table 5.6 that the results from the two studies are not 
consistent for Region V-A. This is because of the internal inconsistency of the 
YRSCRF results. In their studies, the preserved revegetation area was 616,000 
hectares in 1989 with an annual runoff reduction of 29 million CUBIC METRES. 
In 1996, the preserved revegetation area totalled 902,000 hectares which was 
about 1.46 times of the area in 1989, but the runoff reduction reached 564 million 
CUBIC METRES which was 19.45 times of volume in 1989. 
It should be noted that the accuracy of the methods used to estimate runoff 
reductions is constrained by the extrapolation of site-specific experimental 
results to the wider catchment mainly relying on statistics and comparative 
studies. This could not fully reflect the complexities of the hydrological 
processes and the scale effects of different factors on each stage of the 
hydrological cycle after up-scaling. Ideally physically based hydrological models 
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should be used to estimate runoff reductions caused by water and soil 
conservation measures. By using physically based hydrological models, the 
impact of conservation measures on each stage and process of the hydrological 
cycle can be properly assessed. However, these models require a rich data source 
and also involve complicated calculations. 
5.3 Modelling Changes to Other Environmental Attributes 
5.3.1 Geographical Boundary 
The geographical boundary for the biophysical changes that are to be valued in 
the CM study is set to the Loess Plateau. The selection of the Loess Plateau is 
based on the scientific uncertainties and difficulties in establishing the large-scale 
biophysical links between the CCFGP and its consequence for the environmental 
attributes of interest to people inside and beyond the Plateau. These impacts 
depend on interactions between a large number of land uses, vegetation and 
geological characteristics that occur within heterogeneous landscapes over a 
range of spatial and temporal scales. Very little research has been done in up-
scaling site-specific biophysical monitoring results on the Loess Plateau to areas 
beyond the Plateau. 
5.3.2 Environmental Attributes 
For the CM study, surveys are conducted and respondents are asked to compare 
the outcome of alternative resource management strategies against the status quo. 
It is the change of value 'at the margin' from the status quo to the alternatives 
that the CM researcher aims to estimate. In the CM questionnaire, environmental 
attributes are needed to describe the specific environmental settings and how 
they change between the 'status quo' situation and a number of different 
'proposed' situations. Based on the availability of scientific studies, the supply 
and demand perspectives as well as the principles for the selection of attributes, 
four environmental attributes are selected and defined as follows to cover general 
environmental issues that are of concern to people living in North China: 
air quality defined as the sandstorm frequency 
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landscape aesthetics defined as the vegetation cover 
water quality defined as the water use or sediment discharge 
biodiversity defined as the number of plant species present 
In the following sub-sections, the ranges over which the levels of these attributes 
vary are described. These are based on the identification of biophysical changes 
taken place on the Loess Plateau with the CCFGP in place. The range of the 
attributes is between the projected level in the 'without CCFGP' scenario9 and 
the best level that could be achieved under the CCFGP. The units to measure 
these attributes have also been developed. It is also important to note that the 
CCFGP has an implementation plan from 2000 on to 2010 only. Definitions of 
attributes and their ranges will be detailed in the following sub-sections. 
5.3.3 Air Quality 
Land use changes influences local soil erosion. Sand invasion and dune 
movement buries arable land and causes sand storms in far-reaching eastern area. 
In this research, sandstorm frequency is used to describe air quality. Specifically, 
the annual sandstorm days in the Loess Plateau area has been developed as the 
unit of measurement. Xu (2004) has analysed the relationship between land use 
change and sandstorm frequencies in the vicinity of the Erdos Plateau, which 
covers the sandy area in the North Loess Plateau and the surrounding sandstorm-
struck area mainly in the Loess Plateau. In the first stage of the analysis, the 
effect of land desertification on sandstorm frequencies was investigated. A non-
linear relationship was established between sandstorm frequency and the index of 
land desertification (I1ct), which is defined as the percentage of the area of 
desertified land of the total. The relationship indicates that when I1ct is less than 
30 per cent, the sandstorm frequency did not change with an increasing I1ct. 
However, when I1ct is greater than 30 per cent, the sandstorm frequency increased 
rapidly 10• 
9 Assumption has been made that farmers will revert to prior land use management once the subsidy stops in 
2007. Thus under the baseline scenario, which is the 'with subsidisation under the CCFGP for 8 years', 
projected levels of the attributes will be no worse than the 'without CCFGP' scenario. In other words, 
projections made under the 'without CCFGP' scenario can well represent the worst possible level of the 
attributes. 
10 The equation of the relationship is: Dss=l3.144lnlld - 38.828, where Dss denotes annual sandstorm days, 11d 
denotes the percentage of the area of desertified land of the total. 
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In the second stage of Xu's study, the time series of annual sandstorm days in the 
neighboring area of the Plateau was related to the time series of annual strong 
wind days and the area of cultivated land. A relationship was estimated, based on 
which the relative contribution of changes in land use was 59.7 per cent and in 
the number of strong wind days was 40.3 per cent11 • This result indicates that the 
frequency of sandstorms may be effectively decreased by reducing the area of 
cultivated land and restoring steppe ecosystem in the ecologically fragile areas in 
arid and semi-arid climates. Since the soil erosion area is greater than 30 per cent 
in both the 'with CCFGP' and 'without CCFGP' scenario, the relationship can 
apply. Specifically, the area of cultivation that has been converted to vegetation 
would make a contribution of 59.7 per cent to sandstorm reduction on the Loess 
Plateau. 
With the relationship between land use change and sandstorm frequencies being 
established, it is now possible to estimate sandstorm frequency changes with and 
without the CCFGP. To do this, it is important to first understand the land use 
change on the Loess Plateau under these two scenarios. According to Asian 
Development Bank (2003), desertification in China is occurring on about 2.62 
million sq km, with an annual expansion of 24,600 sq km. For the 'without 
CCFGP' scenario, the total desertification area in China will increase by 18.8 per 
cent in 20 years time by 2020 at the current rate of desertification12• Since almost 
90 per cent of desertification area is located in the North West part of China and 
the Loess Plateau is within the region, an assumption can be made that the 
desertification rate, and hence the sanctification rate, on the Loess Plateau is the 
same as that of the Northwest. Thus without CCFGP, there will be 18.8 per cent 
more desertification area on the Loess Plateau in 2020 compared to 1999. 
Increased area of desertification on the Loess Plateau would lead to higher 
sandstorm frequency according to Xu (2004). Using the relationship between 
land use change and sandstorm frequencies identified earlier, the level of 
sandstorm days on the Loess Plateau is thus estimated to be 11.2 per cent more 
11 The multiple regression equation is: lnD,, = 0.368 lnD,w + 0.546 lnA. where D,, denotes annual sandstorm 
days, D,w denotes annual strong wind days, and A0 denotes area of cultivated land. 
12 This prediction is made by the following calculation: 24600 KM2/ 2620000 KM2 * 20 years = 18.8%. 
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than the 2000 level by year 2020 in the 'without CCFGP' scenario13 . Based on 
meteorological data collected in 83 counties on the Loess Plateau during 1971-
2000 (China Meteorological Bureau 2005), the annual sandstorm days in areas 
with severe soil erosion is around 20 days. An increase of 11.2 per cent in 
sandstorm frequency without CCFGP in place means that there would be 22 
annual sandstorm days on the Loess Plateau by 2020. 
Land use change and consequent sandstorm frequency change under the 'with 
CCFGP' scenario can be estimated in similar ways. According to the 
implementation plan, about 121,000 sq km of water and wind-induced soil 
erosion area on the Loess Plateau will be brought under control through the 
implementation of the CCFGP (Gao, Yan and Liu 2003). Within this area of 
reduced soil erosion, about 17 ,900 sq km will be the reduced desertification area. 
Compared to the desertification area on the Loess Plateau in 1999 which was 
60,600 sq km, the 'with CCFGP' scenario represents a decrease in desertification 
area by 29.5 per cent on the Loess Plateau (see Appendix I for the derivation of 
these results). This land use change would lead to a decrease of 17.6 per cent in 
sandstorm frequencies in the Loess Plateau area by 2020. Thus with the CCFGP 
in place, there would be 16 sandstorm days per year by 2020. This is the best 
level that could be achieved under the 'with CCFGP' scenario. 
5.3.4 Landscape Aesthetics 
The definition of landscape aesthetics is a challenge because vegetation cover, 
which will best describe landscape aesthetics, has been identified as a causally 
prior attribute through the focus group discussions. Hence the information 
presented to respondents need to ensure that landscape aesthetics are introduced 
while at the same time not being perceived as a causal attribute for other 
attributes. To do this, explanations can be made in the questionnaire that 
vegetation cover is only one factor causing the change in sandstorm frequency, 
water quality and plant species diversity -the distribution and type of trees can 
13 This result is derived by: 18.8%* 59.7% = 11.2%. It should be noted that the interaction of strong wind 
days and the change in land cover has already been captured by the multiple regression equation based on 
which the contribution ratio is derived. Unless extreme climate conditions apply, predictions made about 
future sandstorms frequency by using the contribution ratio of land cover change should be considered valid. 
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also have an impact14. Even though landscape aesthetics of the Loess Plateau can 
be described either qualitatively or quantitatively in terms of its levels, 
quantitative expression is preferred because of its modelling and valuation 
potential. Vegetation cover will be used as the descriptor of landscape aesthetics 
in the draft survey questionnaire for further pre-test in the focus groups. 
The Loess Plateau has the most severe ecological deterioration in north western 
China, with 70 per cent of its area being eroded by wind and water (PTFDSSD 
2003). It is also one of the key areas for ecological rehabilitation under the Great 
West Development Strategy that has been undertaken by the Chinese 
Government. The CCFGP and the Natural Forest Protection Program are the two 
key programs to implement this Strategy. As an important component of the 
Strategy, landscape in the North West provinces will be changed from gully and 
hilly barren lands to green lands and hills through revegetation activities. Thus 
the terms 'gully and hilly barren hills' and 'green lands' could be considered as 
the basis for further qualitative descriptions of the landscape attribute as an 
alternative if vegetation cover is finally dropped out as a result of the pre-test of 
the draft survey questionnaire. 
The vegetation cover on the Loess Plateau needs to be projected to 2020 in the 
'without CCFGP' scenario. There have been very few aggregate data collected 
on the total vegetation cover in the Loess Plateau region largely because forest 
and grassland management m China falls into the jurisdiction of two 
administrative agencies, that is, the State Forestry Administration and the 
Ministry of Agriculture. Data have been collected on forest cover in the region. 
Several studies show that forest cover in the region remains around seven per 
cent throughout the 1990s (Sun and Zhu 1995: 22; Peng 2001; Cheng and Wan 
2002), despite the fact that great afforestation effort has been made in the region 
during this period. This is mainly because of the low rate of survival for trees due 
to the low precipitation level and poor soil quality on the Loess Plateau. 
Furthermore, places suitable for afforestation were already used for cultivation 
activities. Even though ecological rehabilitation under different programs has 
14 Post-survey tests could also be conducted to check for the causal effect (Rolfe and Windle 2005). 
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been undertaken, no big change is likely without returning cropland to forests at 
a large scale. 
However, a general trend toward over-grazing and grassland degradation in the 
Loess Plateau region has been observed (PTFDSSD 2003; ADB 2003; Shi and 
Ya 2002). About 97 per cent, 59 per cent and 45 per cent of grassland is 
degraded respectively in Ningxia, Shaanxi and Gansu autonomous region and 
provinces on the Loess Plateau (Shi and Ya 2002). Overall, 60 per cent of 
grassland degradation is observed on the Loess Plateau (Gao et al 2003), and this 
percentage is used to make projections of grassland cover by 2020. Vegetation 
cover on the Loess Plateau including both forest and grassland cover, is predicted 
to drop to 9.6 per cent by 2020 without the CCFGP in place15 . 
According to the ecological rehabilitation plan under the CCFGP, vegetation 
cover on the Loess Plateau will reach 40 per cent by 2010 (Hu and Wang 2000). 
The improvement of technical competence in planting trees and grass has been 
emphasised in the CCFGP implementation plan to increase the rate of survival. 
As there would be no further implementation plan for the CCFGP beyond 2010, 
and seedlings planted before 2010 will grow into forests by 2020, it can be 
concluded that forest and grass cover on the Loess Plateau will be 40 per cent by 
2020. This is the best level that could be achieved under the CCFGP. 
5.3.5 Water Quality 
Eroded soil being carried by heavy rainfall to streams and lakes will cause excess 
turbidity that harms aquatic life, increases water treatment costs, and makes the 
water less useful for recreation. Soil erosion will also cause sedimentation that 
clogs drainage ditches, stream channels, water intakes, and reservoirs, and 
destroys aquatic habitats (USGS 2003). Thus there are two possible ways to 
describe water quality. First, water quality can be described in terms of water 
15 According to Yan et al (1998), forest and grass cover on the Loess Plateau was 13.6% by 1998. Forest 
cover on the Loess Plateau remained 7% throughout the 1990s and is projected to remain constant over the 
next 20 years. Thus the vegetation cover including both forest and grassland cover would drop to: 
7%+(13.6%-7%)*60%= 9.6% 
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usage based on different water grades. Second, it can be described in terms of 
sediment discharge into the rivers. 
In China, the Environmental Quality Standard for Surface Water was established 
to implement the Environmental Protection Law and the Law on Prevention and 
Control of Water Pollution. Surface water is divided into five grades according to 
uses and the aims of protection (SEPA 2002): 
Grade I: mainly suitable for water sources and State Nature Reserves; 
Grade II: mainly suitable for first class protection areas of concentrated 
drinking water sources, habitats of precious aquatic species, spawning areas 
for fishes and shrimps, and feeding areas for juvenile fishes; 
Grade III: mainly suitable for second class protection areas of concentrated 
drinking water sources, winter ground for fishes and shrimps, aquaculture 
production and swimming areas; 
Grade IV: mainly suitable for the common industrial water sources and areas 
used for recreation where water does not directly touch human bodies; 
Grade V: mainly suitable for agricultural use and water areas in common 
landscape areas. 
In general, water quality in the main stream of the Yellow River is better than 
that of its tributaries. Even so, the water quality at 63.1 per cent of the monitored 
sections along the main stream of the Yellow River was Grade V and worse than 
Grade V in 1999 (PRC 1999). Only 18.4 per cent of the monitored sections 
showed a water quality between Grade I and Grade Ill. The main tributaries of 
the Yellow River including Fen River, Wei River, Huangshui River and Yiluo 
River which are located on the Loess Plateau were severely polluted (PRC 1999). 
In 2003, the water quality at 47 .8 per cent of the monitored sections along the 
main stream of the Yellow River was Grade V and worse (PRC 2003). Almost 
all the tributaries in the Middle and Lower Reaches of the Yellow River had a 
water quality of worse than Grade V all through the year, with most of the 
tributaries in the Middle Reach running through the Loess Plateau. 
Specific monitoring indices have been set up to measure water quality. They 
include the hardness of water, the level of ammonia nitrogen (NH3-N), biological 
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oxygen demand (BOD), and chemical oxygen demand (COD) level in the water 
(SEPA 2002). For this study, NH3-N level has been used as the index to find out 
the changes in the grades of water on the Loess Plateau in the 'with CCFGP' and 
'without CCFGP' scenarios. NH3-N level has been chosen as the indicator for 
three reasons. First, NH3-N level is one of the main indicators to classify water 
into different grades. Secondly, NH3-N level in the water can be reduced through 
vegetation rehabilitation in the watershed. Therefore it will be affected by the 
revegetation activities under the CCFGP. Thirdly, NH3-N is one of the main 
pollutants in the Yellow River and its tributaries according to the 1999 
Environmental Communique in China (PRC). Table 5.7 shows the national 
quality standard for each grade of water in terms of its NH3-N level. 
Table 5.7 Environmental Quality Standard for Surface Water - NHrN Level 
Grade of Water Level of NHrN (mg/L) 
Grade I :'.S 0.15 
Grade II :'.S 0.5 
Grade III 
Grade IV 
Grade V 
Source: SEP A 2002. 
:'.S 1.0 
:'.S 1.5 
:'.S2.0 
Empirical research in the Loess Plateau area shows that vegetation can reduce the 
level of NH3-N in the rivers (Sun and Zhu 1995: 377-82). Table 5.8 below 
demonstrates the difference in NH3-N level in rivers with different landscapes on 
the Loess Plateau. The NH3-N level in rivers running through barren slopes 
coincides with the threshold level of national standard for water quality of Grade 
V (about 2.0 mg/L). In contrast, rivers with vegetated catchments have lower 
NH3-N levels (less than 1.0 mg/L) defined as better than Grade III according to 
the national standard. It is worth noting that the shrub and arbor species shown in 
Table 5.8 are the two main species used for revegetation on the Loess Plateau 
under the CCFGP. 
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Table 5.8 NH3-N level in Rivers with Different Landscapes 
Source Level of NH3-N (mg/L} 
Natural precipitation 0.42 
Barren slopes 2.02 
Shrub ( Ostryopsis davidiana) 0.94 
Chinese pine (Pinus tabulaeformis) 0.72 
Source: Adapted from Table 7.10.4 in Sun and Zhu 1995: 377-82. 
Monitoring results in 1999 and 2003 show some improvement in the water 
quality of the main stream of the Yellow River partly due to the pollution control 
effort, but the level of water pollution in the tributaries further deteriorated and 
that situation is likely to remain over the next two decades. This is because as 
local industries grow, more sewage will be discharged into these tributaries so 
that the pollution control effort cannot offset the damage within a short period of 
time. Thus it can be assumed that in the 'without CCFGP' scenario, the river 
sections on the Loess Plateau would have water quality worse than Grade V level, 
an indication that the river system would almost lose all its basic ecological 
functions. Trees and grasses planted under the CCFGP would impose the rivers' 
ecological functions. The best level of water quality that could be achieved under 
the CCFGP would be that watersheds on the Loess Plateau that are covered by 
vegetation would have water quality the can be processed for drinking water. 
The second way to describe water quality is by the amount of sediment discharge 
into the Yellow River. The Loess Plateau is the source of about 90 per cent of all 
the sediment that enters into the Yellow River. In recent decades a total of 2.2 
billion tons of topsoil are washed away every year on the Loess Plateau, with 
around 70 per cent into the Yellow River (Huang 2000). This equals an average 
of 1.6 billion tons of sediment being carried each year by the Yellow River (Peng 
2001). As the total desertification area in China will increase by 18.8 per cent by 
2020 (see the previous 'air quality' sub-section), the total amount of sediment 
discharge will amount to 1.9 billion tons by 2020 in the 'without CCFGP' 
scenario. With the CCFGP in place, it has been projected that the annual 
sediment discharge from the Loess Plateau into the Yellow River will be reduced 
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to 1.42 billion tons 16 which represents 25 per cent less sediment discharge (Wang 
2001; Yang and Gao 2003). This is the best level that could be achieved through 
the implementation of the CCFGP. 
In comparing the two descriptors for water quality, it is worth noting that even 
though vegetation has a potential to improve water quality, it cannot decide water 
quality ultimately. Tributaries of the Yellow River on the Loess Plateau have two 
main pollution sources: industrial sewage and domestic waste disposal, and the 
runoff from barren slopes which brings chemicals into the tributaries. Even 
though chemicals brought into the tributaries can be filtered by vegetation cover 
on the slopes, vegetation in the watershed cannot do much about industrial 
sewage being discharged into the rivers. The descriptor of sediment discharge 
seems to be more relevant in the CCFGP context in the sense that soil erosion 
will be brought under control through revegetation activities. However, sediment 
discharge is more of a 'physical attribute' than an 'effect attribute' which may be 
less closely linked to people. Both these two descriptors of the water quality 
attribute were pre-tested in the second round of focus groups. 
5.3.6 Biodiversity 
Forests and grasslands provide habitat for a wide variety of plants and animals 
and also provide a vast store of genetic information. Vegetation helps to restore 
the disturbed ecosystem functions and fragmented habitats which are the main 
causes for species decline and extinction. The wildlife values provided by 
revegetation are regarded as being a function of 'naturalness', diversity and rarity. 
Diversity is typically regarded as being most valuable if it is itself natural. 
Conservationists tend to regard such gains (biodiversity value generated by 
revegetation) as being at the expense of natural diversity. Most afforestation 
tends to increase diversity based on the assumption that afforestation displaces 
low value agricultural land which, in turn, is regarded as being of low wildlife 
conservation interest (Pearce 1998: 160). 
16 It has been planned that the annual sediment discharge into the Yellow River will be reduced by 0.65 
billion tons by 2020 through integrated water and soil conservation measures on the Loess Plateau (Yang 
and Gao 2003). Forests and grass contribute to 27.3% of the reduction (Wang 2001). Therefore, the 
sediment discharge due to the CCFGP will be: 1.6-0.65*27.3%=1.42 billion tons. 
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Ideally the number of both fauna and flora species should be included to 
represent biodiversity change. However, no aggregate data of fauna species in 
the Loess Plateau region have been found. Therefore, for this research, the 
change in biodiversity induced by the CCFGP will be represented by the change 
in the number of plant species on the Loess Plateau. There are altogether 2,046 
plant species on the Loess Plateau (Cheng and Wan 2002). Around 15 to 20 per 
cent of plant species in China are being threatened (PTFDSSD 2003). Little 
information is available on the current status of the plant species on the Loess 
Plateau. As ecosystem deterioration on the Loess Plateau is more severe than in 
the other parts of China, an upper bound of 20 per cent of plant species being 
threatened is used as a proxy to make projections on the change in plant species 
on the Loess Plateau for the status quo situation. If the current deteriorating 
ecosystem remains without taking any mitigation actions, there would be only 
about 1637 plant species being protected from extinction on the Loess Plateau by 
2020. 
Research at Zhifanggou watershed in Ansai County, Shaanxi Province shows 
changes in composition and structure of plant communities after vegetation 
rehabilitation (Wang et al 2002a; Wang et al 2003b; Wang et al 2002b). Ansai is 
located in the Loess hilly gully region, and this type of land makes up about 70 
per cent of the Loess Plateau territory on which the CCFGP mainly takes place 
(Zhu 2003; Sun and Zhu 1995: 18-9). Discussions with experts (Wang, Zhang 
and Hou, personal communication, 2005) have also confirmed that the research 
results from Ansai are representative of the broader region and can be used to 
extrapolate to the whole Loess Plateau area. Research results show that 
vegetation rehabilitation would result in an increase in plant species from 126 up 
to 151 in 20 years' time (Wang et al 2002b ). This represents a 16.6 per cent 
increase in plant species. It can thus be estimated that with the CCFGP in place, 
there could be up to 2386 plant species being protected from extinction on the 
Loess Plateau by 2020. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, Hypothesis 3 of this research thesis has been tested with the 
biophysical changes caused by the implementation of the CCFGP in North West 
China being modelled for a 20-year period. The biophysical modelling work 
conducted in this research is the first of this type in the CCFGP literature. As 
noted earlier, studies on the environmental services provided by the CCFGP are 
scant. While the very few case studies to evaluate the ecological impact of the 
CCFGP involved only qualitative descriptions (Ge et al 2001; Shen et al 2001; 
Du and Guo 2001; Li et al 2001; Zhao 2001), this research quantified these 
biophysical changes where possible. The research work presented in this chapter 
provides a sound scientific basis for a comprehensive environmental valuation of 
the CCFGP. The environmental benefits and costs thus derived will form an 
integral component of the anticipated social welfare change from the CCFGP. 
The biophysical changes being modelled in this chapter include runoff reductions 
along the Yellow River and improvements in air quality, landscape aesthetics, 
water quality and biodiversity on the Loess Plateau. With the biophysical 
changes being identified and predicted, economic models will be built up in the 
following chapters to estimate environmental benefits and costs associated with 
these biophysical changes. 
As the value changes brought about by runoff reductions are directly observable 
from the market place, they are estimated as part of the market valuation exercise 
detailed in the next chapter. In contrast, preferences for some significant value 
components associated with changes in landscape aesthetics, air and water 
quality and biodiversity are not revealed directly or indirectly in markets. These 
non-market values will be estimated using the CM approach and the results will 
be reported in Chapter 7 to 9. 
120 
Chapter 6 
Market Valuation ofCCFGP 
6.1 Introduction 
The market valuation of the CCFGP in this research is comprised of two main 
parts. The first involves the social welfare impact of the Program on local 
agricultural production as a direct result of the land use change incurred. It is 
focused on the well being of the people of the North West Provinces. The second 
part of the market valuation involves the welfare change associated with the 
biophysical changes arising from the Program. In particular, it is the welfare 
change brought about by the reduced runoff that is to be valued. The runoff 
reductions not only affect people living on-site in the North West, but also those 
living off-site along the Yellow River. 
The valuation of agricultural production impacts of the CCFGP will begin with a 
farmer livelihood analysis. This will provide an insight into the livelihood impact 
of the Program on participating farmers and will be a useful tool in assessing the 
long-term sustainability of the land use changes which is one of the major policy 
concerns. This will be followed by an extension of the livelihood analysis to 
convert the household based information to a region wide population basis. The 
value estimates of agricultural production impacts in the region will be used in 
the cost benefit analysis (CBA). In valuing agricultural production impacts of the 
CCFGP, Hypothesis 1 'The CCFGP increases household income for 
participating farmers' and Hypothesis 2 'The CCFGP has a positive impact on 
agricultural production on the Loess Plateau' will be tested. 
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Hypothesis 4 'There are market benefits and costs associated with the 
biophysical changes arising from the CCFGP' will also be tested in this chapter. 
The impacts of the CCFGP-induced runoff reductions on the Basin-level social 
welfare will be valued. This will form another part of the market valuation that 
will be integrated into the CBA of the CCFGP. The structure of this chapter is 
follows. In Section 6.2, the agricultural production impacts of the CCFGP are 
evaluated. This is followed by a valuation of runoff reductions in Section 6.3. 
This chapter concludes with Section 6.4. 
6.2 Valuation of Agricultural Production Impacts 
6.2.1 Farmer Livelihood Analysis17 
One of the most important factors influencing farmers' decisions regarding their 
land use practices is the contribution made by alternative land uses to the net 
income of their households. Therefore the net incomes generated by land uses 
before and after the implementation of the CCFGP will be compared. Net farm 
household income is defined to include the revenues generated from all 
household activities net of their associated costs. By comparing the net farm 
household income with and without the CCFGP, the likelihood that farmers 
revert to their previous land use practices once the CCFGP payments are 
withdrawn can be investigated. 
A survey of 400 farm households was undertaken in 2004 to assess the impact of 
the CCFGP on the net farm income of participating households. Binxian and 
Ansai counties of Shaanxi Province and Gonghe and Minhe counties of Qinghai 
Province were chosen as the sample counties to cover a wide range of different 
agro-environmental and socio-economic characteristics. Three to five sample 
villages were selected from each of the four counties, and finally 20-30 farm 
households participating in CCFGP were selected from each village at random. 
Table 6.1 sets out the geographical distribution of the sample. 
17 This section is mostly drawn from Research Report No. 3 (ACIAR/2002/021) at 
http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/staff/jb suslndrr.php and Xie et al (2006). 
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Table 6.1 Geographical Distribution of Sampled Households 
Province Shaanxi 
No. 200 
County 
No. 
Village 1 
No. 
Village 2 
No. 
Village 3 
No. 
Village 4 
No. 
Village 5 
No. 
Binxian 
101 
Didian Villiage, 
Didian township 
35 
Poxiang Village, 
Xiaoxin Township 
34 
Licun Village 
Beiji Township 
32 
Ansai 
99 
Long'an Village, 
Jianhua Township 
37 
Fangjiahe Village 
Yanhewan 
Township 
27 
Gaoqiao Village, 
Songzhuang 
Township 
35 
Qinghai 
200 
Gonghe 
99 
Zhongzi village, 
Shazhuyu 
Township 
25 
Xiashe Village, 
Jiangxigou 
Township 
23 
Kecai Village, 
Longyang 
Township 
26 
Dongwei 
Village, 
Dao tang he 
Township 
25 
Minhe 
101 
Maying Village 
Maying Township 
20 
Jiaren Village 
Songshu Township 
23 
Baixing Village 
Songshu Township 
17 
Lijia Village 
Longzhi Township 
22 
Wujia Village 
Longzhi Township 
19 
The survey questionnaire included 94 questions split into four sections. The first 
section focused on the basic information pertaining to farm households, 
including age, education, gender, number of members, ethnic group, time 
participating in the CCFGP, and species and area of forest and grass planted. The 
second section involved agricultural production of farm households before the 
commencement of the CCFGP and in 2003. The questions in this section 
included sown areas, yields and prices of crops, yields and prices of livestock 
products, and the production details of other activities. The third section focused 
on the agricultural inputs of farm households before CCFGP and in 2003. The 
questions in this section included use of hired labour, pesticide, chemical 
fertilizer, seeds, agricultural machines, animal power, irrigation water and 
electricity, forage, livestock, fences and barns, tax and land rent. In addition, this 
section included questions on the expenditure of farm households on CCFGP 
related activities and the subsidies received. The final section concentrated on 
off-farm revenue of farm households and their future expectations. 
The area of cropland available to a household is a key factor determining income. 
It is also an important potential determinant of the scale and impact of the 
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CCFGP. In the year prior to the introduction of the CCFGP, the 400 sampled 
households cultivated an area of 9778.5 mu, or an average per household of 24.5 
mu. After the CCFGP was in place in 2003, the total area of cropping land of the 
sampled households was 2871 mu, an average per household of 7 .2 mu. Changes 
in land use induced by the Program are summarised in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 Land Use Change Before and After CCFGP in Sampled Households 
Change in cropping area (%) 
Average area in CCFGP/household 
(mu) 
Binxian 
-31.l 
2.65 
Ansai Gonghe 
-82.5 
22.l 
-74.5 
51.1 
Minhe 
-60.3 
8.2 
Total 
-70.6 
20.9 
Revenues and costs are projected over time given two alternative settings: with 
and without the CCFGP. These projections are made on the assumption that the 
'without CCFGP' setting is characterised by the conditions observed in 1999 and 
the 'with CCFGP' setting is represented by the data collected for 2003 18. The net 
present value of the net profits of the sampled farm households with and without 
the Program was estimated over a 20 year time period from 1999 onward to 2018. 
Projections are made for a range of parameters including yield and price changes 
for newly introduced farm outputs by local experts19. 
Projected revenue of sampled households is sourced from crop production, 
livestock production, off-farm employment and other business including the 
production of fruits, hay and aquaculture from CCFGP areas. Grain and cash 
subsidies are added to the revenues with the CCFGP in place. The level of costs 
'without CCFGP' is assumed constant at 1999 levels over the 20-year time frame. 
The 'with CCFGP' case is based on 2003 data collected from the survey and 
projections of expenditures relating to the converted forest and grassland made 
by local experts. 
18 The possibility of recall bias may arise in data collection. 
19 Interviews were conducted with experts at Beijing Forestry University and other research institutions to 
determine yields at varying planting densities. In the absence of published research on forest and grass 
output and price forecasts, local experts were asked to provide forecasts on the basis of historical data taking 
into account price elasticities of demand when supply increases are forecast. The revenue predictions also 
embody an increase of 2.28% in with-CCFGP output after 2004 as a result of reduced soil erosion after 5 
years of plantation establishment (Huang and Rozelle 1999). 
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Based on the predictions of average costs and revenue, the average net profits 
with and without the Program are calculated for a 20-year time period. Table 6.3 
summarises the net present value (NPV) of the net profit difference per 
household20. 
Table 6.3 Net Present Value of Net Profit Difference per Household 
Location Discount Rate 
Binxian 
Ansai 
Gonghe 
Minhe 
3% 10% 
31,391 17,923 
28,209 12,086 
48,194 31,071 
55,623 30,233 
Unit: CNY 
20% 
10,138 
4,135 
20,464 
15,443 
As Table 6.3 shows, the NPV of the net profit with CCFGP is greater than that 
without CCFGP in each of the four counties over the 20-year time period. This 
implies that in general, the Program makes the sampled households better off. 
Hypothesis 2 is accepted. However, the difference in net profits with and without 
the Program was found to vary across the sampled farmers in the four counties. 
Binxian and Minhe have positive differences across all 20 years, indicating that 
the samples in these two counties are always better off with the Program. In 
contrast, the Ansai and Gonghe samples have positive value in most years but 
experience negative differences in some years. 
It was found that in addition to the discount rate, the expected income of the 
sampled farm households are affected by the extent of Program subsidies, crop 
prices, and forest and grass output prices. These factors can affect farm 
households' choice of involvement in the Program and their impacts on 
difference in net profits need to be further examined. In particular, the Program 
subsidy and output prices are taken as sensitivity factors in this study. This 
allows a more in-depth analysis of the land-use decisions of sampled households. 
Table 6.4 shows the sensitivity analysis results when the CCFGP subsidy is 
removed from farm household revenue and when the predicted prices of outputs 
fall a further 50 per cent. 
20 Details of the various components of benefits and costs can be found in Appendix IL 
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Table 6.4 Impact of Subsidy and Output Prices on Net Profits Difference of the Sampled 
Households 
Without subsidy With declined forest and grass price 
NPVof net ±%compared NPVof net ±%compared 
Profits difference with the baseline Profits difference with the baseline 
(CNY) (%) (CNY) (%) 
Binxian 28,896.9 -8 29,127.8 -7 
Ansai 8975.1 -68 5293.4 -81 
Gonghe 45,714.2 -5 25,153.0 -48 
Minhe 48,480.8 -13 30,016.9 -46 
*Using a 3 per cent discount rate. 
As Table 6.4 shows, the NPV of the net profit difference is found to be positive 
under the assumption that the price of future forest and grass products declines 
by a further 50 per cent, provided that the price fall has no supply response. The 
result is found to be robust even when payments made under the Program are 
excluded. These results indicated that farmers are made better off with the 
CCFGP and also explained the reason why the Program has been received with 
unprecedented enthusiasm and participation by farm households. Therefore, 
farmers are financially motivated to be involved in the Program. From a pure 
economic perspective, the compliance of the Program can be guaranteed at the 
level of participating farmers. They are unlikely to revert to previous land use 
practices once the CCFGP payments are withdrawn. 
Variations in the impact of the Program payments on farm household net profits 
were observed across the county samples in the study. There is little impact in 
Binxian, Gonghe and Minhe, but a large impact in Ansai (see Table 6.4). 
Payments were found to have the greatest impact where they provide a higher 
percentage of the revenue of farm households' total income. For instance, in 
Ansai where the proportion of the subsidy in households' revenues is as high as 
31.9 per cent, the net profits difference without the CCFGP payments from 1999 
to 2005 is negative. This demonstrates that farmers would be worse off in that 
period if they participate in the Program. From 2006 to 2018, the net profits 
difference becomes positive, showing that forest and grass output of CCFGP 
compensates farmers' costs and makes them better off. The Program subsidy 
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therefore plays a key role in Ansai sampled households' land use decision 
making. It has also been found that the payments were important where there is a 
large initial cost for farmers to initiate land use change, such as the case with 
Gonghe. 
The conclusion that farmers are made better off by the Program relies on 
assumptions regarding future outputs and prices of forest and grass products. The 
four counties are all located in arid and semi-arid areas where the survival rates 
of trees and grass are low. Farmers are therefore likely to encounter natural and 
technical uncertainties in obtaining the expected outputs. Furthermore, it is 
expected that large-scale tree and grass plantation of the Program would increase 
forest and grass products supply and reduce the price, and hence trigger the 
adoption of other crops. The sustainability of the Program therefore depends 
largely on careful monitoring and evaluation of its implementation. As some 
studies point out, fast expansion of the Program without solving problems in 
program design and implementation might in reality damage the Program's long-
term sustainability (Xu et al 2004a; Xu et al 2006; Xu et al 2004b ). 
6.2.2 Agricultural Production Welfare Impact Analysis21 
While the farmer livelihood analysis helps in the understanding of the incentive 
structure of the participating farmers at the household level, it is unable to 
provide information about the overall impact of the Program on the society at 
large. To find out the viability of the continuation of the Program from the 
Government's perspective, the livelihood analysis results were extended to 
convert the household based information to a region wide population basis. It 
focuses on the household agricultural production impact of the Program on the 
social welfare of the people of the north west provinces. The result will then be 
integrated in the CBA of the Program. 
To convert the household financial impact analysis to an economic impact 
analysis in order to estimate consumers' and producers' surpluses, a number of 
21 This section is mostly drawn from Research Report No. 7 (ACIAR/2002/021) at 
http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/staff/jb suslndrr.php. 
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adjustments were carried out, through which household economic benefits and 
costs were calculated for each of the four counties. These adjustments include: 
1. Grain prices received by farmers for soybeans, maize and wheat crops 
were replaced by shadow prices22 to reflect the true economic extent of 
cropping benefits; 
2. The cost of seedlings provided to farmers under the Program were 
adjusted to include the cost subsidy component born by government; 
3. Payments made to farmers under the CCFGP were deducted from 
revenues and instead counted as a cost of the Programme; 
4. Payments of rents between land owners are transfer payments rather than 
any reflection of either benefits or costs and so were excluded; and, 
5. Government administration costs associated with the operation of the 
CCFGP and expenses related to the production of seedlings supplied to 
farmers were added as costs. 
The extrapolation process involves the per household net benefit difference 
estimates being used to 'represent; a wider population which is taken to be farm 
households across the Loess Plateau in North West China. The region covers 327 
counties across Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, Shanxi, Shaanxi and Inner Mongolia 
Provinces and autonomous regions. In 2002, 198 of those 327 counties were 
engaged in the CCFGP. Hence, farm households in those 198 counties are used 
to define the extent of the population for extrapolation. 
The 198 counties on the Loess Plateau were grouped into categories that can be 
'represented' by the four surveyed counties. Of the four surveyed counties, 
Gonghe is predominantly a pasture-based economy and so was used to represent 
the 24 pasture dominated CCFGP counties that were identified on the Loess 
Plateau. The remaining 174 counties differ in terms of their social economic 
conditions. The Ii velihood impact study found that the proportion of CCFGP land 
in total cropland is a key indicator of the mix between farm and non-farm 
activities undertaken by rural households. Hence, this proportion (total from 
22 The shadow prices for grains were taken to be as the average of prices across those recorded in 1998 and 
2003 as determined in the Chicago grain exchange. 
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2002 to 2005) was used as the primary criterion for groupmg counties. In 
addition, crop yield - as an indicator of land productivity - was taken as a 
secondary criterion to achieve finer differentiation. The groupings are as follows: 
1. The Binxian group of 76 counties (Binxian has a CCFGP ratio of 13.43 
per cent and a crop yield of 148.53 kg per mu); 
2. The Minhe group of 59 counties (Minhe has a CCFGP ratio of 20.18 per 
cent and a crop yield of 140.16 kg per mu); and, 
3. The Ansai group of 39 counties (Ansai has a CCFGP ratio large than 60 
per cent and a crop yield of 114.48 kg per mu). 
The net present value of the net benefit difference (NBD) with and without the 
CCFGP across 20 years for each group of counties and for all the Loess Plateau 
counties is shown in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5 NPV of NBD with and without CCFGP 
County Group 
Binxian Group 
Ansai Group 
Gonghe Group 
Minhe Group 
All Loess Plateau 
counties 
3% 
36739.62 
-14475.96 
-254.15 
37633.02 
59642.43 
Discount Rate 
10% 
30548.80 
-22883.76 
-1035.65 
27078.74 
33708.02 
Unit: CNY million 
20% 
28603.15 
-35410.13 
-2272.24 
17946.98 
8867.62 
Results show that overall, the total benefits to the Loess Plateau arising from the 
implementation of the CCFGP are higher than the associated costs at discount 
rates varying from three to 20 per cent. Hypothesis 2 is therefore accepted and 
the Program is economically feasible for the Loess Plateau region as a whole. 
However, the situation varies across the four groups of counties. For the 35 
counties of the Ansai group and the 24 pasture counties of the Gonghe group 
where CCFGP land ratio is larger, the NPVs for the NBD are negative at all three 
discount rates. This suggests that the land use change under the CCFGP changes 
the rural economic structure and brings net economic loss to the local 
communities. The CCFGP is not economically feasible for those counties. With 
relatively small proportions of CCFGP land in their total areas, counties of the 
Binxian and Minhe group have positive NPVs for the NBD at all the three 
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discount rates. This shows that the CCFGP is economically worthwhile in these 
districts. 
It has been found that forest and grass income, as well as off-farm labour income 
are the key factors affecting the extrapolated results. Hence, sensitivity analyses 
are conducted on these factors. Table 6.6 below presents the results of these 
sensitivity analyses. 
Table 6.6 Sensitivity Analysis - NPV of NBD with and without CCFGP 
Sensitivity Factor 
Halve forest and grass revenues 
Halve off-farm income 
Halve revenues and off-farm 
income 
3% 
4844.03 
3786.36 
-51012 
Discount Rate 
10% 
-9560.82 
-16937.47 
-60206.3 
Unit: CNY million 
20% 
-27642.4 
-44397.26 
-80907.2 
The NPV of the NBD is found to be positive at three per cent discount rate when 
halving forests and grass revenue or halving off-farm income, but negative at 10 
per cent and 20 per cent discount rate. This result demonstrates that in the Loess 
Plateau region, the economic efficiency of the CCFGP is sensitive to tree crop 
and grass outputs and prices. Hence, if there were reduced forest and grass 
revenue because of a natural risk factor (drought or disease reducing yields) or a 
market risk factor (oversupply of the market causing price reductions), the 
CCFGP would not be economically feasible across the Loess Plateau region at all 
but the lowest discount rate. 
It is possible that the off-farm incomes are lower than predicted. For instance, if 
the Chinese work force is otherwise fully employed, the labour freed from farm 
work for other occupations by the CCFGP would involve a positive opportunity 
cost. To reflect this possibility, off-farm incomes were halved to find out its 
impact on the NPV of the NBD with and without CCFGP. It has been found that 
the NPV of the NBD is positive at three per cent but negative at 10 and 20 per 
cent discount rate. This shows that off-farm income prospects have the potential 
to make the Program uneconomic on the Loess Plateau. Further, if both forest 
and grass revenues and off-farm incomes fall simultaneously, the costs of 
implementing the CCFGP would outweigh the benefits at all three discount rates. 
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The valuation of agricultural production impact presented in this section is a 
partial cost benefit analysis and forms only one part of the market valuation of 
the CCFGP. To find out if the Program is economically feasible in the Loess 
Plateau region, these net economic costs need to be weighed against the benefits 
of environmental improvements that the CCFGP has been primarily aimed to 
achieve. The extent of the environmental benefits will therefore play a key role in 
determining the overall social impact of the CCFGP. In the next section, the 
market values of the environmental changes arising from the CCFGP will be 
estimated. 
6.3 Valuation of Runoff Reductions 
In Chapter 5, the runoff reductions brought about by the CCFGP is modelled 
along the Yellow River. This information will be used to establish the basin-level 
bio-economic model in order to test Hypothesis 4, which states that 'There are 
market benefits and costs associated with the biophysical changes arising from 
the CCFGP'. The Yellow River Basin (YRB) contains approximately nine per 
cent of China's population and 17 per cent of its agricultural area. Irrigated 
agriculture occupies 10 per cent of this total area but consumes 95 per cent of the 
available water (Giordano et al 2004). 
The reduced runoff arising from the implementation of the CCFGP is expected to 
have impacts on both water availability and flooding risks in the YRB. Reduced 
runoff arising form the CCFGP can have both positive and negative effects. On 
one hand, decreased runoff can reduce soil erosion and sediment loads in the 
Yellow River, consequently reducing flooding risks. On the other hand, however, 
decreased runoff can have important repercussions to basin function for three 
reasons. First, it can reduce base flows and may even result in flows ceasing in 
the lower reaches. This in tum will limit the availability of surface water for 
irrigation, domestic and industrial uses. Second, it can reduce the capacity of the 
river to carry its sediment load to the sea, potentially resulting in a more rapid 
rate of sedimentation, thus making the channel more flood prone than would 
otherwise be the case. Third, the reduced runoff can impact the ecology of 
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downstream areas and, in particular, the Yellow River delta and coastal fisheries 
(Giordano et al 2004). Consequently, reduced runoff in the Yellow River may 
bring about changes in the value of agricultural production, hydropower 
generation, aquaculture and coastal fishery production as well as benefits and 
costs associated with flood control efforts. 
To estimate the benefits and costs associated with reduced runoff in the Yellow 
River, detailed information is needed about the links between biophysical 
changes and economic impacts. However, only scant information and research is 
available to establish such linkages. Because of this, in this research thesis focus 
is given to the impact of reduced runoff on agricultural production in the YRB. 
Hence Hypothesis 4 has been modified as follows to reflect this reality: 
Hypothesis 4: The runoff reductions arising from the implementation of the 
CCFGP brings economic loss from foregone agricultural production in the YRB. 
The model on regional water allocation in the YRB developed by the Australian 
Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE)23 is used to derive 
values associated with runoff reductions. With the ABARE model, the YRB is 
divided into the same 10 regions as in the hydrological model. This water 
allocation model was developed to examine the efficiency of water resource 
allocation both within and between irrigation regions, and between competing 
uses. Faced with increasing demand for water from industrial and urban sectors 
due to rapid economic and population growth in the YRB, more pressure has 
been placed on water resources used for agricultural production. One of the key 
policy challenges is how to reallocate water supplies while maintaining rural 
incomes and agricultural output. The ABARE model therefore aims to assess the 
potential to reallocate water used for irrigation efficiently within the agricultural 
sector among the 10 regions in the YRB. Regional water demand functions are 
estimated and water use and the scarcity value of water for the base year of 2002 
are derived. 
23 See Section 5.2.3 for details of the 10 regions of YRB developed under the ABARE model (Heaney et al 
2005). 
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For the purpose of this study, the ABARE model results are used to estimate the 
decrease in the economic surplus of water between the base year scenario (before 
the CCFGP) and after the CCFGP. This is done through multiplying the 
estimated decrease in water use by the scarcity value of water (Table 6.10). As 
the decrease in regional water use is estimated to be around one per cent or lower 
(Table 6.9 and 6.10), for simplicity it is assumed that the resultant change in 
scarcity value is negligible. The marginal change in the economic surplus from 
water due to the implementation of the CCFGP can then be regarded as the value 
change associated with agricultural production. 
The methodology used to model water reallocation in the YRB involved four 
steps. First, a set of flexible production functions was estimated to characterise 
the agricultural production technologies in the basin for each region and for 
seven agricultural crops; wheat, maize, rice, vegetables, cotton, soybean and 
potatoes. Second, a non linear profit maximization problem was formulated for 
each region. The objective function of this problem embeds the flexible crop 
production functions from the first step and input costs. The constraints reflect 
regional resource limits on the availability of land and water as well as any 
policy restrictions. Third, the maximisation model was solved over a range of 
water prices to estimate the parameters of regional water demand functions. 
Fourth, these water demand functions were incorporated into a spatial 
equilibrium model of regional water markets for the YRB to estimate the 
potential gains from water transfers within the basin (Heaney et al 2005). The 
study assumed that agents do not change the type of crops. 
For the purpose of this study, the water use model developed in the first three 
steps is used. In particular, the base year water demand and water scarcity value 
in each of the 10 regions derived from the model estimation are used to estimate 
the economic cost of the foregone agricultural production in these regions due to 
reduced runoff. The base year (2002) water demand and water scarcity value are 
reproduced in Table 6.7. The proportion of upstream region runoff used by 
downstream regions is estimated using the base year water use data. Given that 
regional reductions in water use are projected to be around 1 per cent or less, a 
simple method is used to estimate the economic cost. The reductions in water use 
133 
m each region due to reduced runoff, multiplied by the water scarcity value, 
gives the economic cost of the foregone agricultural production due to the runoff 
reductions. 
Table 6.7 Water Use, Scarcity Values and Demand Elasticities by Region, 2002 
Region Base year water use Scarcity value of Demand elasticity 
(Million m3) water• 
(Yuan/'000 m3) 
1 18 6 -0.76 
2 1129 6 -0.78 
3A 3794 16 -0.87 
3B 1786 19 -0.88 
4 735 16 -0.84 
SA 4347 50 -1.13 
SB 9241 189 -1.81 
6 3249 120 -0.85 
7A 8304 133 -0.88 
7B 15908 103 -0.89 
Source: Heaney et al 2005. 
a. Estimated as the net agricultural return of an additional 1000 cubic metres of water use in the region less 
delivery charges. 
The proportion of upstream region runoff used by downstream regions ts 
estimated using the base year water use given in Table 6.7. It is assumed that 
each region except SB, which is in the Wei Valley covering part of Gansu, 
Ningxia and Shaanxi, receives a share of the runoff originating in itself and in all 
upstream regions. Region SB relies on its runoff only. All regions downstream of 
it receive their share of runoff in SB. It is assumed these shares are reflected in 
regional water use levels. For example, Region 1 's runoff is allocated over all 
regions based on the regional shares of total water use in the basin. Table 6.8 
shows, for each region i, the proportion of runoff used by itself and all 
downstreamj region. 
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Table 6.8 Proportion of ith Region Runoff Used by jth Region 
i\j 1 2 3A 3B 4 SA SB 6 7A 7B 
1 0.0005 0.0287 0.097 0.0455 O.D19 0.1107 0 0.0827 0.2115 0.4051 
2 0.0288 0.097 0.0455 0.019 0.1107 0 0.0828 0.2116 0.4053 
3A 0.1 0.0468 0.019 0.114 0 0.0852 0.2178 0.4173 
3B 0.052 0.021 0.1266 0 0.0946 0.2419 0.4634 
4 0.023 0.1336 0 0.0998 0.2552 0.4888 
SA 0.1367 0 0.1021 0.2611 0.5001 
SB 0.252 0.0885 0.2263 0.4334 
6 0.1183 0.3024 0.5793 
7A 0.343 0.657 
7B 
Source: Author's own calculation. 
From the results displayed in Table 6.8, for each region, the volume of all 
upstream runoff used in both the base case (without CCFGP) and the change 
scenario (with reduced runoff under the CCFGP) can be estimated. The results of 
the baseline scenario are shown in Table 6.9. The annual volume of the ith region 
runoff used by jth region is estimated by multiplying the surface runoff of the ith 
region with the proportion of the ith region runoff used by jth region given in 
Table 6.8. For each region, adding up the share of runoff originating in itself and 
in all upstream regions gives the total runoff used in each region. 
Table 6.9 The Annual Volume of ith Region Runoff Used by jth Region (million M3)-Base 
Case 
zy 1 2 3A 3B 4 SA SB 6 7A 7B 
1 9.474 594 1997 940 387 2288 0 1710 4371 8373 
2 382 1284 604 249 1471 0 1099 2809 5382 
3A 50 23 IO 57 0 43 109 209 
3B 13 5 32 0 24 60 116 
4 119 704 0 526 1345 2576 
SA 381 0 285 728 1395 
SB 2329 819 2093 4009 
6 615 1572 3012 
7A 154 296 
7B 1340 
Basin 9.474 976 3330 1581 770 4933 2329 5121 13242 26709 
Source: Author's own calculation. 
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Total 
For the CCFGP scenario, the annual volume of runoff used by each of the 10 
regions is estimated in the same way, with the surface runoff reduced to the 
extent estimated by reference as shown in Table 5.5 in Chapter 5. Table 6.10 
gives an example of the annual volume of runoff used in each region during 
2010-2020 as well as the percentage reduction in runoff used in these regions 
compared to the base case. Note that the runoff reductions are projected to be 
constant during this period of time. 
Table 6.10 Annual Volume of ith Region Runoff Used by jth Region (million M3) 
-2010-2020 under CCFGP 
i\j 1 2 3A 3B 4 SA SB 6 7A 7B 
1 9.465 594 1995 939 386 2286 0 1708 4367 8365 
2 379 1272 599 246 1458 0 1090 2785 5335 
3A 42 20 8 49 0 36 93 178 
3B 13 5 31 0 23 59 113 
4 118 695 0 520 1329 2545 
SA 375 0 280 716 1372 
SB 2300 809 2067 3959 
6 614 1570 3008 
7A 153 294 
7B 1340 
Basin 9.465 972 3310 1571 764 4894 2300 5081 13139 26510 
Reduction in 
Runoff(%) 0.10 0.40 0.62 0.63 0.72 0.79 1.25 0.79 0.78 0.74 
Source: Author's own calculation. 
The annual cost of the simulated runoff reductions due to CCFGP during 2010-
2020 is estimated in Table 6.11. The volume of reductions in water use in each 
region due to the reduced runoff, multiplied by the water scarcity values in these 
regions gives the economic cost of runoff reductions. 
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Table 6.11 Annual Costs of the Simulated Reductions in Runoff - 2010-2020 
Region Baseline Runoff Reduction in Scarcity Economic 
Water Use Reduction Water Use Value of Cost(CNY 
(million M3) * (%) (million M3) Water (CNY million) 
/ 'OOOM3) * 
1 18 0.10 0.02 6 0.00 
2 1129 0.40 4.52 6 0.03 
3A 3794 0.62 23.34 16 0.37 
3B 1786 0.63 11.23 19 0.21 
4 735 0.72 5.28 16 0.08 
SA 4347 0.79 34.38 50 1.72 
SB 9241 1.25 115.79 189 21.88 
6 3249 0.79 25.52 120 3.06 
7A 8304 0.78 65.04 133 8.65 
7B 15908 0.74 118.35 103 12.19 
Basin 48511 0.76 403.46 48.20 
Source: Author's own calculation. 
* Data on baseline water use and the water scarcity value are obtained from Heaney et al 2005. 
The economic costs of the runoff reductions during 2002-2009 are estimated in 
the same way, using the estimates of annual runoff reductions provided by the 
hydrologists. To be consistent with the livelihood analysis and non-market 
valuation of the CCFGP in this research series, the losses per annum during 
2002-2018 are displayed in Table 6.12. Year 2000 and 2001 are not included in 
this analysis as the ABARE model uses 2002 as its base year. The total economic 
cost arising from agricultural production loss due to reduced runoff in the YRB is 
CNY 667.32 million during the 19 year period, calculated at three per cent 
discount rate and brought back to the 2006 level. The present value of the 
economic cost totals CNY 467.75 million and CNY 340.30 million respectively 
at a discount rate of 10 per cent and 20 per cent. 
Table 6.12 Annual Economic Costs from Foregone Agricultural Production - 2002-2020 
Year 2002 2003 2004 200S 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Present Value 
of Total Cost• 
-2020 
Annual 
Economic cost 10.88 23.04 27.85 38.25 42.22 45.21 46.20 47.18 48.2 667.32 
(CNYmillion) 
Source: Author's own calculation. 
* Calculated at three per cent discount rate. 
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One limitation with the ABARE water allocation model is that it was developed 
on the basis of limited data. For each region, water use and the scarcity value of 
water are derived by calibrating the model to a data set with base year land, water 
and labour allocation to alternative crops. Accordingly, the estimation of 
economic cost from agricultural production based on this model may to some 
extent be biased as resource allocation data for just one year are used to calibrate 
the model. 
6.4 Conclusion 
The implementation of the CCFGP in North West China brings both market 
benefits and costs to people living in North China. In this chapter, the market 
value of the agricultural production impact of the CCFGP was estimated through 
an extrapolation of the household based information to a wider population across 
the Loess Plateau region. It was found that the CCFGP makes the sampled 
households better off in general, and it brings total economic benefits of CNY 
48494.76 million to the region over a 20-year time period at a three per cent 
discount rate. 
The market costs from reduced runoff in the Yellow River due to the 
implementation of the CCFGP were also estimated in this chapter. Reduced 
runoff has both positive and negative effects. One important aspect of the 
negative effects involves a decline in irrigation water supply in the Yellow River 
Basin. This leads to a loss of agricultural production in the region. Bio-economic 
modelling was conducted through integrating basin-wide runoff reduction 
simulation model and water allocation model. It was found that the total 
economic cost from agricultural production in the Yellow River Basin amounts 
to CNY 667.32 million across 20 years at a three per cent discount rate. 
The farmer livelihood analysis reported in this chapter has policy implications 
for the long-term sustainability of the land use changes arising from the CCFGP. 
It sheds light on the incentive structure of farm households in their land use 
practices. This will be further discussed in the policy chapter (Chapter 10). 
Findings from the economic analysis of the welfare impact of the CCFGP (that 
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the CCFGP is not economically feasible for counties with larger CCFGP land 
ratios) highlight the importance of estimating the environmental benefits arising 
from the land use change. The extent of these environmental benefits, with a 
large proportion being the non-market benefits, will play a key role in 
determining the overall social impact of the CCFGP. 
In the next three chapters, the non-market values of the environmental 
improvements arising from the CCFGP will be estimated. These non-market 
values, together with the market benefits and costs of the CCFGP, will be 
integrated to conduct a (partial) CBA of the Program in Chapter 10. It should be 
noted, however, that there are other economic costs associated with runoff 
reductions, such as hydropower generation, aquaculture and coastal fishery 
production which are not included in this research study yet are all components 
of the environmental cost of the CCFGP. Further policy analysis using the 
estimates generated in this study should take into account these constraints and 
the potential bias thus generated. 
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Chapter 7 
Development of the Choice Modelling Questionnaire 
7 .1 Introduction 
An important component of a benefit-cost analysis of a resource use change 
where environmental improvements are expected is an accurate estimate of the 
value of the non-market environmental goods and services in 'luestion. The 
absence of a price for environmental resources or environmental externalities 
does not mean that they have no value. Depending on whether the social well-
being is increased or decreased, there is a value that is either positive or negative. 
In order to make allocatively efficient decisions, these values need to be 
estimated and incorporated into the resource allocation decision making process. 
In this research, the choice modelling (CM) approach is used to test for 
Hypothesis 5 which states 'There are non-market benefits and costs associated 
with the biophysical changes arising from the CCFGP'. The non-market values 
associated with the land use change in the North West Provinces under the 
CCFGP are estimated24 and included in the cost benefit analysis (CBA) of the 
Program. As the CM is survey-based, the development and design of a relevant 
and well-structured questionnaire is a crucial part of the valuation. In addition to 
the core part of the CM questionnaire which is the choice sets with their 
combinations of different scenarios described by attributes occurring at varying 
levels, there are other elements in the questionnaire. In general, a CM 
questionnaire is comprised of the following other components (Morrison et al 
1997): 
a description of the study site; 
24 The non-market valuation of the environmental benefits arising from the CCFGP reported in Chapter 7 
through to Chapter 9 has been p1o1blished in the Ecological Economics (Wang et al 2007). 
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details of the proposed changes; and, 
a series of socioeconomic and attitudinal questions. 
This chapter provides details of the application of the CM technique in the 
CCFGP policy context by addressing the critical issues in developing a CM 
survey questionnaire. Two rounds of focus groups were held in December 2004 
and July 2005 to preliminarily develop the questionnaire and to pre-test its 
validity. A further pre-test of the revised questionnaire was also undertaken. 
The structure of this chapter is as following. In the next section, the preliminary 
design and development of the survey questionnaire is detailed. This includes 
principles for the selection of attributes, the findings and implications of the first 
round of focus group meetings. Section 7 .3 presents the findings from the second 
round of focus groups in pre-testing the draft survey questionnaire based on 
which the questionnaire was revised. Findings from the further pre-test of the 
revised questionnaire are also presented in this section. This chapter concludes 
with Section 7.4. 
7 .2 Preliminary Design of Survey Questionnaire 
7.2.1 Survey Design 
Both the non-marketed use and non-use values of the environmental 
improvements are estimated in the CM study. Values that people attach to the 
environmental goods and services as assets are non-use values. People hold 
values for these environmental goods and services without actually using them. 
While in some of the literature, non-use values are defined only in terms of 
existence values (Pearce 1993: 17), in this thesis they are separated into option 
values, existence values and bequest values following Krutilla (1967). First, 
individuals would be willing to pay to conserve the environmental goods or 
services for future use. Second, some people may value the environment for its 
mere existence. Third, bequest of the environmental goods and services to future 
generations may be a motive for current non-users to value preservation (Krutilla 
1967). These values are normally assessed as a group because of the difficulty in 
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differentiating them from one another. There are situations, however, where 
specific components of non-use values need to be estimated separately, such as 
in the case of a benefit transfer exercise (Rolfe and Windle 2005). 
To test if people living proximate to the environmental impacts of concern have 
greater value than those who live further away, the same CM questionnaire was 
used in surveying local residents in Ansai on the Loess Plateau, Xi'an which is 
the capital of Shaanxi Province, as well as residents from Beijing, the national 
capital, who live at a distance from the area involved in land use change under 
the CCFGP. All these three places are located in North China but have different 
social and economic characteristics. Using the same questionnaire affords an 
analysis of how estimates of value are influenced by respondent's distance from 
the site of the environmental impacts. Results in these three places can also be 
used to infer the value held by the wider Chinese urban community in the North. 
Details of value extrapolation using the CM results derived from the three sample 
sites are presented in Chapter 9. 
7 .2.2 Demand Side Perspectives - Focus Groups 
In order to design a draft of the CM survey questionnaire, inputs from 
prospective respondents are crucial. For example, feedback from respondents can 
help identify which attributes are regarded as important and the simplicity with 
which information needs to be presented. To generate sound feedback, focus 
group meetings were held. A focus group is defined as 'a group of individuals 
selected and assembled by researchers to discuss and comment on, from personal 
experience, the topic that is the subject of the research' (Powell and Single 1996). 
Focus groups are used to reveal many of the factors that drive people's decision 
making process. The attitudes, feelings and beliefs of the people are more likely 
to be revealed via the social gathering and the interaction between participants. 
Two focus group meetings were held in Beijing in December 2004 to tackle the 
key issues in the design of the CM survey questionnaire. Specifically, the focus 
groups were designed to gain an understanding of: 
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The environmental issues that are considered to be important (to frame the 
issue under consideration and identify the attributes to be used in the choice 
sets). 
The causes of these environmental problems (to understand peoples' 
perceptions of cause-effect relations among attributes). 
People's knowledge of policies or activities undertaken by the government or 
individuals to tackle these environmental problems (to frame the CCFGP in a 
series of policies, programs and other activities). 
The extent of knowledge that people have about the CCFGP and its 
environmental impacts (to decide how much information needs to be 
included in the questionnaire, how the information needs to be presented, and 
to identify the attributes to be used to describe the environmental good 
provided by CCFGP). 
Potential (form and amount) of payment to improve the environment (to 
define the attribute based on which willingness to pay for the environmental 
good can be derived). 
Participants in the focus groups were recruited primarily by using the 'friends of 
friends' approach. Contacts in Beijing were rung and asked to invite people they 
knew. This was a pragmatic approach given the difficulty of recruiting 
participants for focus groups while the researcher was then in Australia. In order 
to diversify the socio-demographic coverage of participants, the social 
classification of the Chinese society was taken as a reference for stratifying the 
sample. According to CASS (2004 ), people in China are categorised into the 
following ten groups: 
Government employees 
Managers 
Private entrepreneurs 
Professionals and technicians 
Clerks 
People involved in small family business 
Employees in the service sectors 
Workers/ labours 
Farmers 
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Unemployed people 
Based on the above categories and considering the specifics of the situation in 
Beijing, participants for the focus groups were chosen. 
The two focus group meetings were held in the same afternoon for two hours 
each. The groups' compositions are set out in Table 7.1. The samples included 10 
females and 8 males. This compares with the recent statistics of gender 
distribution in Beijing, which is 52 per cent male and 48 per cent female (Beijing 
Statistics Bureau 2004). About 78 per cent of the Beijing residents are between 
age 15 and 64. Around 13.6 per cent are younger than 14 and 8.4 per cent are 
over 65 years old (Zhang 2002). All the focus group participants were aged 
between 20 and 64. 
Table 7.1 Age and Sex Statistics for the Two Focus Groups in Beijing 
Focus Group 1 Focus Group 2 Total 
No. Proportion No. Proportion 
Number of female 7 70% 3 37.5% 
Number 20-30 years 3 30% 4 50% 
Number 31-50 years 6 60% 3 37.5% 
Number 51-65 years 1 10% 1 12.5% 
Total 10 100% 8 100% 
Framing of the Issue 
Framing of the issue under consideration in the questionnaire is crucial. The 
frame makes respondents aware of the array of substitute and complementary 
goods to the environmental good under consideration and the competing 
demands for public fund hence their budget constraints (Bennett and Adamowicz 
2001: 51 ). The way in which choices about substitutes and budgetary constraints 
are framed can have a significant effect on resulting value estimates. The process 
of framing is partly done using the choice sets: choices can encompass a range of 
both substitute goods and opportunity costs. In addition, framing needs to be 
done in a broader context that is not only restricted to the attributes of the 
environmental good under consideration. The issue at hand should be framed in 
the context of competing interests and different spending schemes. 
144 
10 
7 
9 
2 
18 
The focus group meetings started with general discussions regarding the 
environmental issues that are of concern to Beijing residents. These included 
local issues in Beijing and issues across the region in North China. This was 
followed by discussions on the problems that people considered to be the most 
important, which helped to get some idea of the ranking of these issues. Such 
information is useful in framing the issue in the survey questionnaire. In other 
words, this discussion revealed how people position the environmental impacts 
associated with the CCFGP in an array of environmental goods that they value. 
Information revealed by participants can also be used to determine which 
attributes should be included in the choice sets. In this section, environmental 
problems that people identified together with their perceptions on the solutions 
are described and analysed based on their rankings of these problems. 
Geographical Boundary of Environmental Problems 
All the participants expressed their concern about environmental problems in 
both Beijing and across the region in North China because environmental quality 
impacts on their lives. However, they did not perceive the necessity to discuss 
the environmental issues in Beijing and across the region in North China 
separately. In their opinion, environmental problems in the two places are 
inseparable and interrelated. They gave the example that if air quality in North 
China was not good, air quality in Beijing would definitely be affected in a 
negative way. Another example they gave was that most of the sandstorms that 
Beijing had suffered originated from other parts of North China. Following this 
clarification, discussions about environmental problems were held from the 
perspective of Beijing residents in a more general sense rather than site-specific. 
Air Quality 
Participants were more concerned about environmental issues that are more 
closely related to their daily lives. Most people expressed their concern about the 
bad air quality including increasing level of pollutants and dust and sandstorms. 
Poor air quality increased probability for respiratory diseases and severely 
145 
threatened the health of people in Beijing. Dust and sandstorms made life 
inconvenient. People had to spend a lot of time everyday cleaning the dust at 
home and also to reduce their travels during sandstorm or dust storm days. 
Participants believed that pollution control efforts had been made to improve air 
quality. These included reducing pollution emissions from both factories and 
vehicles through technical upgrading of equipment. To reduce dust and 
sandstorms, afforestation and sand control programs had been implemented for 
many years, with greater effort being made in recent years. However, no one in 
the focus groups mentioned the CCFGP explicitly in tackling the dust and 
sandstorm issue. 
Sanitation, Congestion and Heavy Traffic 
The urban sanitation problem was raised. Based on their personal experiences 
and observations, people discussed various kinds of sanitation problems such as 
inappropriate garbage disposal due to irresponsible behaviour or bad habits. To 
tackle this issue, participants noted that education and awareness-raising 
activities had been undertaken, inspections had been conducted, and regular 
cleaning in the public places had been organised by the communities. 
Participants also considered heavy traffic and congestion in the city as an 
environmental problem that lowered life quality, and was therefore of great 
concern to them. These environmental issues might not seem relevant in the 
CCFGP context because they were human environment rather than natural 
environment problems. However, discussions over these issues were crucial in 
the 'framing' exercise as they gave some indication of people's preferences in 
terms of environmental protection. 
Landscape Aesthetics 
A decreased level of urban landscape aesthetics with less trees and grassland was 
also on the list of the participants' environmental concerns. People compared the 
current urban landscape with that of ten years ago and believed their living 
environment had deteriorated. A lack of landscape aesthetics made life less 
pleasant. They noted that effort had already been made to increase urban green 
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areas by growing trees and grass, but they also suggested that building 
construction needed to be stopped or at least slowed down. 
Water Quality 
The last issue of concern brought up directly by the participants was poor water 
quality. Many people suggested that decreased drinking water quality severely 
damaged people's health. Discussions about this topic revealed that people were 
informed of decreased drinking water quality from the news media rather than 
experiencing it themselves. This has implications for the CM survey in Beijing 
because Beijing residents might attach some value to the water quality 
improvement in the North West even though they might not use the water 
directly and immediately. Some participants in the focus groups experienced 
poor water quality from direct use of some of the rivers in Beijing for swimming. 
They confirmed that they were no longer able to swim in those rivers because of 
poor water quality. Participants were aware of various pollution control efforts 
such as reducing sewage discharge into the rivers. Only a few participants 
mentioned the impact of afforestation on water quality, although none explicitly 
referred to the CCFGP. 
Water Shortages 
With some prompts from the facilitator, participants showed their concern for 
water shortages. Water shortages are severe in Beijing and the water price has 
already been increased. Even though Beijing suffers from water shortages, 
people's daily lives have not yet been severely impacted. Furthermore, Beijing 
residents in the focus groups were largely insensitive to the water price increase 
possibly because of their affordability. Participants agreed that water shortages 
would have a negative impact on life quality. Lack of water made life 
inconvenient in terms of direct consumption and also had a negative impact on 
tourism. They talked about some popular tourist sites around Beijing where 
rivers stopped flowing in recent years. They believed that would reduce the 
number of tourists. People suggested that the government had developed water 
saving technologies and adopted policies to encourage water saving such as 
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increasing water prices. However, none of the participants mentioned the role 
that forests play in regulating run-off and changing the water flow. 
Biodiversity Loss 
Also with some prompts, participants showed their concern over the decreasing 
numbers of animal and plant species. They observed the loss especially of animal 
species from their own daily lives and believed that this would break the 
ecological balance and eventually threaten the survival of human beings. Focus 
group respondents suggested that afforestation programs and the establishment of 
nature reserves were useful government undertakings for biodiversity 
conservation. A voiding human disturbance was also considered to be a good 
strategy to protect animal and plant species. 
In summary, participants m the focus groups identified a wide range of 
environmental problems that were of concern. Some are directly associated with 
the CCFGP and can be regarded as its environmental attributes. This demand 
side perspective can be examined against the supply side perspective. This will 
be discussed later in Section 7.2.3 to determine the attributes to be used in the 
CM study. Insight was also provided by the focus groups into how people link 
these environmental problems to available solutions. Even though people 
acknowledged the role of afforestation in tackling some of the environmental 
problems such as dust and sandstorm, decreased landscape aesthetics, poor water 
quality and biodiversity loss, other government initiatives and programs were 
considered of equal or even more importance or at least prominence. It is also 
worth noting that the CCFGP was not explicitly specified as one of the policies 
designed to tackle the environmental problems. 
Causal Links 
The next topic for focus group discussion was the causes of these environmental 
problems. This was aimed at helping gain an appreciation of how people 
perceive the causal links between the CCFGP and the attributes as well as any 
causal links between the attributes. 
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People believed that bad air quality was mainly caused by industrial pollution, 
the growing number of vehicles and the expansion of construction. Sandstorms 
as an attribute of air quality were seen to result from the dry climate and 
devegetation and land degradation in the North and West where the sand and 
dust arose. According to participants, the deteriorating landscape which 
negatively affects people's comfort was a result of less greening in cities and 
surrounding areas, and was also due to human disturbance such as tourism. 
People believed that poor water quality could be attributed to industrial pollution. 
Water shortages were thought to be caused by population growth and wasteful 
use of water resources. Biodiversity loss was believed to be caused by urban 
expansion and tourism that damages the habitats for fauna and flora. Since 
sanitation, congestion and traffic problems are not relevant in the context of the 
CCFGP, discussions on the causes of these problems will not be mentioned here. 
Some conclusions can be drawn from the discussion. First, dust and sandstorms, 
decreased landscape aesthetics and biodiversity loss were considered to be 
caused or partly caused by vegetation loss, which is the main issue addressed by 
the CCFGP. This implies that vegetation cover would be perceived as a causally 
prior attribute and ideally should not be included as an attribute in the CM 
questionnaire. Even though the focus groups did not identify vegetation cover as 
an attribute in an explicit way, landscape aesthetics in the context of CCFGP 
could be mainly caused by changes in vegetation cover. This leads to the 
question of how to describe landscape aesthetics if it is going to be included as 
an attribute. 
Secondly, all other attributes (except the vegetation cover) were in parallel and 
there was no causally prior attributes. This poses another challenge to the design 
of survey questionnaire. If these attributes are perceived to move together with 
one common factor, which is the vegetation cover change, people will tend to 
think that these attributes should always move in the same direction. It could be 
difficult to convince respondents that opposite movements in attribute levels in 
the CM choice sets could occur. However, the levels of these attributes can 
change at different rates and in different directions. For instance, biodiversity 
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could increase at a lower rate than sandstorm prevention. It is also possible that 
there are more plant species while sediment discharge is increasing. Thus it is 
possible that attributes move in different directions under different management 
options. Respondents need to have this explained clearly in the survey 
questionnaire. 
Thirdly, the causes of the environmental problems were consistent with the 
solutions to these problems mentioned by participants. For instance, participants 
talked about afforestation programs and sand control programs to tackle dust and 
sandstorm problem, and growing trees and grass to increase greening areas in 
cities and surrounding areas. This shows the consistency of the responses 
obtained from the focus group discussions and justifies the results from the 
discussions. 
Knowledge of the CCFGP 
An understanding of people's knowledge of the CCFGP including its current and 
potential environmental impacts helps to determine how much information is 
needed by respondents and how the information needs to be presented in the CM 
survey questionnaire. During the focus group meetings, the majority of 
participants did not relate the environmental problems they identified to the 
CCFGP as one of the mitigation strategies. Instead, they talked about other 
policy measures undertaken by the Chinese Government in solving these 
environmental problems. 
Most participants had heard of the CCFGP from newspapers and other news 
media, but few people knew the details of the Program. For instance, they 
understood that the CCFGP was about afforestation, but were not well aware of 
the conversion of cropland part of the Program and the subsidies involved. This 
implies that details of the CCFGP are needed in the CM questionnaire. 
Once introduced, participants believed that the CCFGP would have positive 
impacts on the environment as a whole if it could be implemented as planned. 
However, they did not perceive a direct link between the implementation of the 
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CCFGP and environmental improvements in Beijing. First, they talked about the 
distance between the CCFGP sites and Beijing, suggesting that the 
environmental benefits could hardly be felt by people in Beijing. Secondly, they 
mentioned that the potential reduction in dust and sandstorms in Beijing might be 
due to other afforestation and sand control programs around Beijing instead of 
being a result of the CCFGP. Thirdly, they worried about the survival rate of 
trees being planted under the CCFGP, questioning the potential environmental 
impact of the CCFGP. This discussion showed that the Beijing residents are most 
likely to hold non-use values for the environmental improvements arising from 
the CCFGP in North West China instead of use values. 
Payment 
The last topic discussed in the focus groups was the payment issue. The goal was 
to gain an understanding of peoples' willingness to pay for environmental 
improvements, the form of payment that they would be comfortable with, and the 
amount that they would be willing to pay. Payment is a key component in any 
CM study. The trade-offs that respondents make in selecting between the status 
quo situation and proposed alternatives are measured in monetary terms via the 
payment vehicle. As the payment issue was being discussed, participants were 
made aware of other spending commitments they might have such as helping 
poor children going to school or making donations to areas struck by natural 
disasters. 
The focus groups participants thought it important to keep the CCFGP in place 
even if it meant continual financial support to farmers to help them convert and 
maintain their cropland to forest and grassland. Participants understood that the 
financial support had been provided by the Government over the past few years, 
but also noted that part of the money paid was from themselves as tax payers. 
Participants did not reach agreement on their willingness to pay for the 
environmental improvement induced by the CCFGP. Some participants felt 
reluctant to contribute some amount of money to the CCFGP in addition to the 
tax they had already paid for four main reasons. First, the environmental 
improvement brought about by the CCFGP is a public good, hence should be 
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provided by the government through existing tax revenue without charging extra 
money from individuals. Secondly, they believed that people have a right to 
enjoy a good environment without having to pay for it. They commented that 
those entities damaging the environment should pay to clean up or pay for the 
environmental damage they cause. Thirdly, they did not perceive a direct link 
between the implementation of the CCFGP and the environmental improvement 
around themselves in Beijing. To them, use values are more important than the 
non-use values. They indicated that they would rather make donations to other 
ecological programs that have more direct bearing on the environmental 
improvement in Beijing such as the sand control program. They even mentioned 
that they would like to spend the money on things that were more approachable 
and believable, such as helping poor children going to school or making 
donations to areas struck by natural disasters. Fourthly, they were not confident 
in the credibility of the monitoring system for the management of the funds that 
would be raised. 
In contrast, other participants perceived that the environmental improvements 
brought about by the CCFGP are important and believed that there would be an 
indirect impact on Beijing. This implies that they may attach non-use value to the 
environmental improvements in North West China. They expressed their 
willingness to pay some amount of money to share the financial burden for the 
continuing implementation of the CCFGP. However, they suggested that there 
was a lack of knowledge among themselves and many other people as well on 
where to pay that money. They were not well informed of different kinds of fund 
raising activities and also did not know much about the organisations that were 
responsible for fund raising. These participants did suggest different forms of 
payment, including making donations to various Greening Funds or 
Environmental Funds, investing in the environmental security market, and 
buying environmental protection lotteries. Also they preferred donation to being 
taxed. As environmental securities and lotteries are investment activities from 
which purchasers hope to gain some financial return as well as an environmental 
improvement, they are not appropriate forms of payment in the CM study context. 
Participants also implicitly mentioned the maximum amount that they would like 
to pay: about 0.1 per cent of their net annual income (after tax). 
152 
The discussion on the payment issue has implications for the CM survey 
questionnaire. Even though some participants rejected the idea of paying for the 
environmental improvements that seemed to have no direct relationship to them, 
there were participants who would like to pay some money for these 
environmental benefits. In short, there would be some willingness to pay among 
the Beijing residents for the environmental benefits resulted from the CCFGP. 
7.2.3 The Supply Side Perspective 
To find out the supply perspective of the environmental impacts resulting from 
the CCFGP, the policy objectives of the CCFGP need to be well understood. 
This has been achieved through discussions with policy makers and their 
advisers as well as referring to government documents in which the policy 
objectives of the CCFGP are detailed. 
The CCFGP was implemented in the context of accelerating rates of soil erosion 
and desertification in China, especially in the North West provinces. These 
problems led to increasing frequency of flooding and serious sandstorms. 
Deforestation and degradation of grassland is considered to be the main 
immediate biophysical cause of the deteriorating natural environment (CCICED 
2002). In addition, the planting of annual crops and the grazing of livestock on 
devegetated lands with a slope of over 25 degrees have led to accelerated rates of 
soil erosion (SFA and SDPC 2000). Hence the CCFGP has land improvement 
and the provision of environmental services as its top priorities and was 
implemented across the whole country. In the north west where the main river 
systems in China originate, the CCFGP is planned to bring soil erosion under 
control, combat desertification, increase biodiversity and mitigate water shortage 
and drought (SF A and SDPC 2000; CCICED 2002; State Council 2002). From 
the supply side perspective, the anticipated environmental impacts of the CCFGP 
can be reflected by the following four general attributes: 
Air quality 
Landscape aesthetics 
Water quality 
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Biodiversity 
The biophysical modelling results presented in Chapter 5 confirm the 
environmental achievements which are in line with the CCFGP policy statement. 
Since 2000, the land use changes induced by the Program in the North West 
Provinces have brought about reductions in sandstorm severity and frequency, 
increased vegetative cover and hence an improved landscape, less sediment 
discharge into the Yellow River, and more plant species on the Loess Plateau. 
These attributes also cover the general environmental issues that are of concern 
to people living in both Beijing and the North West. This is important as the 
same survey questionnaire will be used in both places. 
7 .2.4 Defining the Payment Attribute 
The descriptions of the environmental attributes and the ranges over which their 
levels can vary have already been presented in the biophysical modelling chapter. 
In this sub-section, the payment attribute is described. From the initial focus 
group meetings it was clear that to sustain the implementation of the CCFGP, 
people are willing to pay no more than 0.1 per cent of their net annual income 
(after tax) to a Greening Fund or an Environmental Fund. Even though people in 
the focus groups were opposed to being taxed to support the CCFGP, imposing a 
tax or levy is the only way to ensure respondents understand that they would 
have to make some contribution in order to enjoy the environmental 
improvement brought about by the CCFGP. This is necessary to being able to 
estimate trade-offs between money and environmental improvement. Other 
payment vehicles suggested by the focus groups such as making a voluntary 
donation could lead to strategic behaviour of respondents because of the free-
riding problem. 
Therefore, an annual environmental levy was adopted as the payment vehicle in 
the CM questionnaire. The levy was defined to be collected from 2008 when the 
Government subsidy stops onwards for 10 years. Even though focus group 
participants were asked to state the amount of their willingness to pay explicitly, 
they gave an implicit answer using a percentage of their net annual income. 
154 
Given that people feel reluctant to reveal their income level, it would be difficult 
to ensure the validity of such a percentage of income approach. Based on the per 
capita net annual income of urban people in Beijing and the average persons per 
household (Zhang 2002), the maximum willingness to pay per household in 
Beijing was about CNY 35. The payment attribute was defined in terms of an 
annual environmental levy designed specifically for the CCFGP to be deposited 
into the existing Green China Fund or China Environmental Protection Fund. 
7.2.5 Draft of Survey Questionnaire 
Based on the first round of focus group findings, a preliminary CM survey 
questionnaire was structured (see Appendix III). The draft questionnaire was 
further tested in the second round of focus groups. An experimental design was 
developed to produce the choice sets for the CM questionnaire. An orthogonal 
fractional factorial was used to allow the estimation of all main effects of the 
attributes. A main effect is the effect of an attribute change on utility regardless 
of the levels of the other attributes of that choice option (Bennett and 
Adamowicz 2001: 57-58). It has been argued that the main effects typically 
account for 70 to 90 per cent of explained variance (Louviere et al 2000: 94). 
Dominant alternatives or implausible alternatives were removed after the 
fractional factorial design was completed but orthogonality was preserved. The 
experimental design generated altogether 25 choice sets and these were allocated 
to five blocks of five choice sets. Therefore there were five versions of the 
survey questionnaire differing only in the levels of the attributes in the choice 
questions. 
In the questionnaire, respondents were first briefed with the main land use 
management problems on the Loess Plateau and related environmental outcomes 
for the status quo situation between now and by year 2020. They were then told 
that there were two broad options available for land use management on the 
Loess Plateau: to revert to the pre-CCFGP land use practices which was the 
status quo situation; and to continue the land use practices under the CCFGP 
which was the 'change' situation. The scenario presented to respondents was that 
the financial support from the government in implementing the CCFGP will 
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cease in 2007. This would mean that farmers may revert to previous land use 
practices because of their income losses under the CCFGP. To keep farmers 
growing trees and grass on the Loess Plateau, financial support for the farmers 
involved in the Program will be needed for 10 years beyond 2007. Specifically, 
an environmental levy will be collected from taxpayers for a 10-year period 
would be required under this scenario. The size of the payment was stated to 
depend on the extent of the environmental improvements that the CCFGP aims to 
achieve on the Loess Plateau. The respondents were also assured that the money 
from the payment would go into a special fund and would be used only for the 
continuation of the CCFGP in the Loess Plateau region. Further, an independent 
body would make sure the money was spent properly. 
Respondents were then presented with five choice sets showing various options 
for land use management in the Loess Plateau region (see Figure 7.1 for an 
example). There were two versions of choice sets pre-tested in the second round 
of focus groups differing only in the description of the water quality attribute. 
The options in the choice sets were defined using five different attributes: rates 
of annual environmental tax, sandstorm days per annum, landscape in terms of 
vegetation cover, water quality described as the annual sediment discharge OR 
the usage standard of water, and plant species present. Respondents were asked 
for their preferred choice from each of the five sets of questions. They were also 
reminded of their available income and all other things they have to spend money 
when deciding on their preferred options. The different attribute levels used in 
the study are shown in Table 7 .2. 
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Figure 7.1 Example of a choice set from the Land Use Management on the Loess Plateau 
questionnaire 
Payment to farmers per ¥ O 
annum 
Sandstorm days per year 22 days 
Landscape (vegetation cover) 10% 
Water 
quality 
Annual sediment 100% (1. 9) 
discharge (billion 
tons) 
Option 2 
By 2020: 
¥ 25 
20 days 
30% 
15% less 
Option 1 
Option3 
"''' 
,·; ;+10:: \ ''~{' •• ,20201::'; . 
¥ 25 
18 days 
20% 
than 10% less 
Option 1 
than 
Usage of water Completely For irrigation For recreation 
Plant species present 
Table 7.2 Levels of Attributes 
Attribute 
Payment per annum (CNY)* 
Sandstorm days per year 
Landscape (vegetation cover) 
useless 
1600 species 
Water quality (annual sediment discharge) 
(usage of water) 
Plant species present 
* annual payment for 10 years 
1900 species 2200 species 
Base Level Choice Set Levels 
0 15,25,35 
22 20, 18, 16 
10% 20%, 30%, 40% 
1.9 billion tons 10% less, 15% less, 25% less 
Completely For irrigation, for recreation, for 
useless 
1600 
processing drinking water 
1900,2200,2400 
Some follow-up questions were presented next to find out the reasons why some 
respondents choose the status quo situation throughout the five choice questions 
and also to check for consistency of answers from the respondents. These 
questions also aimed to find out whether the information provided in the 
questionnaire and the choice questions caused any confusion or bias. Finally, 
respondents were asked for their socio-demographic information. 
Since the development of the draft questionnaire was based on the focus group 
discussions conducted only in Beijing, there might be some bias in framing the 
issue and defining the attributes. How people in other places perceive the 
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environmental improvements resulted from the CCFGP and the extent of their 
willingness to pay as well as the form of payment are all issues that need to be 
further explored. 
7 .3 Pretest of Survey Questionnaire 
Four more focus groups were organised in Beijing, Xi'an and Ansai in July 2005 
to pre-test and refine the draft survey questionnaire. In conducting this second 
round of focus groups, three main objectives were addressed: 
To gain an understanding of whether people in Xi' an and Ansai frame the 
issue in a similar way as people in Beijing did. This could determine the 
relevance of attributes currently used in the draft questionnaire; 
To test the draft questionnaire through a simulation of the survey. As the 
formal survey would be conducted in person, a simulation could help to 
identify potential problems, for instance, the time needed for the survey, the 
suitability of visual aid, and the format, etc. 
To evaluate the draft questionnaire. This involved assessing the clarity and 
adequacy of the information presented, getting feedback on the extent of 
willingness to pay as well as the form of payment especially from Xi'an and 
Ansai participants, understanding people's choice process and their 
perceptions of the plausibility of options in the choice sets. 
7.3.1 Focus Group Logistics 
Two focus groups were held in Beijing, one in Xi' an and one in Ansai for two 
hours each. The Beijing focus groups were held on July 4, followed by ones in 
Xi'an on July 6 and in Ansai on July 7. Participants in the focus groups were 
recruited primarily by using the 'friends of friends' approach. Similar to the first 
round of focus groups, the social classification of the Chinese society was used to 
stratify the sample in order to diversify the socio-economic coverage of 
participants. The groups' compositions in terms of their age, sex and occupation 
are set out in Table 7.3 and 7.4. 
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Table 7.3 Age and Sex Statistics for the Focus Groups 
Beijing Xi'an Ansai Total 
FGl FG2 FG3 FG4 
Number of female 6 6 5 2 19 
Number 20-30 years 2 2 2 7 
Number 31-50 years 4 6 5 5 20 
Number 51-65 years 4 3 3 11 
Total 10 10 10 8 38 
Table 7.4 Occupation of Focus Group Participants 
Occupation Beijing 1 
(No.) 
Beijing 2 
(No.) 
Xi'an 
(No.) 
Ansai 
(No.) 
Government Employee 
Senior Manager 
Private Entrepreneur 
Professional and technician 
Clerk 
Small family business owner 
Employee in the service sector 
Worker/ labour 
Unemployed 
7.3.2 Environmental Attributes 
2 
2 
2 
2 2 
2 
In each of the focus groups, people were first asked of what they think were the 
most important environmental issues in the Loess Plateau region. The discussion 
was designed to determine the relevance of attributes currently used in the draft 
questionnaire. People in the Beijing focus groups believed that major 
environmental problems on the Loess Plateau included: 
Desertification, soil erosion and sandstorms 
Drought 
Deforestation 
Sedimentation in the rivers 
They also believed that these environmental problems would have an impact on 
the environment in Beijing. Specifically, the riverbeds in the downstream areas 
would be raised up because of sedimentation, there would be more sandstorm 
days, and water shortage would become more severe. 
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2 
People in Xi' an and Ansai held similar views. Compared to people in Beijing, 
they were more specific about the environmental problems because they lived in 
the Loess Plateau region. The environmental issues they had identified included: 
Desertification, soil erosion and sandstorms 
Poor air quality 
Harsh and dry climate conditions 
More frequent natural disasters of drought and floods 
Water shortage 
Barren hills 
Deforestation and a decreasing number of plant species 
In addition to these common environmental problems, people m Ansai 
considered sedimentation in rivers to be a major concern. 
In summary, the discussions indicated that sandstorms, sedimentation discharge 
in rivers, air quality, water shortage, vegetation cover, and plant species should 
be included in the choice sets as attributes. Except for air quality and water 
shortage, these attributes conformed to the attributes included in the draft 
questionnaire. There were two aspects of air quality according to the focus group 
discussions: sandstorms and industrial air pollution. Sandstorms had already been 
included in the draft questionnaire as an attribute. Industrial air pollution would 
not be a relevant attribute in this study because although vegetation could 
mitigate industrial air pollution to some extent through carbon sequestration, 
other pollution control measures would play a bigger role. Water shortage was an 
environmental concern for people across the three places, but was not directly 
related to the CCFGP. Hence, the discussions confirmed that the four 
environmental attributes included in the draft questionnaire were relevant to 
people across the three places. 
7.3.3 Survey Simulation 
It took about 15 to 20 minutes on average to simulate the formal survey for each 
of the focus groups. To ensure the comparability of people's feedbacks across the 
three places, initially the same draft questionnaire was used in the four focus 
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group meetings. Because the focus groups were held in sequence, findings from 
the earlier focus groups were integrated into another revised version of the 
questionnaire which was later given to participants during the questionnaire 
evaluation section of the focus group meetings for them to comment. 
The facilitator of the focus groups acted as the interviewer. After a brief 
introduction of the survey, each participant was given an information sheet and 
an answer sheet. The information sheet contained a map of the Loess Plateau and 
the information about land use management problems on the Loess Plateau and 
related environmental outcomes for the status quo situation between now and 
year 2020. Participants were also presented with photos showing sandstorms, 
landscape, water quality and plant species on the Loess Plateau, as the 
environmental outcomes were described by these environmental attributes. 
Participants could ref er to the information sheet when the interviewer briefed 
them with the background information about the Loess Plateau and the 
environmental problems in the region. The information sheet and the photos were 
found to be useful visual aids. However, when presented with the water quality 
attribute in terms of water usage and a photo showing industrial sewage 
discharge into the river, participants indicated they could not link it to the land 
use management issues. They also suggested that they could not distinguish 
between different water usage such as water for irrigation use and for 
recreational use. Water quality in terms of sediment discharge was easier for 
them to understand and seemed to be more relevant in the context of land use 
management. 
Participants were then told how the land use options would affect them. 
Specifically, to keep farmers growing trees and grass on the Loess Plateau, an 
environmental levy would be collected from taxpayers for a 10-year period to 
support the farmers. At this point of the focus group discussions, participants in 
Beijing and Xi'an reacted strongly, with the majority objecting to the idea of an 
environmental tax. Ansai participants did not show much objection. To continue 
the simulation, the facilitator told participants to hold their opinions about the 
environmental tax until the simulation section was completed and this issue 
would be further discussed in the evaluation section. 
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Before being presented with the five choice questions, respondents were 
instructed on how to make their choices. This involved an introduction of the 
choice sets, the alternatives that made up each choice set, explanation that help to 
avoid confusions and causal links, and a reminder of people's available income 
and other spending plans. It was found that respondents could not remember 
these instructions when they answered the choice set questions. For instance, 
some respondents asked about the causal links between vegetation cover and 
other environmental attributes. To help respondents remember, an instruction 
sheet with bullet points on it was found to be useful when respondents were 
answering the choice questions. 
Another finding from the simulation was that the payment level in the draft 
questionnaire was set too low. The highest level of payment, which was CNY 35, 
was set based on the first round of focus group discussions in Beijing. During the 
survey simulation in the second round of focus groups, no one explicitly objected 
to the payment level, indicating that the amount of money was acceptable to 
people of different socio-economic status including those with low income level. 
People with higher income level might have a higher willingness to pay, yet the 
payment level in the draft questionnaire was not able to capture that. This 
suggested that a new payment level was needed. 
7.3.4 Evaluation of the Questionnaire 
After the simulation was completed, participants were asked a series of questions 
about the questionnaire. These questions mainly focused on people's reactions to 
the information provided in the questionnaire, the payment vehicle and level, and 
how people answered the choice sets. 
Clarity and adequacy of information 
Participants were first asked questions about the clarity and adequacy of the 
information in the draft questionnaire. These questions included: 'What's your 
initial impression of the survey questionnaire? ls it too hard? Too easy? 
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Confusing?'; 'What do you think of the information provided in the 
questionnaire? Is it clear? Or anything not clear?'; and 'What are your 
perceptions about the purpose of the survey? Any bias?'. 
Most participants suggested that in general the questionnaire was not difficult to 
understand. A few participants in the Beijing focus groups suggested that the 
background information was so complicated and professional that they could 
hardly remember all the information by the time they came to the choice 
questions. Participants in Xi'an and Ansai did not find this a problem mainly 
because they were more familiar with the land use management issues on the 
Loess Plateau and the CCFGP program. This concern was also raised during the 
survey simulation process where some respondents could not remember the 
instructions when they answered the choice set questions. To address this 
problem, an instruction sheet would be needed. Both an information sheet which 
had already been provided to participants in the focus groups and an additional 
instruction sheet were considered sufficient to help people understand the 
background information better and remember issues they should consider when 
answering the choice questions. 
Participants questioned the validity of the estimated and projected levels of the 
environmental attributes in the choice sets. They asked specifically about the 
information sources. They were told that these were the best estimates based on 
scientific research conducted in the Loess Plateau region and projections made 
by experts from the State Forestry Administration and the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences. To increase the credibility of the survey, information sources of these 
estimates were added to the revised questionnaire. In addition, because of the 
uncertainties associated with the estimation and prediction of attribute level, it is 
necessary to convey some notion of the degree of uncertainty of the biophysical 
result to individuals when they are evaluating the options. To do this, wordings 
such as 'about', 'around' and 'approximately' have been added in the 
questionnaire when attribute levels are indicated. 
Participants also suggested that some issues should be made more specific in the 
questionnaire. First, the draft questionnaire only mentioned that payment would 
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be collected from taxpayers. People would like to have more information about 
how the money would be collected, the geographical boundary for the collection, 
and whether the payment would be from individual income earners or from 
households. Following this suggestion, a statement of 'payment from urban 
households across China' was added to the revised questionnaire. 
Second, participants suggested the annual sediment discharge need to be 
conceptualised. In the draft questionnaire, water quality was described as 
' ... currently the sediment discharge from the Loess Plateau region into the 
Yellow River totals 1.6 billion tons per year'. Participants felt hard to 
conceptualise this quantity. To make people understand better, further 
descriptions was added to the revised questionnaire following the previous 
sentence: ' ... if this amount of sediment was filled into the Three Gorges Dam, it 
would take up about one twenty-seventh of the Dam's total capacity'. Another 
alternative for such description would be: ' ... if this amount of sediment was built 
into a dam with one metre width and one metre height, the total length of the 
dam would equal twenty-seven and a half circles of the Earth's equator'. Both 
these two descriptions were further tested during the one-on-one interviews after 
the second round of focus groups. 
Third, participants in the focus groups identified a problem with the choice set 
format. They indicated that with the three options titled simply as 'option 1', 
'option 2' and 'option 3' in the draft survey questionnaire (see Table 7.1), they 
could hardly distinguish between the 'status quo' and the 'change' scenarios. It 
would be better to list these scenarios explicitly in the choice sets. Following this 
suggestion, the choice set format was changed slightly in the revised 
questionnaire by adding in 'Reversion to land use practices pre-CCFGP' under 
the heading 'Option 1', and 'Continuation of CCFGP' on top of headings 
'Option 2' and 'Option 3' (see Table 7.5). 
Payment 
Much of the concern and discussion in the second round of focus groups centred 
on the topic of payment. Most participants strongly opposed to the idea of an 
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environmental tax. They suspected that the tax money would not be spent in the 
right place based on their previous experiences. To avoid paying extra tax, they 
suggested that this environmental tax should be drawn directly from the tax they 
had already paid to the government. Many participants indicated that even 
though they did not like an environmental tax, they had no choice but to choose 
the 'change' scenarios during the simulation because their wishes for 
environmental improvement were too strong. This implied that the selection of 
an inappropriate payment vehicle would obscure the true value that people might 
hold for environmental improvement. It would result in inaccurate value 
estimates and low response rate. 
In the focus groups, some participants indicated that the payment should be made 
on the basis of people's affordability and the extent of their demand for 
environmental improvement and therefore should be voluntary, while other 
people especially those from Xi'an and Ansai suggested the payment should be 
compulsory. In the final questionnaire, the payment would have to be 
compulsory in order to estimate people's trade-offs between money and 
environmental improvement and to avoid the free-riding possibility. Therefore, 
participants of the focus groups were encouraged to make suggestions on other 
acceptable and possible forms of a compulsory payment. Some focus group 
participants suggested being specific about the payment, naming it as the 
'compulsory payment to farmers' for them to grow trees and grass on the Loess 
Plateau under the CCFGP. This suggestion did not meet with objections possibly 
because people were more assured of where their money would go to. 
In the draft questionnaire, it was mentioned that '. .. the money would go into a 
special fend and would be used only for the continuation of the CCFGP in the 
Loess Plateau. An independent body will be set up to make sure the money was 
spent properly'. However, focus group participants were still suspicious of the 
administration and spending of the money. To address their concern of the 
credibility of the administration, the sentence was later changed into ' ... the 
money would go into a special fend and would be used only for the continuation 
of the CCFGP in the Loess Plateau. For the collection, use and administration of 
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the fund, a complete system would be put in place and would be monitored by the 
State Auditing Administration'. 
During the focus group discussions, participants were also asked for their 
preference of payment timeframe. Most people preferred an annual payment for 
10 years to a one-off payment, suggesting that an annual payment would remind 
people of the long-term effort that would be needed in environmental protection 
programs. They also considered that a one-off payment might be a financial 
burden to some households with relatively low income level. As it was found 
through the simulation that the highest payment level of CNY 35 in the draft 
questionnaire might be set too low, participants of the focus groups were further 
asked of their maximum willingness to pay every year for the program. While 
some participants suggested that CNY 100 would be the acceptable maximum, 
others indicated a maximum of CNY 200. Based on these findings, the highest 
payment level of CNY 200 was finally adopted in the revised draft questionnaire 
for further pre-test during the one-on-one interviews. 
The choice process 
A relevant issue was the possibility that the landscape attribute in terms of 
vegetation cover was perceived as a causally prior attribute for the other 
environmental attributes. Careful consideration was given to the information 
presented to respondents about this attribute to ensure that it would not be 
perceived as a causal attribute. It was also important that respondents did not 
perceive the choice alternatives as implausible, even though the very implausible 
alternatives were already removed when the experimental design was 
incorporated. To avoid these problems, the following statement was included in 
the draft questionnaire: 
Some of these effects may seem strange, for instance, vegetation cover is 
increasing while water quality is decreasing. However, remember that all 
these environmental effects are impacted differently by different CCFGP 
continuation options. Effects that may seem strange are quite possible. 
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Also, you might think that it is the change of vegetation cover that leads to 
changes in sandstorm days, water quality and the number of plant species. 
However, vegetation cover is only one factor. For instance, the distribution 
and type of tree also has an impact. 
The focus groups were used to test if the information presented in the draft 
questionnaire was sufficient and framed in the intended context. No causal links 
or implausibilities were specifically pointed out by participants, suggesting that 
the information was sufficient to address these problems. In addition, participants 
did not feel the choice set questions per se confusing and they found a total 
number of five choice sets were all right to handle. When asked whether it would 
be a good idea to add a few more choice sets, most participants objected to the 
proposal suggesting that would be excessive. 
However, some participants were confused by having to repeat the choice 
process with differing levels of payment and environmental attributes, in other 
words, they were not clear about the purpose of doing this exercise. They even 
made the suggestion of having choice scenarios similar to those in CV exercises. 
It has been found that confusion caused by bounded rationality may lead to 
people answering the choice sets strategically by focusing on just one or two 
attributes (Morrison et al 1997). Bounded rationality refers to the limit to which 
respondents can reasonably be expected to understand in a questionnaire 
(Morrison et al 1997). However, this was not the case in this study maybe 
because the confusion was not actually caused by bounded rationality. When 
asked about their choice process and how they made their choice decisions, most 
participants indicated that they considered both the payment level and the levels 
of the other four environmental attributes. This suggested that the choice tasks 
for respondents were not excessive and confusing so they did not have to 
simplify their choice process. However, according to participants, they did have 
some rankings that helped them make choices. While participants in Beijing put 
higher weight on sandstorms, participants in Xi' an considered sedimentation 
discharge more important, and participants in Ansai attached more attention to 
vegetation cover. Different rankings did not present any problem as they revealed 
people's true preferences. 
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Choice set format and attribute levels 
Based on findings from the second round of focus groups, the format of choice 
set was changed slightly with more information attached to the three options. 
Water quality was finally described in terms of annual sediment discharge into 
the Yellow River. In addition, the payment levels were increased from the 
previous CNY 35 to CNY 200 as the maximum. The revised choice set and the 
levels of attributes are shown in Table 7.5 and 7.6. 
Table 7 .5 Revised Choice Set Format 
Payment to farmers per ¥ O ¥ 100 
annum 
Sandstorm days per year 22 days 20 days 18 days 
Landscape (vegetation cover) 10% 30% 20% 
Water quality 1. 9 billion tons 15% less than 10% less than 
(Annual sediment discharge) Option 1 Option 1 
Plant species present 1600 species 1900 species 2200 species 
D 2 
Table 7 .6 Levels of Attributes 
Attribute Base Level Choice Set Levels 
Payment per annum (CNY)* 0 
Sandstorm days per year 22 
Landscape (vegetation cover) 10% 
Water quality (billion tons of annual sediment 100% (1.9) 
discharge) 
Plant species present 1600 
*annual payment for 10 years 
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50, 100 200 
20, 18, 16 
20%, 30%, 40% 
10% less, 15% less, 25% less 
1900,2200,2400 
7 .3 .5 Pre-test of the Revised Questionnaire 
Based on the second round of focus group discussions, the draft questionnaire 
was revised and pre-tested in Beijing later in July 2005. The pre-test was in the 
form of one-on-one interviews, similar to the formal survey which was 
conducted in person. Altogether 10 people were interviewed, with their 
occupations as following: 
1 senior government employee 
1 senior manager 
2 professionals and technicians 
1 clerk 
1 small business owner 
1 commercial and service sector employee 
1 construction worker 
1 temporarily re-employed person as a guard 
1 half-employed as a housekeeper 
The respondents in the one-on-one pre-test showed a good understanding of the 
information in the survey questionnaire as well as the choice sets. They made 
only minor suggestions on the revisions and further improvement of the 
questionnaire. The payment vehicle and the level of payment were the foci for 
the pre-test. Most respondents agreed with the form of compulsory payment 
made to farmers. Only one person (senior manager) suggested using tax to 
differentiate people with different income levels. Another respondent suggested 
that the government should make the payment. As tax was shown to be a vehicle 
objected by the majority in the focus groups and the payment would have to 
come from urban households, suggestions from these two respondents were 
rejected and the compulsory payment to farmers remained to be the payment 
vehicle in the final questionnaire. Most of the 10 respondents suggested that the 
amount of payment, with the maximum of CNY 200, was acceptable to their 
households. 
Respondents indicated that the information sheet and instruction sheet were 
useful references when the interviewer briefed them on the background 
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information. Two respondents suggested making it more specific as to the 
income sources for farmers after 2017 when the payment from urban household 
stopped. This suggestion was adopted and some more explanations were added to 
the questionnaire. With findings from the one-on-one pre-test being integrated 
into the survey questionnaire, the process of questionnaire development 
concluded and the questionnaire was ready for use in the final survey (see 
Appendix IV). 
7 .4 Conclusion 
This chapter detailed the development of the CM questionnaire through two 
rounds of focus groups held in Beijing, Xi' an and Ansai where the formal survey 
will be conducted. The attributes were defined taking into consideration both 
demand side perspective and supply side perspective, as well as the results from 
the biophysical modelling. The questionnaire was tested and refined during the 
second round of focus groups in relation to the clarity and adequacy of 
information, the suitability of visual aids and format, and the perception of 
plausibility of options in the choice sets. The revised questionnaire was further 
pre-tested and refined during the one-on-one interviews. 
It has been found through the focus group discussions that the application of the 
CM technique is feasible in the Chinese context. The CM technique is often 
challenged because of its task complexity and the cognitive burden its 
application imposes on respondents. These factors are argued by critics of CM to 
give rise to the use of simplified decision strategies or induce choice 
inconsistency. However, the CM study conducted in this research shows that 
these potential negative impacts can be mitigated with careful design of the 
survey questionnaire and the selection of appropriate attributes and their varying 
levels. 
It should be noted that there are possible limitations associated with using the 
focus group meetings in the Chinese social and cultural context. Focus group 
meetings rely heavily on the interactions among group members. Interactions are 
believed to enable participants to ask questions of each other, as well as to re-
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evaluate and reconsider their own understandings of their specific experiences 
(Kitzinger 1994). In some of the focus group meetings held during the research, 
interactions among participants were not sufficient. Very often comments and 
opinions from the most articulate person in the focus group were supported and 
further elaborated by the rest of the group. People seemed to lack some critical 
thinking and were more concealing compared to people from a more open 
society. Thus the discussions provide some caveats to the overall conclusions 
regarding CM viability. 
The CM questionnaire will be used in the formal survey to find out people's 
willingness to pay for the environmental improvements arising from the CCFGP 
on the Loess Plateau. The survey and survey results will be discussed in the next 
chapter. The estimates of the non-market value of the environmental benefits 
from the sampled households will be extrapolated to the wider population in 
Chapter 9 and the results will be integrated into the CBA to enable an overall 
assessment of the CCFGP. 
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Chapter8 
Survey and Survey Results 
8.1 Introduction 
The choice modelling (CM) survey was conducted by personal interviews in 
Beijing, Xi'an and Ansai in July and August 2005. Because of the various 
distances from the sample sites to the area involved in land use change and their 
different social and economic characteristics, the survey results can be used to 
infer the value held by the wider Chinese urban community. The survey results 
allow Hypothesis 6 which states 'People have a willingness to pay for the 
biophysical changes arising from the CCFGP' to be tested. 
In addition to the general conclusion about the non-market value of the 
environmental improvements arising from the CCFGP, a number of issues can be 
explored through the CM survey. These include if different aspects of the 
environmental improvements are valued differently, if different people hold 
different values for the environmental improvements, and if people in different 
locations hold different values. Using the same questionnaire for the three sample 
sites also affords an analysis of how value estimates are influenced by 
respondent' distance from the site of the environmental impacts. An 
understanding of these issues will help to extrapolate the results derived from the 
samples to the wider population. The non-market value held by the urban 
population in North China is an important component of the cost benefit analysis 
(CBA) of the CCFGP. 
This chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, the survey method is 
outlined together with a report on the socio-demographics of respondents. This is 
followed by Section 8.3 in which the results of general survey questions are 
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presented, mostly in relation to respondents' attitudes towards the land use 
management issue and towards the survey itself. Section 8.4 details the model 
specification results using three different model forms. In Section 8.5, results 
from different model forms are compared and value estimates are presented and 
discussed. This chapter concludes with Section 8.6. 
8.2 Survey Method and Socio-demographics of Respondents 
Empirical studies of goods with a large passive use value component have 
verified that only a small percentage of the aggregate economic benefit is 
accounted for by the people in the immediate jurisdiction where the good is 
located (Champ et al 2003). The environmental benefits resulting from the land 
use change under the CCFGP on the Loess Plateau can be both on-site and off-
site, and the associated non-market use and non-use value will accrue to people 
in both the North West provinces and elsewhere. The population of interest in 
this research context is the urban residents in North China. The definition of 
urban resident needs to be carefully drawn as the former distinction between 
urban and rural residents based on their 'hu kou' (household register) no longer 
holds. Many rural people now live and work in urban cities without an urban 'hu 
kou'. According to the occupation-based social stratification completed by CASS 
(2004), rural people who have been living and working in urban cities for four to 
five years no longer belong to the social class of farmers but instead fall into 
other categories based on their new occupations. This principle applies to this 
survey. Furthermore, household rather than individual values are elicited in this 
survey. 
Ideally, stratified random sampling based on occupation should be adopted. 
According to CAAS (2004), in the past 20 years, social stratification in China is 
more and more reflected by occupation stratification. This gives a true picture of 
the heterogeneity of the dynamic contemporary Chinese society. Even though 
theory suggests that willingness to pay is closely related to income, stratification 
directly based on income levels may not work well in the Chinese context 
because people's true income levels are not reflected in official statistics. This is 
mainly due to the lack of a well-established tax system in China during the 
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transition period and it is difficult to track the 'implicit' income that people have. 
On the other hand, income can be inferred by people's occupations. Hence 
stratification based on occupation could ensure that the sample is representative 
in terms of income. To adopt the occupation-based stratified random sampling, a 
full list of people from each occupation is needed to set up the sample frame for 
each stratum. However, there is no such a list for some occupation groups. 
Therefore, a mixture of sampling methods was used for this research. 
To meet the requirement of statistical testing for the choice models, a target of 
600 households was set to be interviewed in Beijing, Xi' an and Ansai, with 200 
households in each sub-sample. The occupation-based social structure is 
homogenous across different geographical districts in the urban areas in Beijing 
and Xi'an. Because of this, the geographical boundaries of the Third Ring Road 
in Beijing and the Second Ring Road in Xi' an were set as the limits of the survey 
area. This enabled travel cost savings of the in-person survey and also ensured 
that rural residents were excluded. In the next stage, systematic sampling was 
adopted to select five blocks each from the 15 blocks within the Third Ring Road 
in Beijing and from the 16 blocks within the Second Ring Road in Xi'an based 
on maps of Beijing and Xi' an. Quota sampling against occupation and systematic 
sampling in terms of the households approached within each block were then 
applied in combination. About 40 households were drawn randomly from each 
geographical block, with the specific number of households drawn from each 
occupation group in proportion to the percentage of the population as a whole in 
the respective cities (Table 8.1). Because there are five versions of the CM 
survey questionnaire distinguished by five different blocks of choice sets, this 
sampling strategy ensures that each version was taken by 40 respondents in each 
of the five geographical blocks with respondents from different occupation 
groups being involved evenly. Altogether 200 valid questionnaires were 
collected in Beijing and 203 questionnaires in Xi' an. 
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Table 8.1 Sub-sample Occupation Groupings: Beijing and Xi'an 
Occupation Stratification Percentage of 
Residents ( % ) 
Number of People 
Surveyed 
Percentage of the 
Sample(%) 
Senior Government Employee (division 
director level and above) 
Senior Manager 
Private Entrepreneur 
Professional and Technician 
Clerk (in governments, manufacturing 
sectors and companies) 
Small Business Owner 
Employee in the Commercial and 
Service Sectors 
Worker/ labour 
Unemployed (including those being re-
employed temporarily) 
Total 
Beijing 
5 
5 
2.6 
20 
20 
6.1 
20 
20 
1.3 
100 
Xi'an Beijing 
3 
3 
2.1 
20 
20 
11.5 
16.1 
20 
4.3 
100 
10 
10 
5 
40 
40 
12 
40 
40 
3 
200 
Xi'an Beijing 
6 
6 
4 
40 
40 
23 
32 
40 
9 
200 
5 
5 
2.5 
20 
20 
6 
20 
20 
1.5 
100 
Sources: Adapted from Beijing Statistics Bureau 2003 and 2004 and Xi'an Statistics Bureau 
2004; Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 2004. 
Quota sampling based on occupations was not used in Ansai given its small 
urban population of around 17 ,000 and its lower population heterogeneity. All 
the residential buildings in the urban area of Ansai are within walking distance, 
so four geographical blocks were stratified first and systematic sampling was 
then applied in approaching the households living in each block. Because the 
urban area of Ansai is home for both the urban population and rural population, a 
screening question was asked to identify urban respondents. Altogether 203 valid 
survey questionnaires were collected. 
The socio-demographics of the respondents and the population average in 
Beijing, Xi'an and Ansai are shown in Table 8.2. Across the three sub-samples, 
the age structure of the samples is close to the city/ town average. The sex 
structure of the sample in Beijing is close to the city average, but is not 
representative in Xi'an and Ansai. This is because the survey was mainly 
conducted at people's homes, and in most cases the male is the decision-maker in 
the households. Both the education and income characteristics of the sub-samples 
are different from the populations in each of the three places. The difference in 
education can be explained by the inclusion in the city/ town average of both 
urban and rural residents who generally have lower average educational levels 
than urban residents, which are the target group of this survey. The lower income 
level of the sample does not present a problem, as an earlier argument in the 
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Xi'an 
3 
3 
2 
20 
20 
11.5 
16 
20 
4.5 
100 
survey method section demonstrates that stratification based on occupation can 
fully ensure that the sample is representative of the population in terms of 
income. The lower income level is also partly due to the fact that people 
normally do not like to reveal their true incomes. 
Table 8.2 Socio-demoB!aehics of Reseondents 
Variable BEIJING XI'AN ANS AI 
Sample Beijing Sample Xi'an Sample Ansai 
average average average average average average 
Age 39.6 42.1 39.4 41.5 36.6 39.5 
(>18 years) 
Sex 56.3 52.3 70.4 52.0 62.6 52.5 
(%male) 
Education 40.5 28.6 40.9 20.4 37.0 24.4 
(%>year 12) 
Income (CNY) 9906.3 15637.8 4973.5 8544.0 5673.3 9407.0 
Sources: China National Statistics Bureau 2001 Census data; Beijing Statistics Bureau 2003 and 
2004; Xi'an Statistics Bureau 2003 and 2004; Shaanxi Statistics Bureau 2003 and 2004. 
8.3 The Results of General Survey Questions 
The survey questionnaire includes a number of attitudinal questions. These 
questions helped to explain the results derived from model specifications that 
will be the focus of next section. After a brief introduction of the Loess Plateau 
region, respondents were asked to indicate whether they have visited the Loess 
Plateau, and whether they intend to visit it sometime in the future. This question 
was for respondents from Beijing and Xi'an only, as Ansai is exactly located on 
the Loess Plateau. It is anticipated that respondents who have visited the Loess 
Plateau or who intend to visit it will attach higher value to the environmental 
improvements in the area. Table 8.3 summarises the findings. 
Table 8.3 Respondents' Stated Previous and Future Visit to the Loess Plateau 
Location Beijing Xi'an 
No. of respondents with 55 104 
previous visit 
No. of respondents intending 88 73 
to visit 
Percentage 71.5% 87.2% 
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After a brief introduction to the land degradation and major environmental issues 
on the Loess Plateau, respondents were asked about their interest in the 
environmental impacts of land management in the region. It is assumed that 
respondents' interests will be positively correlated to the amount of money 
respondents would be willing to pay for the environmental improvements. To test 
this hypothesis, a summary of responses to this specific question is presented in 
Table 8.4 and this information will later be used to interpret how respondents' 
willingness to pay is related to different attitudinal factors. 
Table 8.4 Respondents' Interests in Environmental Impacts of Land Management on the Loess 
Plateau 
Location 
Very interested 
Moderately interested 
Slightly interested 
Not at all interested 
Percentage of very and 
moderately interested 
Beijing 
76 
102 
15 
7 
89% 
Xi'an Ansai 
78 113 
92 74 
28 14 
5 2 
83.7% 92.1% 
Beijing respondents was included in the samples in order to find out the 
existence value that people elsewhere hold for land management and consequent 
environmental improvements in the Loess Plateau region. In the questionnaire, a 
specific question was directed to Beijing respondents about their perceptions of 
the relationship between growing trees and grass in the Loess Plateau region and 
sandstorm frequencies in Beijing. This question was deliberately designed to find 
out if the value that Beijing respondents hold for sandstorm reductions is purely 
existence value or a mixture of existence and use value. Findings are presented in 
Table 8.5. Results show the value that most Beijing respondents put on 
sandstorm reductions involve both existence value and use value. 
Table 8.5 Beijing Respondents' Perception of Relationship between Revegetation and 
Sandstorms 
There is relationship 
There is no relationship 
Don't know 
No. of respondents 
177 
184 
3 
13 
Percentage 
92% 
1.5% 
6.5% 
Respondents' attitude towards the payment vehicle is considered to be a main 
factor affecting their willingness to pay. Objections to the payment vehicle may 
engender protest responses that obscure respondents' true values for empirical 
estimation (Champ et al 2003: 128-129). In the questionnaire, a compulsory 
payment from urban households is required to provide financial support for the 
continuation of the CCFGP once the government subsidies cease. Respondents' 
attitude toward the compulsory payment is summarised in Table 8.6. It is 
interesting to note that while the percentage of respondents supporting the 
payment vehicle is about the same in the three places, it is increasing for 
respondents against the compulsory payment from Beijing to Xi'an and further to 
Ansai. The more proximate respondents are to the site of implementation for the 
CCFGP, the higher percentage of them is against the payment vehicle. 
Table 8.6 Respondents' Attitude towards Payment Vehicle 
Location Beijing Xi'an Ansai 
No. of respondents supporting 115 120 115 
it 
No. of respondents against it 32 59 65 
No. of respondents who don't 53 24 23 
know 
Percentage of respondents 16% 29% 32% 
a ainst it 
Among the surveyed respondents, about 11.4 per cent of them always chose the 
'status quo' scenario for the five choice sets. To identify the reasons for doing so, 
a follow-up question was asked in which respondents were provided with three 
possible reasons and an option for them to specify the reasons. Table 8.7 
summarises the findings. For the three possible reasons listed in the questionnaire, 
no one considers the CCFGP should be implemented in areas other than in the 
Loess Plateau region, while half of them always chose the 'status quo' scenario 
because of a lack of financial capacity, and about 15 per cent of them stuck to 
making no payment because they were not sure which option was the best. The 
remaining 35 per cent of respondents specified other reasons for them not to 
choose any of the 'change' scenarios. Most of them questioned the credibility of 
the Government in managing the fund or were doubtful about the effective use of 
the money. A small number of them were strongly against the compulsory nature 
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of the payment, suggesting that those who were much better off should be the 
ones to pay for the environmental improvements. 
Table 8.7 Number of Respondents and Reasons for Always Choosing 'Status Quo' 
Beijing Xi'an Ansai 
No. of respondents always 17 23 29 
choosing 'status quo' 
No. of respondents who could not 7 10 18 
afford payment 
No. of respondents not sure of best 5 2 3 
option 
No. of respondents considering 0 0 0 
other area for implementation of 
CCFGP 
Finally a set of questions were asked about the information presented in the 
questionnaire. This can help to check for respondents' understanding of the issue, 
the choice questions and the whole exercise, and also gives researchers an idea of 
the level of confidence to interpret the survey results. As Table 8.8 shows, the 
more proximate respondents are to the Loess Plateau, the higher percentage of 
them understands the information provided in the questionnaire. Based on the 
responses, less than 3 per cent of respondents actually said they did not 
understand the information (not shown in this table). The rest of them were not 
sure whether they had a full understanding of the issues and the exercise. Around 
half of the respondents believed that they would need additional information in 
order to make more sound and reasonable decisions. 
Moreover, a majority of respondents believed that the information provided in 
the questionnaire is biased in favour of continuing the CCFGP. The social 
desirability bias would likely occur in such circumstances whereby respondents 
have a tendency to present themselves in a favourable position with respect to 
social norms (Blarney and Bennett 2001: 179). This has implications for the 
interpretation of the level of willingness to pay respondents elicited. The elicited 
level might be higher than respondents' true willingness to pay. As the choice 
sets are the core part of the questionnaire, a good understanding of respondents' 
perception of these choice questions is crucial. As Table 8.8 reveals, only a small 
percentage of respondents found the choice sets confusing, and a majority of 
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them were confident in their answers to the choice questions. This ensures the 
validity of the CM results. 
Table 8.8 Respondents' Perception oflnformation 
Understand the information 
Need more information 
Believe the information is 
biased towards continuing 
CCFGP 
Find the choice sets confusing 
Sure of the answers to the 
choice questions 
8.4 Model Specification 
Beijing 
45.5% 
45% 
74% 
17.5% 
66.5% 
8.4.1 The Multinomial Logit (MNL) Models 
Unit: Percentage of Respondents 
Xi'an Ansai 
66.5% 86.2% 
52.7% 56.7% 
82.8% 88.2% 
17.7% 8.4% 
70.9% 87.7% 
The choice data were analysed using LIMDEP. With the sub-samples separated, 
three data sets emerge. Variables used in these models (only significant non-
attribute variables are included) and their coding are specified in Table 8.9. Mean 
values for the socio-demographic and attitudinal variables used in these models 
are shown in Table 8.10. 
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Table 8.9 Variables Used in the Choice Models 
Variable 
Attribute Variable 
Cost 
Sandstorms 
Landscape 
Water quality 
Plant species 
ASC 
ASCI 
Non-attribute Variable 
Age 
Sex 
Income 
Job 
Education 
Attitude 
Devatt 
Description 
Amount that households would pay each year as a compulsory 
payment to farmers for a duration of 10 years (payment vehicle) 
Number of sandstorm days each year 
% of vegetation cover on the Loess Plateau 
% of current sedimentation level in the Yellow River 
Number of plant species present in the Loess Plateau region 
Alternative-specific constant taking on a value of 1 for options 2 
and 3 in the choice sets, and 0 for the base option 
Alternative specific constant used in nested logit models taking on a 
value of 1 for option 2 in the choice sets, and 0 for the base option 
Age of respondent (in years) 
Sex of respondent taking on a value of 0 for male and 1 for female 
Income of households in CNY 
Job groupings taking on a value of 1 for white-collar jobs and 0 for 
blue-collar jobs 
Education level taking on a value of 1 for those of tertiary or higher 
level, and 0 otherwise 
Attitude towards the payment vehicle taking on a value of 1 if 
respondents support the payment vehicle, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable taking on a value of 1 for respondents indicating 
that, over the years, when have heard about proposed conflicts 
between development and the environment, they have tended to 
'Favor economic development'; 0 otherwise 
Table 8.10 Mean Value of Socio-demographic and Attitudinal Variables 
VARIABLE BEIJING XI'AN ANSAI 
HOUSEHOLD 26648.35 16909.55 17019.70 
INOCME (CNY) 
AGE 39.9 39.8 36.6 
SEX 0.43 0.29 0.39 
EDUCATION 0.41 0.41 0.37 
JOB 0.58 0.60 0.77 
ATTITUDE 0.59 0.59 0.57 
DEVATTI 0.05 0.07 0.06 
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Two different MNL models were estimated for each data set. The first is a basic 
model that shows the importance of the choice set attributes in explaining 
respondents' choices across the three different options: 'do nothing' and revert to 
land use practices pre-CCFGP (option 1), and 'do something' and continue with 
the CCFGP (options 2 and 3). Three utility functions (Vi_3) were derived from 
the basic model. Each function represents the utility generated by one of the three 
options: 
Vi= Bi. cost+ B 2.sandstorms+ B 3.landscape+ B 4.water quality+ B 5.plant species 
V2=asc+ B i. cost+ B 2.sandstorms+ B 3.landscape+ B 4.water quality+ B 5.plant 
species 
V3=asc+ B i. cost+ B 2.sandstorms+ B 3.landscape+ B 4.water quality+ B 5.plant 
species 
The ASC for option 2 and 3 were constrained to be equal because a generic 
format and an experimental design that was close to orthogonal were used to 
develop the choice sets. For the three utility functions, utility is determined by 
the levels of the five attributes in the choice sets (COST, SANDSTORMS, 
LANDSCAPE, WATER QUALITY, PLANT SPECIES). Hence the model 
provides an estimate of the effect of a change in any of these attributes on the 
probability that one of these options will be chosen. The results for this model 
are shown in Table 8.11 as 'Model 1'. 
The second model also includes interactions socio-demographic and attitudinal 
interactions. Socio-demographic and attitudinal variables can be included in 
MNL models either through interactions with the attributes in the choice sets or 
through interactions with the ASC. These interactions show the effect of various 
attitudes and socio-demographic characteristics modify the effect of attributes on 
the probability of choice or the effect on the probability that a respondent will 
choose either option 1, or option 2 or 3. The specification for 'Model 2' is as 
follows and the results for this model are shown in Table 8.11 as 'Model 2'. 
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V 1 = f3 1• cost+ f3 2.cost.income+ f3 3.sandstorms+ f3 4.landscape+ f3 5.water quality 
+ f3 6.plant species 
V2 = asc+asc.age+asc.sex+asc.education+asc.job+asc.attitude+asc.devatt+ f3 I· 
cost+ f3 2.cost.income+ f3 3.sandstorms+ f3 4.landscape+ f3 5.water quality 
V 3 = asc+asc.age+asc.sex+asc.education+asc.job+asc.attitude+asc.devatt+ f3 1. 
cost+ f3 2.cost.income+ f3 3.sandstorms+ f3 4.landscape+ f3 5.water quality 
To ensure comparability across the three data sets, the same socio-demographic 
and attitudinal variables are included in the second models. Since the models are 
based on three data sets, the coefficient estimates are not directly comparable 
across the samples. However, the significant level of the attributes and the socio-
demographic and attitude characteristics that affect people's choices can be 
compared across the three places. 
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Table 8.11 Multinomial Logit Model Results 
BEIJING XI'AN ANS AI 
VARIABLE Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model2 Model 1 Model2 
ASC 0.3098 1.2500*** 1.1914*** 2.2098*** 0.1651 0.5087 
(-0.2825) (0.4998) (0.2808) (0.5856) (0.2809) (0.4989) 
COST -0.0042*** -0.0074*** -0.0077*** -0.0112*** -0.0073*** -0.0087*** 
(0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0012) 
COST*INCOME 0.14E-06*** 0.16E-06*** 0.llE-06** 
(0.32E-07) (0.52E-07) (0.47E-07) 
SANDSTORMS -0.0808*** -0.0938*** 0.0027 -0.0048 -0.0439 -0.0381 
(0.0291) (0.0307) (0.0290) (0.0299) (0.0292) (0.0299) 
LANDSCAPE 0.0190** 0.0159*** 0.0065 0.0108* 0.0287*** 0.0263*** 
(0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0056) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) 
WATER QUALITY -0.0045 -0.0046 -0.0202*** -0.0183*** -0.0151 ** -0.0162** 
(0.0071) (0.0075) (0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0074) 
PLANT SPECIES 0.0013*** 0.0012*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
ASC*AGE -0.0447*** -0.0557*** -0.0346*** 
(0.0081) (0.0087) (0.0087) 
ASC*SEX 0.0786 0.2639 -0.7660*** 
(0.2395) (0.2234) (0.2045) 
ASC*EDUCATION 
-0.4534* 0.6116*** -0.2080 
(0.2731) (0.2493) (0.2336) 
ASC*JOB 1.1231*** 0.2460 0.9772*** 
(0.2701) (0.2251) (0.2337) 
ASC*ATTITUDE 1.4152*** 1.7127*** 2.2653*** 
(0.2526) (0.2225) (0.2277) 
ASC*DEVATT 0.1387 -1.2750*** -2.0172*** 
(0.4637) (0.3447) (0.3353) 
Summary 
Statistics 
Log-likelihood 
(LL) 
-926.3654 -789.8531 -957.2196 -859.9047 -993.072 -869.9788 
Constants only LL 
-869.5580 -999.7631 -1057.0923 
Pseudo-R2 0.03637 0.08513 0.05577 0.13037 0.0578 0.1717 
Observations 1000 910 1015 995 1015 1015 
Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses; *denotes significance at 10% level, **denotes 
significance at 5% level, and ***denotes significance at 1 % level. 
In each case the model fit improves by including respondent heterogeneity. As 
expected a priori, respondents have, in general, a preference for lower payments, 
fewer sandstorm days, a landscape with more vegetation coverage, better water 
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quality in terms of less sedimentation content, and more plant species. Contrary 
to expectations, the WATER QUALITY attribute in the Beijing models and the 
SANDSTORMS attribute in the Xi'an and Ansai models are insignificant, 
indicating that these environmental attributes did not influence the selection of 
options by respondents in these locations. The insignificant sign of the 
SANDSTORMS attribute in Xi' an and Ansai contradicts a priori expectations 
that sandstorms might be more of a concern to people in the North West who 
suffer more from sandstorms than to people in Beijing. The LANDSCAPE 
attribute in Xi' an Model 2 becomes significant at the 10 per cent level by 
including respondents' heterogeneity. Nevertheless, the results comply with the 
statements made earlier in the focus groups that the Beijing participants put 
higher weight on sandstorms, the Xi'an participants considered sediment 
discharge more important while residents in Ansai attached more importance to 
vegetation cover. 
The sign and significance of the ASC indicates a positive preference for the 
'change' scenario for respondents in Beijing and Xi'an. The models show that 
across the three sites, respondents were willing to pay more if they have higher 
income, and they were more likely to choose the 'change' options if they were 
accepting of the payment vehicle concept. Interacting the AGE variable with the 
ASC shows that older people are less likely to support the continuation of the 
land use change under the CCFGP. This is consistent with a prior expectation 
that older people are more conservative in spending and have less confidence in 
policy enforcement in China. 
The other socio-demographic and attitudinal variables have different impact on 
respondents across the three sites. Those in Beijing who had a white-collar job 
were found more likely to support the continuation of the land use change. 
Education level is a determinant of preferences among the Beijing respondents, 
but with an unexpected sign. The negative sign shows that people with higher 
education were less likely to support the continuation of the CCFGP. However, 
as expected a prior, those respondents who received higher education in Xi' an 
were more likely to choose the 'change' options. The Xi'an and Ansai 
respondents who have a pro-development orientation were more likely to choose 
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the status quo as expected. Education level has significant effect on choices made 
by the Xi'an respondents. In Ansai, female respondents were found to be more 
likely to choose the status quo compared to males. 
In order to test the validity of the IIA assumption underpinning the MNL models, 
a Hausman test was performed for the three data sets. Results show that the MNL 
models suffer from violations of the IIA assumption at the one per cent 
significance level. Accordingly nested logit models were explored to relax the 
IIA assumption. 
8.4.2 The Nested Logit (NL) Models 
A nested structure was adopted where respondents were assumed to make an 
initial choice between 'doing nothing' and 'doing something'. Initial choice at 
this branch level was made on the basis of attitudinal and socio-demographic 
variables. If respondents chose to 'do something', they were then assumed to 
choose between Option 2 and Option 3 on the basis of the five attributes and 
associated levels presented in the choice sets. The NL model can also be used to 
test for the IIA assumption. An inclusive value (IV) parameter statistically equal 
to 1.0 indicates that the two branches should collapse into a single branch, which 
is equivalent to a MNL model. It also indicates there are small correlation 
structures between the utility functions of alternatives present within the lower 
level of the nest (Hensher et al 2005: 490-494). The results of the nested logit 
model specifications for the three data sets are shown in Table 8.12. 
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Table 8.12 Nested Logit Model Results 
VARIABLE BEIJING XI'AN AN SA I 
Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error 
Utility functions 
COST -0.0062*** 0.0013 -0.0117*** 0.0015 -0.0081*** 0.0012 
COST*INCOME 0.13E-6*** 0.29E-7 0.18E-6*** 0.57E-7 O.lOE-6** 0.43E-7 
SANDSTORMS -0.0571* 0.0342 -0.0141 0.0330 -0.0239 0.0298 
LANDSCAPE 0.0127** 0.0058 0.0118** 0.0061 0.0237*** 0.0058 
WATER QUALITY -0.0019 0.0070 -0.0183** 0.0075 -0.0144** 0.0072 
PLANT SPECIES 0.0012*** 0.0002 0.0006*** 0.0002 0.0008*** 0.0002 
ASCl 0.1973*** 0.0730 -0.0312 0.0747 0.0879 0.0745 
Branch choice 
equations 
ASC -0.4794 1.5343 2.0350*** 0.7019 0.3432 0.6411 
ASC* ATTITUDE 1.4500*** 0.2612 1.7088*** 0.2215 2.2659*** 0.2305 
ASC*AGE -0.0454*** 0.0083 -0.0548*** 0.0087 -0.0350*** 0.0089 
ASC*JOB 1.0717 0.2745 0.2705 0.2261 -0.7937*** 0.2074 
ASC*DEVATT 0.2605*** 0.4871 -1.2383*** 0.3462 0.9524*** 0.2370 
ASC*EDUCATION -0.6016** 0.2864 0.5987** 0.2487 -0.2255 0.2374 
ASC*SEX 0.1162 0.2447 0.2669 0.2225 -2.0718*** 0.3421 
Inclusive value 
parameters 
DO NOTHING 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
DO SOMETHING 1.9350*** 0.5236 0.7951*** 0.2499 1.4597*** 0.3200 
Model Statistics 
Log-likelihood -782.6912 -859.5063 -867.6758 
Pseudo-R.2 0.33919 0.3198 0.31647 
Observations 910 995 1015 
Notes: *denotes significance at the 10% level; **denotes significance at 5% level; and 
***denotes significance at 1 % level. 
The branch choice equations indicate the relative utility of 'doing something' 
versus 'doing nothing'. The socio-demographic and attitudinal variables that 
were significant in determining how respondents made the initial choice between 
'doing nothing' and 'doing something' are the same as those in the MNL models, 
with the same signs and very similar magnitude as indicated by the coefficients 
and the level of significance. Allowing for differential variation in the 
unobserved effects across partitions of alternatives improves the model fit. Even 
so, the log likelihood ratio tests show that the NL and MNL models are 
statistically the same for Xi'an and Ansai. For the Beijing sample, the NL model 
is significantly superior to the MNL Model. 
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The choice between options 2 and 3 is modeled as shown under the heading 
'Utility functions' in Table 8.12. Compared to the result of MNL model 2, the 
attributes in the respective NL model all have the same signs and the attribute 
coefficients are of similar magnitudes. While the levels of significance of these 
attributes remain the same in the Ansai NL model, they differ in the Beijing and 
Xi' an NL model. The level of significance for SANDSTORMS and 
LANDSCAPE in the Beijing NL model is lower compared to the MNL model, 
while the level of significance for LANDSCAPE is higher and for WATER 
QUALITY is lower in the Xi'an NL model. 
The inclusive value (IV) parameter for the 'doing nothing' partition is 
constrained at 1.0 as it is a degenerate partition, while the IV parameter for the 
'doing something' partition is left free to be estimated. The IV parameter is the 
ratio of the scale parameter at the upper level to the scale parameter at the lower 
level, and the scale parameter is inversely related to the standard deviation. 
Hence the IV parameter should be in the range of 0-1.0 due to the presence of 
greater variance in the upper-level error components which include the variance 
components from both the lower-level choices and upper-level choices (Louviere 
et al 2000:144-149). The IV parameter for the 'doing something' partition is 
found not to be significantly different from one in the three NL models. This 
indicates that there is little correlation between options 2 and 3. Similarly, a 
number of nested models were estimated for the three data sets using a range of 
different nesting structures. Again the IV parameters for the nest partitions were 
found to be not significantly different from 1.0 in these models. This indicates 
that the nested model specification conferred no advantage over the MNL model 
(Hensher et al 2005: 490-494). Hence, to test for the accuracy of the MNL model 
estimates, random parameter logit (RPL) models were explored to relax the IIA 
assumption. 
8.4.3 The Random Parameter Logit (RPL) Models 
In the RPL models, a distribution for the random parameters is specified and 
parameters are estimated for that distribution. In most applications, normal and 
lognormal distributions are specified (Train 2003: 138-154). The normal 
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distribution sets no constraints on the signs of the parameters while the 
lognormal distribution is useful when a coefficient is known to have the same 
sign for all respondents (Train 2003: 138-154). Revelt and Train (1999) suggest 
fixing at least one coefficient for reasons of identification and stability. In this 
study, the COST coefficient is fixed while other coefficients are allowed to vary. 
This makes it convenient to interpret the model as the willingness to pay for each 
attribute is thereby distributed in the same way as the attribute's coefficient. 
Initially, all the attributes apart from COST were included as random variables 
and a number of different mixing distributions were used to estimate the models. 
Only minimal qualitative differences in parameter estimates were observed 
between the different mixing distributions and models with the normal 
distribution were selected for presentation. Estimates were obtained using 500 
random draws to simulate the sample likelihood. Attributes which consistently 
show an insignificant standard deviation over the range of draws were then re-
estimated as having fixed coefficients. The results of the RPL model 
specifications for the three data sets are shown in Table 8.13. 
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Table 8.13 Random Parameter Logit Model Results 
VARIABLE BEIJING XI'AN ANS AI 
Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error 
Random Parameters 
SANDSTORMS (Mean) -0.1437 0.0987 -0.2510** 0.1286 
LANDSCAPE (Mean) 
WATER QUALITY (Mean) 0.0103 0.0250 
Non-random Parameters 
ASC 0.8971 ** 0.4191 2.4185*** 0.4742 0.9970** 0.4713 
COST -0.0079*** 0.0009 -0.0141 *** 0.0016 -0.0091 *** 0.0013 
COST*INCOME O.lSE-06*** 0.39E-07 0.20E-06*** 0.61E-07 0.12E-06*** 0.54E-07 
SANDSTORMS -0.0219 0.0317 
LANDSCAPE 0.0153** 0.0064 0.0108 0.0067 0.0275*** 0.0060 
WATER QUALITY -0.0084 0.0083 -0.0278*** 0.0087 
PLANT SPECIES 0.0015*** 0.0003 0.0006** 0.0003 0.0008*** 0.0002 
Heterogeneity around the 
Mean 
SANDSTORM: ATTITUDE -0.2933*** 0.0647 -0.3365*** 0.0726 
SANDSTORM: AGE 0.0080*** 0.0020 0.0142*** 0.0031 
SANDSTORM: JOB -0.1793*** 0.0584 
SANDSTORM: EDUCATION -0.2044*** 0.0655 
WATER QUALITY: ATTITUDE -0.1109*** 0.0206 
WATER QUALITY: AGE 0.0016*** 0.0005 
WATER QUALITY: JOB -0.0451 *** 0.0142 
WATER QUALITY: SEX 0.0348*** 0.0121 
WATER QUALITY: DEVAIT 0.1338*** 0.0282 
SANDSTORMS (Std. Dev.) 0.3063*** 0.1118 0.4544*** 0.1113 
WATER QUALITY (Std. Dev) 0.0570* 0.0300 
Model Statistics 
Log-likelihood (LL) -795.3998 -872.1980 -887.6134 
Restricted LL -999.7372 -1093.1192 -1115.0915 
Pseudo-R2 0.19955 0.19767 0.19887 
Observations 910 995 1015 
Notes: *denotes significance at the 10% level; **denotes significance at the 5% level; and 
***denotes significance at the I% level. 
The random parameters that are identified for the three data sets include the 
SANDSTORMS attribute for the Beijing and Xi'an models, and the WATER 
QUALITY attribute for the Ansai model. The ASC, LANDSCAPE and PLANT 
SPECIES remain non-random parameters in the three RPL models, indicating 
that respondents in each of the three places show general consensus regarding 
these attributes, and that in general people prefer the 'change' scenario. The 
MNL and RPL models have very similar levels of significance for the mean 
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effects of the non-random parameters, with the RPL models showing slightly 
lower significance levels. The LANDSCAPE attribute is insignificant in the 
Xi' an RPL model. WATER QUALITY in the Beijing RPL model and 
SANDSTORMS in the Ansai RPL model have no impact on choices. This is 
consistent with the MNL model results. To determine the possible sources of 
heterogeneity around the means of the random parameters, the random 
parameters were interacted with other socio-demographic variables. All the 
socio-demographic and attitudinal variables are highly significant with expected 
signs. 
For the Beijing sample, the RPL model leads to an improvement in model fit 
compared to the MNL models, with the pseudo-R2 values reaching around 0.2. 
The MNL model failed to capture the heterogeneity around the mean of the 
SANDSTORMS attribute. The estimates of the SANDSTORM attribute in the 
Beijing RPL model are well dispersed, indicating that there is a diversity of 
opinion, ranging from deep concern to indifference, and this leads to imprecise 
estimates of the average population preferences for sandstorm reductions. The 
inclusion of socio-demographics shows that respondents' ages, jobs, and whether 
they support the payment vehicle concept all significantly impact their 
preferences of sandstorm days. Those in Beijing who support the compulsory 
payment concept, who are younger and have white-collar jobs have higher values 
for sandstorm reductions. Even with the inclusion of respondent characteristics, 
the standard deviation is still significant, indicating that respondents' preference 
for sandstorm days varies more than is captured by these characteristics. Taken 
together, the insignificant mean of the SANDSTORMS parameter and the 
significant standard deviation imply that SANDSTORMS do affect respondents' 
choices: the mean is not significantly different from zero because the different 
tastes regarding sandstorms tend to balance out across the sample. 
Compared to the MNL models, the Xi' an RPL model shows an improvement in 
model fit with the pseudo-R2 value approaching 0.2. The SANDSTORMS 
attribute becomes significant at the five per cent level in the RPL model. The 
inclusion of socio-demographic characteristics shows that respondents' ages, 
educational levels, and whether they support the payment vehicle concept all 
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significantly impact their preferences for SANDSTORMS. Respondents who 
support the payment vehicle concept, who are younger and received higher 
education attach higher values to sandstorm reductions. However, considerable 
variation remains after taking into account these socio-demographic variables, 
indicating that tastes vary more than can be explained by the observed 
characteristics of respondents. Even though the mean of the SANDSTORMS 
parameter is significant, the presence of heterogeneity over the sampled 
population may suggest a single parameter estimate is insufficient to represent all 
respondents. 
The Ansai RPL model shows the least improvement in model fit compared to the 
MNL Model, with a pseudo-R2 value of around 0.2. WATER QUALITY is the 
attribute that has the greatest variation. The standard deviation for WATER 
QUALITY remains significant after including socio-demographic characteristics. 
Respondents' ages, sex, jobs, whether they are pro-development and whether 
they support the payment vehicle concept all significantly impact their 
preferences for water quality. However, respondent's preference for water 
quality varies more than is captured by these characteristics. Even though the 
mean of the WATER QUALITY parameter is not significant, it does affect 
respondents' choices. The different tastes regarding water quality tend to balance 
out across the sample. However, the positive sign of the WATER QUALITY 
coefficient implies that respondents are willing to pay some amount of money to 
have more sediment discharge into the Yellow River, which is clearly counter 
intuitive. 
8.5 Comparative Results and Discussion 
8.5.1 A Comparison of Implicit Prices: MNL and RPL 
The MNL and NL models have so far been the most commonly used models to 
analyse choice data. While the MNL and NL models secure the simplicity of 
estimation, they impose several well-known restrictions such as homogeneous 
values of respondents with the same observed characteristics, unrealistic 
substitution pattern, and uncorrelated choices for the same respondent over time. 
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The RPL models avoid these limitations and generalize logit by allowing the 
coefficients of observed variables to vary randomly over people (Train 1998). 
The RPL model represents the latest development in the econometric technique 
for choice modelling. It offers an extended framework within which to capture a 
greater amount of true behavioral variability in choice making and aligns itself 
much more with reality (Hensher et al 2005: 621). However, the RPL model 
demands better-quality data than MNL and NL models and presents a high 
degree of computational complexities. Train (1998) argued that in some 
situations, NL model is easier to estimate than RPL model and can be preferred 
on those grounds, especially if the richer correlation patterns that RPL allow are 
not needed to adequately represent the choice process. 
As the NL models conferred no better advantage over the MNL models in this 
research, implicit prices for the environmental attributes are calculated using the 
MNL models (Model 2) and RPL models. In the case of the RPL models, the 
means of the attribute coefficients are divided by the mean of the COST 
coefficient for the non-random parameters, as with the MNL models. For the 
random parameters, the willingness to pay measures are constructed using the 
unconditional parameter estimates (population moments), which are obtained by 
simulating the population (Hensher et al 2005: 623-694). Confidence intervals 
for the implicit prices of the non-random parameters in the RPL models and 
parameters in the MNL models are calculated using the Krinsky and Robb (1986) 
procedure. A vector of 1000 sets of parameters is drawn for each model to re-
estimate the welfare changes. Estimates of implicit prices derived from these 
models for each data set are displayed in Table 8.14. These implicit prices relate 
to the annual payments respondents indicated they were willing to pay for units 
of environmental improvements. The payments were to be made for a period of 
ten years. 
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Table 8.14 Mean Annual Implicit Prices (IP) and Confidence Intervals (95% level) 
Beijing Models Xi'an Models Ansai Models 
MNL RPL MNL RPL MNL RPL 
Sandstorms -26.49 -38.66* -0.58 -24.46* -5.62 -3.03 
(-47.51 - - (-111.15- (-7.53 - (-105.70 - (-14.39 - (-11.97-
5.47) 33.83) 6.37) 56.78) 3.16) 5.02) 
Landscape 4.45 4.05 1.29 0.98 3.85 3.90 
(0.39-8.52) (0.12-7.98) (-0.13-2.71) (-0.19 - (2.00-5. 70) (2.06-5.85) 
2.15) 
Water -1.41 -2.27 -2.24 -2.57 -2.42 1.26* 
Quality (-5.97 (-6.58 - (-4.05-- (-4.07 - - (-4.66 - - (-14.05 -
-3.15) 2.05) 0.43) 1.06) 0.19) 16.57) 
Plant Species 0.35 0.40 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.11 
(0.12-0.57) (0.16-0.65) (0.01-0.12) (0.00-0.10) (0.05-0.20) (0.04-0.19) 
Note: '_'denotes those IPs that are not significantly different from zero at the 95% level; Cls in 
parentheses; 
* The mean IPs and Cls are calculated using the unconditional parameter estimates; other mean 
IPs and Cls reported in this table are calculated using the Krinsky and Robb (1986) procedure. 
A Poe et al. (2001) test was conducted to assess whether there are significant 
differences between the implicit prices derived from the MNL and RPL models. 
The results are shown in Table 8.15. Based on the Poe et al. test, the MNL and 
RPL models generate annual implicit prices for most attributes that are not 
significantly different from each other across all the samples. However, the 
implicit prices for SANDSTORMS in the Xi'an models and WATER QUALITY 
in the Ansai models are statistically different between the two model 
specifications at the five per cent significance level. The implicit prices for the 
random parameters all have larger confidence intervals compared to their 
counterparts in the MNL models, reflecting the great variations in people's 
preferences for these attributes. 
Table 8.15 Poe et al Test Results 
SANDSTORMS 
LANDSCAPE 
WATER QUALITY 
PLANT SPECIES 
BEUING 
PROB 
(IPMNL-IPRPL>O) 
0.6776 
0.4377 
0.3881 
0.6521 
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XI'AN ANS AI 
PROB PROB 
(IPMNL-IPRPL>O) (IPMNL -IPRPL>O) 
0.0310 0.6598 
0.3723 0.5179 
0.3881 0.0574 
0.3544 0.4249 
For further policy analysis, the estimates from the RPL models are used. 
Justifications are made on the following grounds. First, the RPL models display 
better fit than the MNL models as they capture the heterogeneity of respondents' 
preferences. Secondly, the MNL models were found to violate the IIA 
assumption and hence the MNL estimates might be biased. 
8.5.2 A Comparison of Implicit Prices: Beijing vs Xi' an vs Ansai 
Table 8.16 displays the present values of the implicit prices over a 10-year period 
calculated using the discount rates of three per cent, 10 per cent and 20 per cent. 
Because respondents were asked to make the payment from 2007 in the survey, 
the present values at 2007 are then further discounted to the present values at 
2006. 
Table 8.16 Present Value of Implicit Prices (in CNY) and Confidence Intervals (95% level) 
Attribute/ Beijing Xi'an Ansai 
Discount Rate Implicit CI Implicit CI Implicit CI 
Price Price Price 
Sandstorms 
3% 0 0 0 
10% 0 0 0 
20% 0 0 0 
Landscape 
3% 33.54 0.99-66.09 0 32.30 17 .06-48.45 
10% 22.62 0.67-44.58 0 21.79 11.51-32.68 
20% 14.15 0.42-27.88 0 13.63 7.20-20.44 
Water Quality 
3% 0 -21.28 -33.71- -8.78 0 
10% 0 -14.36 -22.73- -5.92 0 
20% 0 -8.98 -14.22- -3.70 0 
Plant Species 
3% 3.31 1.33-5.38 0.41 0.00-0.83 0.91 0.33-1.57 
10% 2.23 0.89-3.63 0.28 0.00-0.56 0.61 0.22-1.06 
20% 1.40 0.56-2.27 0.17 0.00-0.35 0.38 0.14-0.66 
The estimated implicit price for SANDSTORMS is not significantly different 
from zero among respondents across the three places. This indicates a possible 
framing bias for respondents in Xi' an and Ansai and a lack of sufficient precision 
of the model to measure the value that Beijing respondents put on sandstorm 
reductions because of the preference heterogeneity demonstrated in that sample. 
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While the implicit price for landscape improvement is not significantly different 
from zero for Xi' an respondents, it is significant and statistically the same for 
respondents in Beijing and Ansai. For one per cent more vegetation cover, 
respondents in Beijing on average are willing to pay CNY 33.54 (USD 4.16) at 
three per cent discount rate and the average willingness to pay of Ansai 
respondents is CNY 32.30 (USD 4.00). 
The value estimated from respondents in Beijing and Ansai for WATER 
QUALITY is not significantly different from zero. In contrast, the Xi' an 
respondents are willing to pay for reduced sedimentation. This is consistent with 
the focus group findings. For one per cent less sediment content in the Yell ow 
River, on average respondents in Xi'an are willing to pay CNY 21.28 (USD 2.64) 
at the three percent discount rate. 
The implicit price for PLANT SPECIES is significantly different from zero in all 
of the models, indicating a common concern over biodiversity protection across 
respondents in the three survey sites. However, a Poe et al (2001) test shows that 
the implicit prices are significantly different between Beijing respondents and 
Xi' an and Ansai respondents at the one per cent significance level, and are 
different at 10 per cent significance level between Xi' an and Ansai respondents. 
On average respondents are willing to pay CNY 3.31 (USD 0.41) for the 
protection of an additional plant species in Beijing, followed by CNY 0.91 (USD 
0.11) in Ansai and CNY 0.41(USD0.05) in Xi'an. 
8.5.3 Compensating Surplus 
The implicit price estimates show that, in general, respondents in Beijing, Xi'an 
and Ansai are willing to pay for environmental improvement on the Loess 
Plateau under the CCFGP. Different combinations of attribute outcomes can be 
evaluated. These alternatives can be considered as the outcomes of different 
management options. The compensating surplus for each household, which is the 
overall willingness to pay for a change from the status quo, is calculated based 
on the estimates derived from the RPL models. The status quo (reversion to land 
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use practices pre-CCFGP) and the change (continuation of CCFGP) scenarios are 
projected as follows based on biophysical projections of attribute levels: 
Status quo scenario: There will be an average of 22 sandstorm days per year, 9.6 
per cent vegetation cover, 1637 plant species and 1.9 billion tons of sediment in 
the Yellow River by 2020. 
Change Scenario: There will be an average of 16 sandstorm days per year, 40 per 
cent vegetation cover, 2386 plant species and 1.4 billion tons of sediment in the 
Yellow River by 2020. 
Estimates of compensating surplus are calculated using the equation: 
1 CS=- -(Vo-V1) 
/JM 
where /JM is the marginal utility of income (assumed to be equal to the 
coefficient of the COST attribute); Vo represents the utility of the status quo and 
V 1 represents the utility of the change scenario. 
On average, respondent households in Beijing are willing to pay CNY 882.56 
(USD 109.44) each year over 10 years for the specified environmental 
improvement. This is followed by CNY 388.08 (USD 48.12) in Ansai and CNY 
342.56 (USD 42.48) in Xi'an. The present values of the CS calculated using a 
range of discount rates at three, 10 and 20 per cent are shown in Table 8.17. For a 
three per cent discount rate, the present value (in 2006) of the average CS per 
respondent household for the specified environmental improvement will be CNY 
7309.14 (USD 906.33) in Beijing, CNY 2837.00 (USD 351.79) in Xi'an and 
CNY 3213.98 (USD 398.53) in Ansai. 
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Table 8.17 Estimates of Household Willingness to Pay (WTP, in CNY) and Confidence Intervals 
(95% level) 
BEIJING XI'AN AN SA I 
Household WTP 882.56 342.56 388.08 
per annum (489.77-1275.35) (283.18-401.94) (301.96-474.20) 
Discount 3% 7309.14 2837.00 3213.98 
-ed Total (4056.15-10562.13) (2345 .23-33 28. 77) (2500.76-3927.21) 
WTP 4929.95 1913.53 2167.80 
ForlO 10% (2735.84-7124.07) (1581.84-2245.22) (1686.74-2648.87) 
years 
20% 3083.42 1196.81 1355.85 (1711.12-4455.72) (989.35-1404.27) (1054.97-1656.73) 
The effect of varying income levels on the environmental payment is 
investigated by substituting different income levels25 into the utility functions. If 
average incomes were to increase to the 'high' range, average willingness to pay 
per household would rise by 64 per cent, 17 per cent and 19 per cent in Beijing, 
Ansai and Xi 'an respectively. 
8.5.4 Method of Provision 
Another issue that has been further explored is the impact of the method of 
provision on value estimates. In this study, the method of provision is the 
mechanism by which CCFGP will continue to be implemented, which is a 10-
year compulsory payment made to participating farmers by urban households. It 
has been argued that in some cases the method of provision engenders protest 
responses that obscure respondents' true values for empirical estimation (Champ 
et al 2003: 128-129). During the survey, some respondents explicitly objected to 
the proposed policy mechanism, suggesting that it should be the Government's 
responsibility to finance the continuous implementation of the CCFGP. To test 
whether the method of provision had an impact on welfare estimates, another set 
of RPL models were estimated in which people who strongly objected to the idea 
of compulsory payment were excluded. 
25Respondents were classified into the low, middle (average income level of the samples), and high income 
groups based on the income statistics in the three places (Beijing Statistics Bureau, 2004; Xi'an Statistics 
Bureau, 2004; Ansai Statistics Bureau, 2004). 
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Results are shown in Table 8.18. While the SANDSTORMS and WATER 
QUALITY attribute for the Beijing data and the SANDSTORMS attribute for the 
Xi'an data remain insignificant in the new RPL model, the WATER QUALITY 
attribute becomes significant for the Ansai data by excluding those who were 
strongly against the payment vehicle. In contrast, the SANDSTORMS attribute 
in the new Ansai RPL model becomes insignificant. For the attributes that are 
significant, results show that except for WATER QUALITY in Xi' an, the 
implicit prices derived from the new RPL models are higher than those from the 
previous models without exclusion. This proves that in general the method of 
provision did have an impact on welfare estimates. Respondents in fact have a 
higher willingness to pay for the environmental improvement under the CCFGP 
which had been obscured by the proposed policy mechanism. 
Table 8.18 Comparison of Implicit Prices with and without Exclusion (CNY) 
BEIJING XI'AN ANSAI 
Without With Without With Without With 
Exclusion Exclusion Exclusion Exclusion Exclusion Exclusion 
Sandstorms -38.66* -45.6* -24.46* -1.0* -3.03 -1.07* 
Landscape 4.05 5.05 0.98 1.75 3.90 4.6 
Water -2.27* -2.6* -2.57 -2.54 1.26* -2.94 
Quality 
Plant 0.40 0.48 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.11 
Species 
*denotes the attributes which are not significant. 
8.5.5 Discussion 
It has been found that there is significant non-market value held by the surveyed 
Chinese urban respondents for various improved environmental conditions under 
the CCFGP. Respondent households in Beijing, Xi'an and Ansai are willing to 
pay about 3.3 per cent, 2.0 per cent and 2.2 per cent of their annual household 
income respectively for the environmental improvements provided by the 
CCFGP on the Loess Plateau. While the willingness to pay of respondent 
households in Xi' an and Ansai are not significantly different, respondent 
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households in Beijing have significantly higher willingness to pay at the one per 
cent significance level. 
Being one of the key policy areas under the CCFGP, the Loess Plateau has drawn 
government funding totalling CNY 18.2 billion (USD 2.26 billion) since the pilot 
phase of the Program started in the region in 2000 (SFA 2000-2004) 26 . An 
extrapolation of the study results suggests that urban households in Beijing, 
Xi'an and Ansai are willing to pay a total of CNY 14.8 billion (USD 1.84 billion) 
for the benefits arising from these costs. This represents about 80 per cent of 
costs so far. 
The socio-demographics and attitudes of respondents are found to have an 
impact on people's willingness to pay. In addition to those that have already been 
discussed in the model specification section, respondents' acceptance or 
otherwise of the payment vehicle is found to have an impact on the level of non-
market values estimated. The non-market values become higher when 
respondents who objected to the compulsory payment were excluded in the 
analysis. Contrary to expectations, attitude variables such as previous visit to the 
Loess Plateau and respondents' interests in land use change do not affect 
respondents' preferences across the three places. 
Environmental preferences are found to be different among respondents across 
the three different survey sites. Respondents in each of the three sub-samples 
provided general consensus regarding the value of biodiversity conservation. 
However, respondents showed various strengths of preference with regard to the 
other three attributes. Respondents in Beijing and Ansai showed positive 
preferences for landscape improvement while respondents in Xi' an valued 
reductions in sediment discharge. There are numerous possible reasons for the 
differences in stated environmental preferences. First, people in different 
locations might have different environmental concerns. For instance, water 
quality in terms of sediment content was found to be of concern to respondents in 
Xi'an, but not so for respondents in Beijing and Ansai. This was reflected 
through the focus group discussions. Second, people in different locations might 
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have different levels of familiarity with the issue at hand, leading to different 
interpretations of the information and framing of the issue. For example, 
respondents in Ansai demonstrated better understanding of land use management 
issues on the Loess Plateau and the implementation of the CCFGP compared to 
people in Xi' an and Beijing. 
The CM study also shows that environmental issues in China can no longer be 
considered to be local issues only. People living both within the Loess Plateau 
region and away are concerned about its land use management and consequential 
environmental impacts. The willingness to pay for an improved environment 
transcends local boundaries. However, the level of willingness to pay might to 
some extent be obscured by respondents' perception that the information 
provided in the questionnaire was biased in favour of continuing the CCFGP. In 
addition, given that the CCFGP is only one of the many ecological programs 
being undertaken in China, the level of willingness to pay elicited by sampled 
respondents might be higher than their true level of willingness to pay in part as a 
result of framing bias in the non-market valuation study (Hoehn and Randall 
1987; Hoehn 1991). The estimates derived in this study, therefore, should be 
interpreted and used with these caveats in mind. 
8.6 Conclusion 
The non-market environmental goods and services provided by the CCFGP 
contribute positively to human wellbeing and warrant inclusion in policy 
analyses of the Program. In this chapter, a range of the non-market values 
derived from the CCFGP were estimated using the choice modelling technique. 
Respondents' preferences for various environmental improvements possible 
under the CCFGP were elicited in a household survey and their choice behaviour 
modelled to infer willingness to pay. Different choice models were estimated to 
simulate outcomes that can be used in policy analysis. 
26 Budgets beyond 2004 are not available from the State Forestry Administration. 
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It has been found that on average surveyed respondents hold significant non-
market value for various improved environmental conditions under the CCFGP. 
However, different aspects of the environmental improvements are valued 
differently, and different people hold different values for the environmental 
improvements. In addition, people in different locations hold different values. No 
distance decay effect has been found for the non-market value for the overall 
environmental improvements arising from the CCFGP. 
The research reported in this chapter also demonstrates, in support of the 
previous chapters' conclusion, that the CM technique is applicable in the Chinese 
context despite the hypothetical nature of the CM survey, the cognitive burden it 
imposes on respondents and the validity of its results are often being challenged. 
The application of CM to estimate non-market environmental values has not yet 
been widely used in developing countries. This CM study is one of the first of its 
kind to have been attempted in China. Throughout the survey, respondents 
showed good understanding of the issue at hand, the different policy scenarios 
and the choice questions. Moreover, the validity of the CM results derived from 
this research can be briefly demonstrated through the consistency of the 
willingness to pay estimates derived across the different samples. 
The household value estimates will be extrapolated to a wider population in 
North China to allow the aggregated non-market values to be integrated into the 
CBA of the Program. In the next chapter, an extrapolation exercise is conducted 
to find out the non-market values that the wider Chinese community holds for the 
environmental benefits arising from the CCFGP. 
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Chapter 9 
Extrapolation of Choice Modelling Results 
9.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the non-market values of the land use changes on the Loess 
Plateau under the CCFGP derived from the choice modelling (CM) study in 
Beijing, Xi' an and Ansai are extrapolated across different populations to 
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities. Ideally, original estimates 
should be obtained for the evaluation process. However, this can be costly and 
hence not feasible in many cases. The implementation of the CCFGP on the 
Loess Plateau in North West China has the potential to provide environmental 
benefits to urban households in North China covering almost one third of China's 
land territory. With such a broad geographical coverage, it would be costly to 
conduct separate empirical work for beneficiary residents in all affected areas. 
Extrapolation of value estimates from the sample to the population is considered 
to be cost-effective. However, its validity and reliability have been challenged. 
There are two main reasons for this. First, the relevant population across which 
the sample estimate is extrapolated is difficult to define. The second source of 
complexity is that there may be divergences between the characteristics of the 
sample and the actual population (Mitchell and Carson 1989: 263). Different 
approaches for extrapolation have been used in the literature. The choice of 
extrapolation approach can affect the derived estimates of total benefits which in 
tum may have an impact upon the outcome of a cost benefit analysis of a policy 
initiative (Bateman et al 2000). These issues are explored for the extrapolation 
exercise presented in this chapter. 
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The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the next section, some of the key 
issues in extrapolation are discussed. Section 9.3 provides an analysis of a pooled 
data approach. A choice model based on data from all surveyed sites is used as 
the basis for defining the geographical extent of the market. The results of the 
extrapolation exercise and the policy implications are reported and discussed in 
Section 9.4. This chapter concludes with Section 9.5. 
9. 2 Issues in Extrapolation 
9.2.1 Definition 
Due to a combination of both the time and resource constraints involved in 
obtaining original estimates of non-market benefits in specific sites, two main 
approaches are now widely used to provide relevant information in policy 
analysis. The first approach is environmental value transfer, defined as the 
transposition of monetary environmental values estimated at one site (study or 
source site) through market-based or non-market-based economic valuation 
techniques to another site (policy or target site) (Brouwer 2000). This is known 
as 'benefit transfer' and has been the subject of a research effort directed toward 
the assessment of the validity of use of data bases of environmental value 
estimates such as ENVALUE and EVRI (Bennett 2006: 3). The second approach, 
which is the focus of this research study, involves the extrapolation of value 
estimates obtained from sampled sites to a wider population that will be affected 
by the policy. Extrapolation has been researched in the wider statistical literature 
but has not been widely examined in the context of environmental valuation 
studies. 
9.2.2 Extent of the 'Market' 
The definition of the geographical extent of the 'market' remains a key issue in 
the extrapolation of sample estimates. In other words, it is difficult to know the 
relevant population of people who may enjoy non-market values from a good 
(Smith 1992b). The magnitude of extrapolated benefits depends on estimates of 
both per-person benefit and of the number of beneficiaries. Hence, extrapolated 
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values can be flawed if errors are made in estimating the number of beneficiaries 
affected by an environmental change (Hanley et al 2003). One way to deal with 
this issue involves the estimation of distance decay functions that show how the 
distance from the source of the non-market benefit affects willingness to pay. For 
instance, Hanley et al (2003) estimated distance decay functions for both users 
and non-users in the context of a contingent valuation study of the benefits of 
improving low flow on the River Mimram in Southern England. Similarly, 
estimation of distance decay functions can be found in a number of other studies 
(Sutherland and Walsh 1985; Pate and Loomis 1997; Bateman et al 1999). By 
doing so, the geographical limits of the market can be defined. 
9.2.3 Misrepresentation of Samples 
Surveys using stated preference methods are vulnerable to low response rates and 
self selection bias because they often present unfamiliar scenarios to respondents 
(Loomis 1987). This is especially the case with mail surveys, with response rates 
typically ranging from 20 to 60 per cent (Whitehead et al 1993). Drawing 
inferences about the population from a sample with a high non-response rate may 
generate biased results if the non-response is non-random (Whitehead et al 1993; 
Bateman et al 2002: 358-343). In other words, non-response bias arises if non-
respondents differ from respondents in observable characteristics that influence 
willingness to pay. Sample selection bias occurs if non-respondents differ from 
respondents in their willingness to pay due to unobservable characteristics even 
if they may have similar observable characteristics (Whitehead et al 1993). For 
instance, some authors suggest that individuals who feel strongly about an 
environmental amenity or who are past users of an environmental good will be 
more likely to respond to a survey, and this sample selection bias will bias 
estimated willingness to pay upward (Bateman et al 2002: 358-343; Mitchell and 
Carson 1989: 277). 
Personal interviews, by increasing response rates, can minimise non-response 
bias and sample selection bias to some extent. However, even with this survey 
approach, some people with unconventional lifestyles may be difficult to contact 
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when the survey is conducted (Loomis 1987; Morrison 2000). They may also be 
prone to 'interviewer bias'. 
Non-response bias and sample selection bias may result in divergences between 
the socioeconomic and attitudinal characteristics of the samples and the 
populations. Because of these divergences, direct value extrapolation using the 
sample mean may lead to biased aggregate estimates (Loomis 1987). Tests for 
bias have been scarce because of a lack of data on non-respondents. Among the 
few studies where such data are available, Whitehead et al (1993) found that 
failure to correct for non-response bias would distort the aggregate benefits of 
wetland preservation upwards by 33 per cent. Other researchers try to minimise 
non-response bias through the estimation of a predicted response rate to define 
the relevant population for aggregation. For instance, Bateman et al (2000) took 
into account non-response rates and bid functions in aggregation. They modelled 
the response rate through respondents' distances to the valuation site and their 
socio-demographic circumstances, especially income. 
9.2.4 Approaches to Correct for Divergences 
Different approaches are used in the literature to correct for the divergences 
between the sample and the population. At one end of the spectrum of 
approaches, sample estimates are generalised to the population on the basis that 
sample and population characteristics are similar, despite the low response rate 
(Walsh et al 1984; Stoll and Johnson 1984). In contrast, other researchers make 
assumptions about the preferences of non-respondents and take a conservative 
approach by assuming that non-respondents have a zero willingness to pay 
(Bishop and Boyle 1985; Boyle and Bishop 1987; Bennett et al 1997). They 
assert that for most non-respondents, the benefits of completing the survey are 
less than the costs, and the benefits depend to some extent on people's perceived 
value for the good involved. The conservative approach is based on the 
assumption that people are implying a low valuation for the non-market good of 
interest by not responding to the survey. 
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In addition to these approaches, a potentially more precise estimate of aggregate 
benefits can be computed by adjusting the sample values to account for 
differences between sample and population characteristics. There are several 
ways to do this. First, differences in socioeconomic characteristics such as 
mcome, age, sex and education can be corrected by substituting population 
averages into the independent variables of the function equation used to estimate 
willingness to pay. The willingness to pay is thus generalised to the wider 
population. This approach is referred to as the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression approach when contingent valuation is used (Loomis 1987). For 
instance, Schulze et al (1983) take this approach to adjust existence values of 
visibility at the Grand Canyon for differences in sample and population socio-
demographic differences. It has the advantage of allowing for differences in 
multiple socio-demographic characteristics. However, as DuMouchel and 
Duncan (1983) argue, estimates obtained from the OLS regression (parameter 
coefficients) may be inconsistent if sample proportions do not match population 
proportions for relevant socioeconomic characteristics. 
Alternatively, weighted least squares (WLS) can be used to produce consistent 
estimates. It involves the use of weights to correct for differences in the 
proportion of people in each socioeconomic class (DuMouchel and Duncan 
1983). The weights are: 
(9-1) 
where Wi is the weight for observations occupying the ith stratum; Ni is the 
population proportion of the ith stratum; and Si is the sample proportion of the ith 
stratum. The stratum can be socioeconomic classes (for example, income, age, 
education) that differ between the sample and the population yet is systematically 
related to willingness to pay. 
A weakness of the WSL approach is that it is not possible to create weights 
across more than one variable unless detailed information is available about the 
combinations of socioeconomic characteristics held by people in the population. 
Hence it only allows for divergence in one socioeconomic characteristic instead 
of the combinations of socioeconomic characteristics held by the population. In 
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addition, the standard errors of the model coefficients mcrease substantially 
when WLS is used (Morrison 2000). 
Another approach is the weighted average approach used by Carson and Mitchell 
(1993) to adjust for differences between sample households and all United States 
households in their study of willingness to pay for clean water. This approach 
involves the computation of a weighted average based on the population 
proportions. Specifically, the population weighted average is: 
n 
L(Ni*WTPi) (9-2) 
i=I 
where Ni is the population proportion for the ith stratum and WTPi is the average 
willingness to pay of respondents occupying the ith stratum. With this approach, 
generally one or at most two variables to which willingness to pay is most 
sensitive are singled out to stratify willingness to pay. The conservative approach 
of assigning a zero willingness to pay to non-respondents in aggregation is 
considered to be an extreme form of weighting (Loomis 1987). Because the 
weighted average approach is essentially based on OLS regression, the estimates 
may be inconsistent if sample proportions do not match population proportions 
for relevant socioeconomic characteristics (Loomis 1987; Morrison 2000). 
The approaches discussed above are used in the context of contingent valuation 
studies. Even though the OLS and WLS shall be phrased differently in the CM 
studies, the same principles apply. Studies show that the particular approach can 
make a major difference in aggregate benefit estimates (Loomis 1987; Morrison 
2000; Bateman et al 2000). Ideally the choice should depend on a comparison of 
the preferences of respondents and non-respondents. However, in most cases data 
are not available on the preferences of non-responses hence such a comparison is 
not possible. In these circumstances, empirical models can be relied on to find 
out whether preferences are highly correlated to socioeconomic characteristics 
and if so, one of the weighting approaches or the OLS regression approach can 
be used to adjust the differences. On statistical ground, WLS can provide more 
precise estimates than OLS. However, as Loomis (1987) further argues, if 
willingness to pay is directly elicited in dollar term, as in the contingent valuation 
studies, WLS is preferred to OLS in the willingness to pay regression to adjust 
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for differences in sample characteristics. On the other hand, if willingness to pay 
is elicited through dichotomous choice questions which is the case with the CM 
studies, then adjustments can be made by substituting population averages into 
the independent variables of a regression equation. 
9.3 The Extent of the Market 
To define the geographical extent of the market for non-market valuation of land 
improvement on the Loess Plateau under the CCFGP, three populations were 
surveyed in the CM study to test for the effects of respondents' distances from 
the site of the environmental impacts on their values. A pooled MNL model was 
estimated with all the three data sets combined. 
In the pooled MNL model, distance is included as an explanatory variable in the 
indirect utility functions. The locations are effects coded and were interacted 
with each of the four environmental attributes to identify site specific values. 
Ansai is defined as the base category and is coded as -1, whereas Beijing and 
Xi'an are coded as 1 respectively. Effects codes are preferred to dummy 
variables because by dummy coding the data, the base category of an attribute is 
confounded with the average overall utility or grand mean, and the dummy 
coded attribute will also be perfectly confounded with the grand mean of the 
alternative (Hensher et al 2005: 119-120). In contrast, effects codes 
orthogonalise the attribute effects to the constant. Specifically, the utility for the 
base category is isolated rather than incorporated into the intercept term. The 
base category of the attribute thus takes the utility level of the negative of the 
sum of the estimated coefficients for the other categories of the effects-coded 
attribute, and each other attribute category (those coded as 1) takes the utility 
associated with the their respective coefficients (Hensher et al 2005: 119-120; 
Lourviere et al 2000: 86-87). Variables used in the pooled MNL and their coding 
are specified in Table 9 .1. 
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Table 9.1 Variables Used in the Pooled Model 
Variable 
Attribute Variables 
Cost 
Sandstorms 
Landscape 
Water quality 
Plant species 
ASC 
Non-attribute variables 
Age 
Income 
Education 
Attitude 
Sex 
Beijing 
Xi'an 
Description 
Amount that households would pay each year as a compulsory payment to 
farmers for a duration of 10 years (payment vehicle) 
Number of sandstorm days each year 
% of vegetation cover on the Loess Plateau 
% of current sedimentation level in the Yellow River 
Number of plant species present in the Loess Plateau region 
Alternative-specific constant taking on a value of l for options 2 and 3 in 
the choice sets, and 0 for the base option 
Age of respondent (in years) 
Income of households in CNY 
Education level taking on a value of 1 for those of tertiary or higher level, 
and 0 otherwise 
Attitude towards the payment vehicle taking on a value of 1 if respondents 
support the payment vehicle, and 0 otherwise 
Sex of respondent taking on a value of 0 for male and l for female 
Effects coded with Beijing=l; Xi'an=O; Ansai= -1 
Effects coded with Xi'an=l; Beijing=O; Ansai= -1 
The pooled MNL model results are shown in Table 9 .2. The effects of the base 
category location (Ansai) on the environmental attributes are calculated and 
demonstrated in Table 9.3. 
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Table 9.2 Pooled MNL Model Results 
VARIABLES COEFFICIENT STD.ERR. P-VALUE 
COST -0.0061 0.00046 0.0000 
SANDSTORMS -0.1248 0.0587 0.0335 
SANDSTORMS*AGE 0.0027 0.0014 0.0584 
SANDSTORMS*EDU -0.0617 0.0242 0.0108 
SANDSTORMS*BEIJING -0.0523 0.0217 0.0160 
SANDSTORMS*XI' AN 0.0201 0.0214 0.3481 
LANDSCAPE 0.0173 0.0034 0.0000 
LANDSCAPE*BEIJING -0.0023 0.0043 0.5977 
LANDSCAPE*XI' AN -0.0026 0.0041 0.5279 
WATER QUALITY -0.0121 0.0043 0.0046 
W ATERQUA *BEIJING 0.0078 0.0053 0.1415 
WATERQUA*Xl'AN -0.0113 0.0051 0.0278 
PLANT SPECIES 0.0009 0.0001 0.0000 
PLANTSPE*BEIJING 0.0004 0.0002 0.0171 
PLANTSPE*XI' AN -0.0001 0.0002 0.4697 
ASC 0.3440 0.3760 0.3091 
ASC*AGE -0.0286 0.0072 0.0001 
ASC* ATTITUDE 1.7848 0.1278 0.0000 
ASC*INCOME 0.00005 0.0000 0.0000 
ASC*SEX -0.2775 0.1191 0.0198 
Summary Statistics 
Log-likelihood -2573.841 
Pseudo-R2 0.12037 
Observations 2920 
Table 9.3 Effect of Ansai on the Environmental Attributes 
VARIABLES COEFFICIENT STD.ERR. b/ St. Er. 
SANDSTORMS * ANSAI 0.0323 0.0216 1.496 
LANDSCAPE * ANSAI 0.0049 0.0042 1.157 
WATER QUALITY* ANSAI 0.0036 0.0052 0.683 
PLANT SPECIES * ANSAI 
-0.0003 0.0002 -1.682 
The location interaction coefficients are added to the mam effects of the 
environmental attributes for Beijing and Xi' an respondents and subtracted for 
Ansai respondents. Interacting the location variable with the environmental 
attributes shows that distance from the site of environmental changes had an 
impact on respondents' values on sandstorms, water quality and plant species at 
different levels, but has no impact on respondents' choices for landscape. In 
other words, respondents' values on landscape are not significantly different 
across the three sample sites. For the sandstorms attribute, an inverse distance 
decay effect is evident. While the location of Xi' an and Ansai has no marginal 
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effect on respondents' choices of sandstorms (their coefficients are not 
significant), the location of Beijing decreases the utility level of 0.0523 units for 
an increase in one sandstorm day. This implies that Beijing respondents have a 
higher willingness to pay for a decrease in sandstorms days compared to Xi' an 
and Ansai respondents. The interaction coefficients for location and water quality 
are not significant for Beijing and Ansai respondents, suggesting that the values 
for water quality are not significantly different between these two places. 
However, the location of Xi'an decreases the utility level by 0.0113 units for an 
increase in one per cent of sediment discharge into the Yellow River. For the 
plant species attribute, the location of Beijing increases the utility level of 0.0004 
units on top of the main effects for one more plant species present while the 
location of Ansai decreases the utility level of 0.0003 for one more plant species 
present. The location of Xi' an has no marginal effect on respondents' choices of 
plant species. This suggests that respondents in Beijing have the highest 
willingness to pay for plant species, followed by respondents in Xi' an and Ansai, 
demonstrating an inverse distance decay effect. 
These findings suggest that people in both the North West and the eastern area 
may attach both use and non-use values to land improvement on the Loess 
Plateau. In particular, people in the eastern area may have a higher willingness to 
pay for the improvement in air quality and biodiversity. On the other hand, the 
response rates of the survey samples (Table 9.4) show that the further 
respondents are located from the site of environmental changes, the more 
unlikely they are to respond to the survey. The response rates may be seen as an 
indicator of a distance decay effect but this may be confounded by other 
differences across the sub-samples, for instance, the level of urbanisation that 
affects people's life style and potentially their attitudes towards social surveys. 
Table 9.4 Response Rate of Survey Samples 
Number of People Beijing Xi'an Ansai 
Agreed to be 144 * 200 200 
interviewed 
Refused to be 113* 68 39 
interviewed 
Response rate 50% 75% 88% 
*Three interviewers failed to provide information on the non-response rate. 
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To define further the geographical extent of markets based on the above findings, 
it is useful to have a better understanding of the geographical extent of the Loess 
Plateau and its surrounding areas. The Loess Plateau, which is the site of 
environmental changes being valued in this study, covers large parts of Shaanxi, 
Gansu, Shanxi Provinces and Ningxia Autonomous region. It also covers parts of 
Qinghai Province and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (Mc Vicar et al 
2002; Sun and Zhu 1995: 14). For two decades, this area has been lagging behind 
China's coastal regions in market-oriented reforms and openness to trade and 
investment. It has relatively low population densities, and ecological 
deterioration in this area is severe. Water shortage, soil erosion and biodiversity 
loss are considered to be major environmental concerns in the area (Giordano et 
al 2004). Severe soil erosion coupled with heavy sedimentation on the Loess 
Plateau contribute to major flooding risks in the lower reaches of the Yellow 
River, where the off-site Shandong and Henan Provinces are located. The erosion 
also brings about increasingly frequent sandstorm events, water quality 
deterioration and a loss of biodiversity in the downstream area of the Yellow 
River in the eastern part of China. This area is one of the most important 
agricultural regions in China, with some of the most densely populated lands 
(World Bank 1993). 
Based on the distance effects on the environmental preferences observed using 
the pooled MNL model and the above definitions of the on-site and off-site areas 
of the Loess Plateau, the geographical extent of the 'market' for non-market 
valuation in this study is taken to include: 1) Shaanxi, Gansu and Shanxi 
Provinces and Ningxia Autonomous Region which are mostly located on the 
Loess Plateau; 2) Qinghai Province and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 
which are partly located on the Loess Plateau; and 3) off-site Shandong and 
Henan Provinces which are located in the downstream of the Yellow River, in 
addition to Beijing. 
For the on-site provinces and autonomous regions, both the capital cities and 
rural urban centres are included. The mean willingness to pay estimates derived 
from the Xi'an and Ansai samples are adjusted to extrapolate respectively to the 
urban population in capital cities and rural urban centres. Only the capital cities 
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of the partly on-site area are included in the extrapolation, which involve Xining, 
the capital city of Qinghai Province and Huhhot, the capital city of Inner 
Mongolia. The mean willingness to pay estimates derived from the Xi'an sample 
is adjusted to extrapolate to the urban population in Xining and Huhhot. The 
other rural town centres in the area are not included because unlike the capital 
cities, they are located further away from the Loess Plateau. For instance, the 
territory of Inner Mongolia stretches to the far North East, bordering Mongolia 
and Russia. Environmental concerns in these places are different from those in 
the vicinity of the Loess Plateau. 
For the off-site area, only the capital cities of Shandong and Henan Provinces are 
included in the extrapolation. This is because Beijing is the only off-site sample 
available for extrapolation. Beijing is unique in terms of its political, economic 
and cultural significance in China. However, major environmental concerns in 
Beijing are similar to those in Shandong and Henan and accordingly people can 
be assumed to have similar environmental preferences. In addition, Beijing is 
representative of the regional capital cities in the sense that these capital cities 
are the local political, economic and cultural centres. Hence the mean willingness 
to pay estimates derived from the Beijing sample is adjusted for extrapolation to 
the urban population in Jinan and Zhengzhou, the capital cities of Shandong and 
Henan Provinces. The rural town centres in the off-site provinces are excluded 
from the extrapolation because of the lack of representation of the Beijing sample 
for the urban population in off-site rural town centres. 
9.4 Value Estimates 
9.4.1 Separate Random Parameter Logit (RPL) Models and Sample Means 
Even though the pooled MNL model is useful in testing for the distance decay 
effect and defining the geographical extent of the market, it cannot provide other 
site-specific information especially on how the socioeconomic and attitudinal 
characteristics impact on environmental preferences in each place. This 
information is crucial in extrapolation because it captures the heterogeneity 
evident in the populations. Separate models for the specific sample sites are 
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therefore preferred. In the CM study reported in Chapter 8, the Multinomial 
Logit (MNL), Nested Logit (NL) and Random Parameter Logit (RPL) models 
have been explored for each data set to derive value estimates for the three 
sample sites. The RPL models were chosen as providing the best fits to the data 
sets, and they are used to make the extrapolation. The preferred RPL models for 
each survey site and the sample means calculated from these models can be 
found in Table 8.13 and Table 8.17. It should be noted that in calculating the 
willingness to pay, the socio-demographics variables are set at the sample 
averages. The mean values of the socio-demographic and attitude variables used 
in the willingness to pay functions can be found in Table 8.10. 
The separate RPL models in Table 8.13 show that across the three samples, 
respondents' incomes have impacts on their willingness to pay. While most of 
the environmental attributes remain non-random parameters in each RPL model, 
the SANDSTORMS attribute in the Beijing and Xi' an RPL models and the 
WATER QUALITY attribute in the Ansai model have shown great variation 
among the sampled respondents, indicating that respondents' preference for these 
attributes were affected by the socio-economic and attitudinal characteristics of 
respondents. In Beijing, respondents' ages, jobs and their attitude towards the 
payment vehicle all have impacts on their value estimates of sandstorm 
reductions. Education levels, ages and the attitude towards the payment vehicle 
are determinants of preferences for sandstorm reductions among the Xi' an 
respondents. In Ansai, respondents' attitude towards the payment vehicle, their 
ages, jobs, sex and whether they are pro-development or otherwise are all 
systematically related to their level of willingness to pay for water quality 
improvement. These findings imply that in extrapolation, the mean willingness to 
pay estimates derived from the samples need to be adjusted to allow for 
differences between sample and population in socioeconomic characteristics that 
relate systematically to willingness to pay. 
9 .4.2 Adjusted Sample Means 
Table 9.5 and Table 9.6 provide a summary and comparison of socioeconomic 
characteristics of population on-site, partly on-site and off-site to which the Xi'an, 
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Ansai and Beijing sample mean willingness to pay is extrapolated. These 
socioeconomic characteristics are found to be systematically related to 
respondents' willingness to pay in the Xi'an, Ansai and Beijing models. Even 
though the occupation stratification sampling method ensures that samples are 
representative in the three survey sites, the proportion of different occupation 
strata differs in different provinces and cities. Hence it must be questioned if the 
sample is representative of populations in places other than the survey sites. For 
this reason, difference in socio-demographics between the samples and the 
populations need to be corrected for in value extrapolation. 
Table 9.5 Socio-demograEhics of PoEulation On-site and Partl~ On-site 
Province/ Number of Average Average Age Sex Education 
Autonomous Urban per capita persons (>18 (%of (% > 
Region Households Disposable per years) male) tertiary 
(million) Income household level) 
(CNY) 
Capital 
Cities On-
site 
Xi'an 1.32 8544 3.4 41.5 52.0 20.4 
Lanzhou 0.7 7094 2.97 41.0 51.4 13.13 
Yinchuan 0.19 7245 3.26 41.0 50.7 18.0 3 
Taiyuan 0.7 8264 3.72 41.3 51.8 16.5 3 
Capital 
Cities Partly_ 
On-site 
Huhhot 0.36 8230 2.96b 41.1 51.51 b 18.5 3 
Xining 0.38 7025 3.59 40.9 50.50 16.o• 
Town 
Centres On-
site 
Shaanxi 2.06 6806 3.09 41.4 52.02 4.2 
Gansu 1.15 6657 2.96 41.0 51.83 2.7 
Ningxia 0.36 6530 3.09 41.0 51.29 3.7 
Shanxi 2.56 7005 3.29 41.3 51.76 3.4 
Sources: Adapted from China National Statistics Bureau 2001; Qinghai Statistics Bureau 2004; Shaanxi 
Statistics Bureau 2004; Gansu Statistics Bureau 2004; Ningxia Statistics Bureau 2004; Inner Mongolia 
Statistics Bureau 2004; Shanxi Statistics Bureau 2004. 
Note: •Percentages that are calculated based on the ratio of Xi' an to Shaanxi, as they are not available from 
official statistics; b Averages of Inner Mongolia, as statistics on its capital city (Huhhot) are not available. 
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Table 9.6 Socio-demogra2hics of Po2ulation Off-site 
Capital City Number of Average per Average Age 
Urban capita persons per (>18 years) 
Households Disposable household 
(million) Income (CNY) 
Beijing 3.29 13885 2.81 42.l 
Jinan 0.98 8982 3.26 41.6 
Zhengzhou 0.75 8647 3.56 41.5 
Sources: Adapted from China National Statistics Bureau 2001; Shandong Statistics Bureau 2004; 
Henan Statistics Bureau 2004; Beijing Statistics Bureau 2004. 
As the OLS approach has the advantage of allowing for differences in multiple 
socio-demographic characteristics, and it is found to outperform the WLS in 
dichotomous choice models that share many of the characteristics of CM, it is 
adopted in this study to adjust sample means for further extrapolation. The 
differences in the socioeconomic characteristics between the samples and the 
populations are corrected through value adjustments by substituting population 
averages into the independent variables of the willingness to pay functions. The 
adjusted mean willingness to pay for the population is shown in Table 9.7. 
Table 9.7 Adjusted Mean WTP 
Capital Cities/ Rural Town Centres 
Capital Cities On-site 
Xi'an 
Lanzhou 
Yinchuan 
Taiyuan 
Capital Cities Partly On-site 
Huhhot 
Xining 
Rural Town Centres On-site 
Shaanxi 
Gansu 
Ningxia 
Shanxi 
Capital Cities Off-site 
Beijing 
Jinan 
Zhengzhou 
9.4.3 Aggregation 
Mean/ Adjusted Mean WTP 
342.56 (283.18 - 401.94) 
290.05 (238.52 - 341.58) 
308.53 (255.03 - 362.03) 
327.41 (269.83 - 384.98) 
311.25 (257.41 - 365.09) 
310.15 (256.34 - 363.95) 
352.97 (279.14 - 426.79) 
350.76 (277.31 - 424.22) 
351.16 (277.67 - 424.64) 
362.00 (285.81 - 438.19) 
882.56 (489.77-1275.35) 
677.18 (448.97 - 905.39) 
700.48 (457.85 - 943.10) 
Aggregation is conducted using two approaches, namely the generalisation of 
adjusted sample means to the relevant population and the conservative approach 
of assigning a zero willingness to pay to non-respondents. This provides higher 
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and lower bounds of aggregate willingness to pays for comparison purposes. The 
adjusted mean value of willingness to pay is calculated (see Table 9.7) and 
generalised to the population by multiplying the adjusted mean willingness to 
pay by the total number of urban households in each place. With the assumption 
that the non-respondents in the survey had zero willingness to pay, the sample 
mean is extrapolated and aggregated across a population that is assumed to be 
respondents. In other words, with the conservative approach, the number of 
urban households for aggregation is the total number of urban households in each 
place multiplied by the response rate. The aggregated willingness to pay using 
these two approaches is shown in Table 9.8. 
Table 9.8 Aggregated Annual WTP in North China 
Place Adjusted No.of Response Method 1: Method 2: 
mean urban rate Extrapolation Zero WTPfor 
WTP households with adjusted non-
(CNY) (million) mean res~ondents 
Xi'an (Shaanxi) 342.56 1.32 75% 452.18 399.13 
Lan Zhou 290.05 0.7 75% 203.04 179.84 
(Gansu) 
Yin Chuan 308.53 0.19 75% 58.62 48.81 
(Ningxia) 
Tai Yuan 327.41 0.7 75% 229.19 179.84 
(Shanxi) 
Rural Shaanxi 352.97 2.06 88% 727.12 703.51 
Rural Gansu 350.76 1.15 88% 403.37 392.74 
Rural Ningxia 351.16 0.36 88% 126.42 122.94 
Rural Shanxi 362.00 2.56 88% 926.72 874.27 
Xining (Qinghai) 310.15 0.38 75% 112.05 92.49 
Huhhut (Inner 311.25 0.36 75% 117.86 97.63 
Mongolia) 
Beijing 882.56 3.29 50% 2903.62 1451.81 
Jinan (Shandong) 677.18 0.98 50% 663.64 432.45 
Zhengzhou 700.48 0.75 50% 525.36 330.96 
(Henan) 
Total WTP 
(CNY Million) 7449.18 5246.44 
(Million USD) 923.70 650.56 
As the payment elicited in the survey was to be paid over a 10-year period, the 
present value of the aggregate amount is calculated using a range of discount 
rates: three per cent, 10 per cent and 20 per cent. The results are shown in Table 
9.9. When a three per cent discount rate is applied, the present value (in 2006) of 
the total non-use market values in North China for a 10-year period will amount 
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to CNY 61.69 billion (USD 7.65 billion) using the adjusted mean approach. The 
conservative approach gives a total willingness to pay of CNY 43.45 billion 
(USD 5.39 billion), 30 per cent less than the adjusted mean approach. 
Table 9.9 Present Value of Aggregated WTP 
Discount Rate NPV (Method 1) NPV 
3% 
10% 
20% 
9.5 Conclusion 
CNY Million (Method 1) 
61692.25 
41610.90 
31230.48 
USD Million 
7649.84 
5159.75 
3872.58 
NPV 
(Method 2) 
CNY million 
43449.71 
29306.46 
18329.63 
NPV 
(Method 2) 
USD Million 
5387.76 
3634.00 
2272.87 
The extrapolation of non-market environmental value reported in this chapter 
sheds light on the long-term sustainability of land use changes in the Loess 
Plateau region. Through the extrapolation of the estimated sample mean 
willingness to pay to the relevant population both on-site and off-site of the 
Loess Plateau, it has been found that urban households in North China have a 
willingness to pay for land improvement on the Loess Plateau varying between 
CNY 61.69 billion (USD 7.65 billion) and CNY 43.45 billion (USD 5.39 billion), 
depending on the specific method used for extrapolation. This can be seen as the 
higher and lower bound of the amount of willingness to pay. Being one of the 
key policy areas under the CCFGP, the Loess Plateau has drawn government 
funding totalling CNY 18.2 billion (USD 2.26 billion) since the pilot phase of the 
Program started in the region in 2000 (SFA 2000-2004) 27 • Assuming that 
government funding for the CCFGP will continue at the same level as in the first 
few years until it ends in 2017-2018, the total investment in the region will be 
around CNY 65.5 billion (USD 8.12 billion). 
Weighing the potential non-market value of the environmental improvements in 
the Loess Plateau region against the investment under the CCFGP reveals that 
the government investment could almost be recovered by the total non-market 
value held by urban households in North China estimated at the higher bound. It 
27 Budgets beyond 2004 are not available from the State Forestry Administration. 
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should be noted that even though the use values will be held mostly by people 
along the Yellow River, the non-use values may accrue to people living in South 
China. Therefore the overall non-market values generated by land improvement 
on the Loess Plateau under the CCFGP may go well beyond the estimates 
derived in this study. 
This chapter also explored some methodological issues in value extrapolation in 
the Chinese context. Differences in the socio-economic characteristics of people 
across different places were accounted for when sample value estimates were 
extrapolated to other policy areas. However, the advantage of the CM 
applications in benefit transfer (as compared to CVM) was not brought into full 
play in this research. The CM applications yield functional relationships between 
value for environmental impacts and a sequence of characteristics or attributes 
that are used to describe those impacts (Bennett 2006: 4). Hence the variation of 
environmental outcomes across the samples and target areas could have been 
accounted for to derive more accurate estimations. However, information on the 
biophysical impacts of the CCFGP in each specific target area is currently not 
available. This reduces the strength of the extrapolation exercise reported in this 
chapter. In addition, more samples should be chosen than there were available for 
this research to cover a much wider array of circumstances. There is a need for a 
strong and detailed database of source studies if the benefit transfer is to be able 
to deliver accurate assessments in target cases. 
In the next chapter, the extrapolated non-market environmental benefits arising 
from the CCFGP will be integrated into the (partial) cost benefit analysis of the 
Program. Together with the market benefits and costs reported in the previous 
chapters of this thesis, the overall impact of the CCFGP on the Chinese society 
can be evaluated. 
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Chapter] 0 
Cost Benefit Analysis and Policy Implications 
10.1 Introduction 
With a number of the components of the social welfare change brought about by 
the CCFGP identified and evaluated in previous chapters, it is now able to 
conduct a cost benefit analysis (CBA) of the Program. The CBA builds on earlier 
findings on the agricultural production impact of the Program and the market and 
non-market valuation of the environmental changes arising from the Program. 
There are other environmental costs and benefits that are not included in the 
analysis due to the lack of scientific information to establish the links between 
biophysical changes and economic impacts. 
As such, a partial CBA is conducted with an aim to inform policy making of the 
CCFGP. With a CBA, the overarching hypothesis of this thesis which states 'The 
CCFGP improves the social welfare of people in North China' can be tested. A 
number of issues around the implementation of the CCFGP can be further 
investigated within the institutional framework and political economy of China. 
These issues include the sustainability of the Program, its economic efficiency, 
and the cost-effectiveness of the Program. An analysis of these issues helps to 
identify the problems associated with the Program, propose policy alternatives, 
and consequently provide policy guidance for future implementation of the 
Program. With the magnitude of the willingness to pay from downstream 
beneficiaries for the environmental benefits arising from the CCFGP available, it 
is also worthwhile to explore policy issues concerning the establishment of the 
environmental services market in China. 
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This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 10.2, the results of a partial cost 
benefit analysis of the CCFGP are presented. This is followed by a discussion of 
the policy implications of the Program in Section 10.3, concentrating on the 
long-term sustainability and economic feasibility of the Program. Section 10.4 
explores the potential to develop markets for environmental goods and services 
provided by the CCFGP, with an emphasis on the institution of an auction 
mechanism to achieve the cost-effectiveness of the CCFGP. The policy settings 
that should be in place to guarantee the socially optimal land use decisions are 
also briefly discussed in this section. The chapter concludes with Section 10.5. 
10.2 Cost Benefit Analysis of CCFGP 
A partial CBA is conducted to assess the overall impact of the CCFGP on the 
economic welfare of the Chinese community in North China. The costs and 
benefits arising from the implementation of the Program in North West China are 
both on-site and off-site. These include the on-site agricultural production 
impacts of the Program, the non-market environmental impacts of the Program, 
and the hydrological impacts of runoff reductions on agricultural production, 
with the latter two extending beyond the Loess Plateau. However, there are other 
environmental costs and benefits that are not included in the analysis. These 
include the impacts of reduced runoff in the Yellow River on hydropower 
generation, aquaculture and coastal fishery production as well as benefits and 
costs associated with flood control efforts. 
In conducting the CBA, assumptions have been made that Results are displayed 
in Table 10.1. Both the on-site net economic impacts and the non-market 
environmental impacts are found to be positive. However, the downstream 
hydrological impacts of the CCFGP bring about an economic loss from foregone 
agricultural production in the YRB. To be conservative, the lower bound of the 
non-market value of the environmental benefits is included in the CBA. 
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Table 10.l Social Cost Benefit Analysis ofCCFGP Unit: CNY million 
Discount On-farm Net Non-market Economic Loss Net Present 
Rate Benefit Environmental from Run-off Value 
Benefit Reduction 2006 
3% 59642 43449 667 102424 
10% 33708 29306 468 62546 
20% 8868 18329 340 26857 
Note: Information included in this table is taken from Tables 6.5, 6.12 and 9.9. 
Overall, the NPV of the net social benefits of the CCFGP are positive at discount 
rates varying from three to 20 per cent. Hence, the Program is found to improve 
the social welfare of people across Northern China and the overarching 
hypothesis of this thesis is accepted. The partial social cost benefit analysis 
provides a justification for the Program from the perspective of the government 
and the society. Even with the inclusion of the other environmental costs and 
benefits arising from the CCFGP, the NPV of the net social benefits of the 
Program is highly likely to remain positive. This is because with reduced runoff, 
the avoided flood damage may far outweigh the potential costs from hydropower 
generation as well as aquaculture and coastal fishery production. Hence the net 
hydrological impacts of the Program on the social welfare are likely to be 
positive. 
However, a number of factors are found to have an impact on the social welfare 
of the Program. Sensitivity analyses of the impact of the CCFGP on agricultural 
production show that forest and grass revenue as well as off-farm income are key 
factors affecting the on-farm net benefit. In Tables 10.2 - 10.4, the social welfare 
impact of the Program is re-calculated by integrating the adjusted on-farm net 
benefit into the CBA framework. 
Table 10.2 CBA Results - Halve Forest and Grass Revenues Unit: CNY million 
Discount Adjusted On- Non-market Economic Loss Net Present 
Rate farm Net Benefit Environmental from Run-off Value 
Benefit Reduction 2006 
3% 4844 43449 667 47626 
10% -9561 29306 468 19277 
20% -27642 18329 340 -9653 
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Table 10.3 CBA Results - Halve Off-farm Income Unit: CNY million 
Discount Adjusted On- Non-market Economic Loss Net Present 
Rate farm Net Benefit Environmental from Run-off Value 
Benefit Reduction 2006 
3% 3786 43449 667 46568 
10% -16937 29306 468 11901 
20% -44397 18329 340 -26408 
Table 10.4 CBA Results - Halve Revenues and Off-farm Income Unit: CNY million 
Discount Adjusted On- Non-market Economic Loss Net Present 
Rate farm Net Benefit Environmental from Run-off Value 
Benefit Reduction 2006 
3% -51012 43449 667 -8230 
10% -60206 29306 468 -31368 
20% -80907 18329 340 -62918 
Results show that the economic efficiency of the CCFGP is sensitive to forest 
and grass price and outputs and off-farm income. Halving either forest and grass 
revenue or off-farm income leads to a negative NPV of the net social benefit of 
the CCFGP at the 20 per cent discount rate. Even though the NPVs are still 
positive at the three per cent discount rate, they are only about half of the original 
result (CNY 47,626 million and 46,568 million respectively). The NPV of the net 
social benefit of the CCFGP is found to be negative at all three discount rates 
when halving both forest and grass revenue and off-farm income, suggesting that 
the CCFGP decreases the social welfare of the Chinese people and is hence not 
economically feasible under those conditions. 
It should be noted that these results need to be interpreted in the context of a 
partial CBA. Adding in the other environmental impacts of the land use changes 
may give rise to mixed results. While the impacts of reduced runoff on 
hydropower generation, aquaculture and coastal fishery production may result in 
an increased economic loss, the impacts on flooding occurrences may bring 
about net economic benefits. In order to derive an accurate estimation of the net 
social benefit of the CCFGP, ideally these environmental impacts should also be 
included in the CBA. 
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10.3 Policy Implications 
10.3.1 Justification of CCFGP 
To the best of the author's knowledge, the research presented in this thesis 
provides the most complete CBA of the Program since its inception in 1999. The 
analysis also expands across a time period of 20 years to allow for an 
examination of the long-term impact of the Program on the social welfare of 
people living in North China. Results show that the implementation of the 
CCFGP can be justified given the assumed conditions. The land use changes 
arising from the Program on the Loess Plateau in North West China has been 
found to improve the social welfare of the Chinese community, and hence should 
be supported by the Government. As subsidies are excluded in the economic 
analysis of the agricultural impacts of the CCFGP in North West China, the 
positive net on-farm benefits of the Program suggest that the land use changes 
will be sustainable in the region even without government support. However, this 
does not mean that the CCFGP is not needed. Justification for government 
intervention through the CCFGP can be made on the following grounds. 
First, land use changes were not being made without the CCFGP in place. This 
might be due to the poor land property rights definition, a lack of initial capital to 
help farm households make a transition, a lack of knowledge about the potential 
of an increase in revenue if farmers change their land use pattern, or simply high 
information costs associated with the change. Because of these 'barriers' to land 
use changes, the CCFGP can be viewed as an important contribution to affecting 
change (Xie et al 2006). 
Second, the welfare impacts of the CCFGP achieved through changes in 
agricultural production differ across the north west region. The counties on the 
Loess Plateau that have larger CCFGP land ratios and are highly reliant on 
grazing show poor financial viability of unassisted conversion and on-site 
economic inefficiency. These counties are also the most ecologically fragile and 
the land conversion impacts on the environment of the Program are likely to be 
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the greatest in these counties. Hence, the CCFGP can be seen as an important 
contribution to achieving sustainable land use changes especially in ecologically 
fragile area in North West China (Xie et al 2006). 
10.3.2 Sustainable Land use changes under CCFGP 
Even though the implementation of the CCFGP is justified on the basis of the 
results of the partial CBA, sustainable land use changes under the Program is not 
guaranteed. Sustainable land use changes also require that the Program be 
positioned within an array of policies focused on the rural economy so that the 
dual goals of environmental improvements and poverty alleviation can be 
achieved. A number of problems that have been identified in this research need 
to be addressed in order to achieve sustainable land use changes under the 
CCFGP. These mainly concern Program implementation and design, as well as 
the future financing of the Program. 
First, future revenue streams from forest and grass products and off-farm 
employment need to be secured under the CCFGP. The sensitivity analyses of 
the CBA results show that reduced forest and grass revenues and off-farm 
income have great impact on the viability of the Program and have the potential 
to make the Program uneconomic in China. This suggests that careful monitoring 
of these factors and consequent policy measures will be needed to ensure the 
viability and long-term sustainability of the Program on the Loess Plateau. 
Forest and grass revenues depend on future outputs and prices of forest and grass 
products. The selection of suitable tree and grass species is crucial in securing the 
expected outputs in the arid and semi-arid Loess Plateau region. For instance, 
limitations on the number of species being planted could reduce biodiversity and 
timber yields, and trees thus planted could be more vulnerable to serious pest 
outbreaks. Technical support from local administrations should also be improved 
to increase the survival rates of trees and grass. Forest and grass revenues will 
also be threatened by the possible price fall due to an increased forest and grass 
products supply. The government therefore needs to take measures to facilitate 
the marketing of forest and grass products under the land conversion program 
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through the development of transportation networks and the removal of trade 
barriers. Reducing technical and market risks will help to ensure the anticipated 
forest and grass revenue brought about by the CCFGP. 
Off-farm employment opportunities for rural households in China are 
constrained by the household registration (hukou) system. Instituted in the 1950s, 
the hukou system divides the population into 'agricultural' and 'non-agricultural' 
sectors and restricts rural-to-urban migration (Wu and Treiman 2003; Johnson 
1994). Despite reforms to the hukou system since the late 1970s when economic 
privatization and government reforms took place, restrictions continue to affect 
the lives of Chinese people, especially those in rural areas. Employment, housing, 
and social benefits are commonly linked to hukou identification. Rural migrants 
to urban areas are often unable to obtain equal access to public services such as 
health care and education. Continued hukou restrictions may be fueling the 
emergence of an excluded migrant population in China's urban areas (Wu and 
Treiman 2003). If the constraints imposed by the hukou system are not removed, 
off-farm income will be at risk and so will be the economic efficiency of the 
CCFGP. 
Second, sustainable land use changes that involve long-term revenue streams 
require farmers' rights over the CCFGP land to be well defined and secured. As 
previously argued, institutional and market imperfections initially drive 
households to choose to cultivate marginal lands. These imperfections include an 
incomplete property right regime, imperfect credit markets, lack of local public 
goods, and high transaction cost, and they characterise the plight of most rural 
communities in the developing world (de Janvry et al 1991). They limit the 
capability of rural households to make optimal production choices and trap them 
into poverty and inefficient land and labour allocation decisions. As a result, 
households are unable to pursue more profitable activities and are left with no 
choice but to resort to cultivating steeply sloped and other marginal lands. 
The land tenure arrangements in China are on leasehold rather than freehold 
basis. This has implications for incentives for long-term land use changes. The 
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security of title to land is weakened where only use rights (instead of ownership) 
to land are rendered. In addition, the land tenure settings under the CCFGP need 
further revision. In line with the Rural Land Contracting Law, which was 
approved by the National People's Congress in August 2002, farmers who plant 
trees or grass under the CCFGP hold the property rights to the trees or grass, with 
the duration of the tenure extending to 70 years (PRC 2002a). Even so, the 
ownership of trees and grass on the CCFGP lands is still incomplete. For instance, 
there is a lack of disposal right of the timber and other forest products, because 
logging and timber procurement system in China is subject to strict government 
quota and regulations. If these imperfections are not removed, there is a risk that 
once the payment of subsidies expires, short term expedient returns will be 
preferred to long term (if somewhat larger) returns and the land use changes 
achieved will be reversed. This is especially likely to be the case when farmers 
are faced with natural, technical and market uncertainties. 
Thirdly, sustainable land use changes under the CCFGP depend on the 
implementation of the Program, in particular, whether the payments can be made 
on time and in full. Based on the farmer livelihood analysis conducted in this 
research, farmers in Ansai and Gonghe counties would be worse off during the 
first few years of the land use changes without Program payments. This implies 
that if farmers were under-compensated due to delays and shortfalls in the 
payment, dissatisfaction, resentment and non-compliance would occur. This 
would present a direct threat to the viability of the CCFGP and sustainable land 
use changes induced by the Program would be at risk. 
In addition, with government funding for the CCFGP drawing to an end, it is 
worthwhile to explore options for financing the CCFGP into the future, 
especially in those counties which demonstrate poor financial viability without 
assisted land conversion. The on-site economic inefficiency of the CCFGP in 
these counties does not imply land use changes should not be pursued in these 
places. On the contrary, these counties are the most ecologically fragile area and 
the land conversion impacts of the Program are likely to be the greatest in these 
places. Indeed, the net economic costs in these counties are found to be off-set by 
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the environmental benefits arising from land use changes, which shows that the 
implementation of the CCFGP in these counties is socially welfare enhancing. 
The viability of land conversion in these counties is therefore dependant on the 
ability of the public policy process to mobilise the surplus value created by the 
enhanced flow of environmental services from the land use changes to fund the 
required land management process. The on-going implementation of the Program 
means this funding must also be on-going. Payment schemes require adequate 
funding to ensure adequate levels of environmental services. Paying for forest 
protection, for instance, requires sufficient long-term funding to at least cover the 
costs of planting high-quality trees and maintaining them, as well as the 
opportunity costs of different forms of forestry vis-a-vis other land uses. Where 
financing is inadequate or not linked to specific quality indicators, farmers often 
revert to agriculture or plant trees with poor economic and ecological returns. 
The magnitude of willingness to pay from downstream beneficiaries for various 
environmental improvements under the CCFGP suggests that with strains on 
government finances, there is a possibility to look outside the public sector for 
additional finance for the implementation of the CCFGP beyond its official 
cessation in 2010. 
10.3.3 Cost-effectiveness of CCFGP 
Even though the implementation of the CCFGP on the Loess Plateau is justified, 
its cost-effectiveness needs further investigation to find out if the policy goals of 
the Program are achieved at the lowest costs. In other words, it is worthwhile to 
find out if there is room for better targeting of the Program. This has important 
policy implications because of the tight fiscal budget from the Government to 
support payments for environmental services in China. 
Because of the dual goals of the CCFGP in achieving poverty alleviation and 
environmental improvements, the targeting of the Program can be investigated 
from two perspectives: first, whether the Program has targeted the 'right' 
households in terms of achieving poverty alleviation and social equity in the rural 
communities; and second, whether the Program has targeted the right types of 
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lands that have the lowest marginal opportunity costs and highest marginal 
environmental benefits (that is, the highest net benefits). The targeting of the 
Program to address the poverty issue is beyond the scope of this research. Only 
the environmental targeting is considered herein to assess the cost-effectiveness 
of the Program. 
To enable a comprehensive assessment of the cost-effectiveness of the CCFGP, 
information is required on the marginal productivity (foregone productivity as 
opportunity costs) and marginal environmental benefits of the policy sites as well 
as the transaction costs of the mechanism. While the marginal environmental 
benefits of specific policy site can be estimated using the CM results, other 
information needed is not available. The research design and data availability, 
though, allows some preliminary conclusions to be drawn in relation to the cost-
effectiveness of the Program. 
The farmer livelihood analysis found that Program payments have vanous 
impacts on farm households. At the moment payments under the CCFGP are 
made on the broad basis of opportunity costs of land instead of the potential 
environmental benefits arising from the land conversion, and there are only two 
levels of payments across the country to differentiate crop productivity in the 
North and South. While the payment is found to be important in some counties in 
changing land use patterns, it is less so in other counties where farm households 
are better off with the land use changes even without payments. For instance, the 
payment was found to play a key role in land use decision making for Ansai 
sampled households. Also, the payment was more important for sampled 
households in Gonghe where there is a large initial cost for farmers to initiate 
land use changes. These findings indicate that a single rate of payment of the 
Program in North China is inefficient in achieving sustainable land use changes 
in Program areas. 
In addition, the economic analysis of the agricultural production impacts of the 
CCFGP has shown that the Program changes the rural economic structure of the 
counties studied. This has negative impacts on the social welfare for the Ansai 
and Gonghe county groups. With a large CCFGP land ratio and degraded pasture 
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land, these counties are also the most ecologically fragile and the land conversion 
impacts on the environment of the Program are likely to be the greatest. This 
suggests that the CCFGP should target these area in particular and more 
resources should be diverted to these area in order to maximise the 
environmental benefits of the Program. While in the other counties such as 
Binxian and Minhe, policy measures such as extension activities, improved 
lending opportunities and better defined property rights may be sufficient. This 
suggests that the cost-effectiveness of the Program can be improved through 
better targeting of the Program sites. 
To improve the cost-effectiveness of the CCFGP, Uchida et al (2005) argued that 
payments should be indexed on the basis of each plot's slope (the steepest ones 
that would provide for the greatest environmental benefit) and yield history (the 
lowest yielding plots to allow for the lowest payment to cover the plot's 
opportunity cost). Suggestions on the improvements of the cost-effectiveness of 
the Program will be discussed in detail in the next section. These include tapping 
the potential of private incentives for the implementation of the CCFGP to link 
environmental benefits to targeted beneficiaries of these benefits. For instance, 
the institution of an auctioning process for access to fund will be discussed. 
These market mechanisms are expected to improve the environmental targeting 
of the CCFGP so that the cost-effectiveness of the Program could be enhanced. 
10.4 Developing Markets for Environmental Services 
10.4.1 Markets for Environmental Services 
Worldwide increasing awareness of the social costs from land degradation, a 
growing demand for environmental improvements, and expanding wealth 
especially among urban residents are moving markets for environmental goods 
and services toward centre stage in the debate about environmental conservation. 
The growing prominence of markets comes at a time when established models of 
government financed environmental conservation are under strain. Through 
public payment, prices paid by governments are often determined by political or 
budgetary considerations, rather than economic evaluation of the environmental 
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benefits involved. Growing public deficits and increasing frustration with 
governmental inefficiencies are spurring action, and this action is increasingly 
backed by willingness from the general public to put finances toward 
environmental services. Given the social benefit of environmental services, and 
the many private and public stakeholders who would gain - both socially and 
economically - from greater protection, it is useful to tap the potential of market 
approaches. 
A number of authors have discussed various market approaches for the provision 
of environmental goods and services (Powell et al 2002; Scherr 2002). According 
to them, market approaches can be grouped into three categories depending on 
their level of public involvement: self-organised private deals, open trading 
schemes and public payment schemes. While the public payment schemes is 
considered to be a market approach because it involves the public agencies 
purchasing services, it is the first two types of markets that are the focus of this 
section. Self-organised private deals include direct transactions between those 
who benefit from environmental services and those who provide them. So long 
as clear property rights and enforceable contracts are guaranteed, little public 
involvement is warranted. Examples of this type of deals include voluntary 
certification and eco-labelling schemes (where consumers as individual entities 
are engaged), direct purchases of land and purchases of development rights to 
land, and direct payment schemes between offsite beneficiaries (normally utility 
companies and conservation groups) and landholders who provide the 
environmental services. The open trading schemes are used when a government 
defines an environmental service commodity to be traded and devises regulations 
to create demand. Examples include carbon credits trading and salinity crediting 
trading. These trading schemes require a transparent framework, accurate 
accounting and verification systems. Finally, the public payment schemes 
involve a government providing the institutional foundation for a program and 
directly investing in it (Powell et al 2002; Scherr 2002). 
While market approaches have the potential to improve social welfare, they are 
not without risks. Market performance depends on site-specific factors, including 
existing power-relations, demand and supply, the supply of information on 
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trading conditions, and the level of transaction costs. Where conditions are less 
favourable, markets may lead to greater degradation, while at the same time 
reinforcing existing inequities. The emerging challenge therefore is to find the 
best market approach that, together with the right regulatory framework, will 
encourage just and efficient environmental conservation. 
10.4.2 Policy Environment in China 
The development of markets for environmental goods and services requires 
converting these freely-accessed public goods into commodities and property. 
This is inherently a political process, whereby new rights and responsibilities of 
different stakeholders are defined, new rules are established, and new 
entitlements are established (Powell et al 2002). 
The growing affluence of the Chinese community, together with a greater 
appreciation of the intrinsic value of environmental services, means there is 
growing demand for environmental service flows in China. The growing demand 
for environmental services calls for a wide range of policies that are currently in 
place. China's revised Forest Law (PRC 1998) and Water Law (PRC 2002b) 
formally recognized the importance of paying compensation for the provision of 
environmental services. Most such payment schemes in China are still publicly 
financed. Large-scale, central government initiatives are best represented by two 
forest conservation programs: the CCFGP and the Forest Ecosystem 
Compensation Program (FECP), which compensates farmers for reforesting and 
protecting forests (Weyerhauser 2006). In addition, the public beneficiary forests 
are publicly financed through other programs including the Natural Forest 
Protection Program and the Sand Control Program (Chen 2002). 
The evolving policy environment for the development of markets for 
environmental goods and services in China can be best reflected by the 
development of the FECP. The FECP emerged in the late 1980s following the 
success of forest management in a tourist site where a proportion of income from 
entrance tickets was used for forest conservation (Chen 2002). In 1996, two types 
of forest classification were identified to serve different objectives. These 
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included commercial forests and public beneficiary forests, and they became the 
working basis of the FECP. The decisive factor in moving the scheme forward 
was its incorporation into the Forest Law in 1998, following growing recognition 
of the limitations of strict mandatory forest protection approaches. The formal 
source of funding was finalised in 2000, with money being directly allocated 
from the fiscal budget (Chen 2002). Pilot implementation of the FECP was 
introduced in 11 provinces in 2001 as a conservation mechanism employing 
economic incentives, with financing totalling CNY 1 billion that was allocated 
by the Ministry of Finance (Chen 2002). 
Problems that have been identified through the pilot implementation of the FECP 
include difficulty in quantifying ecological benefits, the low level of 
compensation which is much less than the full value of the ecological and social 
benefits, and the single rate of compensation that undermines different levels of 
ecological function in different locations (Qu 2002; Liu 2002). In some cases, 
forests of the poorest quality, rather than that with the best ecological function, 
are being selected for compensation. The FECP therefore shares common 
features with the CCFGP in terms of the inefficiency of the public payment 
schemes. 
Some argue that getting the private sector to fund environmental services has not 
been very successful in China because of various reasons (CCICED 2002a; Qu 
2002). In some cases, it is difficult to define the exact beneficiaries. For instance, 
the hydropower companies have argued that they are not the sole beneficiaries of 
improved water quality downstream of land use change areas, and therefore 
should not bear the cost. In other cases, private deals are difficult to organise 
with high transaction costs. An example would be funding of public beneficiary 
forests coming from fees on water, hydropower, forest scenic site entrance 
tickets, and timber enterprises. Compensation between the regions, that is, direct 
payment from the downstream to the upstream is also under-developed largely 
because of a lack of coordination by the state and the transaction costs of 
gathering the required information. In most cases these region-to-region 
compensation schemes are handled by taxation at the national level (CCICED 
2002a; Qu 2002). 
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In contrast, Scherr (2002) argued that self-regulation and innovation by 
communities and self-organised private deals are two good opportunities for 
China to support in the coming years. This suggestion is based on findings that 
eco-tourists and other users of environmental services are not willing to 
contribute to general funds. Instead, they are willing to pay specific producers for 
services that benefit them directly. Further, as Weyerhauser (2006) noted, 
increasingly apparent limitations in public funding has led to an increase in 
private payment schemes. Provincial and local schemes cover a wide range of 
institutional innovations, such as electricity and water consumption fees 
dedicated to forest conservation, and direct payments to upstream farmers from 
downstream hydropower facilities. In addition, other types of environmental 
services market approaches in China, especially trading schemes such as the 
carbon sequestration projects under the Clean Development Mechanism have 
been trialed in several provinces in China to bundle environmental service 
payments (SF A 2005). 
10.4.3 Design of Payment Schemes for CCFGP 
Being the main channel of funding for environmental services in China, very 
often the public budget is not sufficient to cover all the services provided (Scherr 
2002). In other words, environmental service providers are not fully compensated. 
This is also the problem with the CCFGP, and it calls for the most effective 
policy instruments to promote environmental services provided by the Program. 
The selection of the most effective policy instruments needs to consider a 
number of key factors. These include biophysical features, economic conditions, 
institutional conditions, political conditions, management complexities, 
economic costs and equity (Scherr 2002). For instance, while biophysical 
features of ecosystem services might include the relationship between 
revegetation and sediment discharge and whether or not this link is well 
determined, institutional conditions would be important to determine whether 
municipalities have the legal authority to enter into contracts with water users. 
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Two issues need to be considered for the design of payment schemes in order to 
address the problem of insufficient public budget for the implementation of the 
CCFGP. The first issue concerns the sources of future finance of the Program. 
The second issue involves more efficient use of available funds to improve the 
cost-effectiveness of the Program. 
Private Investments 
Drawing in private investments for the provision of environmental goods and 
services under the CCFGP is one option. Funds may be generated from urban 
communities who are the beneficiaries of the environmental services provided by 
the CCFGP to finance sustainable land use changes. These funds can be secured, 
as the environmental valuation exercise conducted in this research thesis has 
found a significant willingness to pay among urban communities for the 
environmental services provided by the Program. This implies that part of the 
benefits (non-market benefits) of the Program is captured and can help finance 
conservation. As a first step, a special fund could be established for the 
implementation of the CCFGP on the Loess Plateau as a supplement to 
Government's spending in the region. To be consistent with the non-market 
valuation findings, annual payment from urban residents would be devoted to the 
fund for a 10-year period. The payment vehicle to the special fund, though, is yet 
to be determined preferably through social surveys. It is important that the 
payment vehicle is designed in a way to minimise the 'free-riding' effect. 
International experience has shown that specific funds, with sources of funding 
clearly linked to those receiving the benefits, are more effective in compensating 
environmental service providers than general funds (Scherr 2002). 
Funds could also be generated from the more easily identified user groups who 
will capture the market benefits from the environmental services provided by the 
CCFGP, mostly beneficiaries from improved water services in terms of reduced 
sediment discharge into the Yellow River. These user groups include 
hydropower companies and water processing factories. This is feasible in the 
CCFGP context as improved water services are in many cases local public goods, 
and the associated benefits are relatively well-defined and transaction costs are 
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lower compared to those from sandstorms reductions and improved biodiversity 
or landscape. Beneficiaries of the latter may be targeted and the associated 
benefits captured through the establishment of the special fund for the 
implementation of the CCFGP. With inputs from the urban residents to the 
special fund, hydropower companies could no longer refuse to bear the cost 
based on the arguments that other users were 'free riding' on their investment. 
The magnitude of funds will depend on a comprehensive valuation of the market 
environmental benefits from improved water services. During the process of 
environmental valuation, specific user groups can be identified. 
The selection of appropriate payment mechanisms for improved water services 
under the CCFGP is beyond the scope of this research and requires further in-
depth analysis. However, potential alternatives can be briefly compared in the 
light of China's policy environment. Funds for improved water services could be 
generated through self-organised private deals between water service user groups 
such as hydropower companies and landholders who provide these services. 
Alternatively, improved water services can be funded under the public payment 
scheme. As the scale of the water service problem to be solved in the CCFGP 
context is the Yellow River Basin which covers nine provinces and autonomous 
regions, private deals across provincial boundaries will be hard to coordinate and 
will also involve larger transaction costs compared to public payment scheme. In 
this case, it is likely to be more cost-effective for the Central Government to 
collect specific water service fees from the water user groups to fund the 
Program at the national level. To do this, clear and scientific biophysical links 
need to be established and services to specific water user groups need to be 
quantified. Monitoring is also important to ensure services are delivered. 
Cost-effectiveness of CCFGP 
Another option to tackle the issue of insufficient public budget is to improve the 
cost-effectiveness of the CCFGP through better design of the payment schemes 
with innovation and the introduction of market mechanisms. It has been shown 
earlier in this chapter that the fixed-rate payments are inefficient in achieving the 
environmental goals and that there is room for better targeting of the Program. 
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There are two main problems associated with the current payment scheme. First, 
the design of the payment scheme requires clear objectives and evaluation 
procedure to help allocate scarce financial resources. The implementation of the 
CCFGP demonstrates how the lack of clear, measurable objectives and means to 
evaluate progress toward meeting objectives can lead to unintended uses of funds. 
The Program typically has been paying to restore vegetation cover on the 
assumption that forests and grass will be beneficial, rather than to reward 
measurable environmental services. 
The second problem of the current CCFGP payment scheme is asymmetric 
information, a problem that has been identified as the factor that affects the 
functioning of markets for environmental goods and services associated with 
private land (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 1997). According to 
Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, farmers know better than the program 
administrator about how participation in conservation actions would affect their 
production plans and profits, while environmental experts hold information about 
the significance of environmental assets that exist on farm land. Furthermore, 
landholders may not have information about government priorities and may not 
understand how this information might influence subsequent contracts (Latacz-
Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 1997). Hence, the flat-rate Pigouvian taxes 
and subsidies may not fully correct market failure when information asymmetry 
is evident. Other forms of contract design or governance arrangements are 
therefore needed. 
Auctioning conservation contracts has emerged in recent years as a means of 
creating markets for public goods and to facilitate price discovery and allow 
resources to be allocated in a more efficient way (Stoneham et al 2003). Under 
the auction mechanism, the land to be converted could be identified through a 
competitive bidding system where land holders, in selected regions, are asked to 
bid for funds to undertake land improvement services. The criteria for selecting 
bids would include both the implication of the bid for longer-term project costs, 
and the environmental impact of the land use changes. Flexible payment 
mechanisms and competitive selection processes have the potential to improve 
the cost-effectiveness of conservation contracting because of the cost revelation 
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advantages of bidding process (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 1997). 
In other words, the lowest cost providers of environmental goods and services 
can thus be identified and selected into the conservation contracts. 
Through empirical studies of Victoria's Bush Tender trial in Australia, Stoneham 
et al (2003) found that it was possible to create at least the supply side of a 
market for nature conservation and in conjunction with a defined budget, prices 
were discovered and resources allocated through contracts with landholders. A 
biodiversity benefits index was developed to incorporate the current conservation 
value of the site, the amount of service offered by the landholder and the cost of 
the conservation action, nominated in the bid. Bids were then ranked according 
to their biodiversity benefits (Stoneham et al 2003). Their studies show that an 
auction for conservation contracts could offer large cost savings to governments 
interested in nature conservation on private land. Meanwhile, problems with 
government intervention programs, such as poor monitoring, administration and 
accounting for performance of the programs, can be tackled so that broad scale 
long-term landscape outcomes can be secured (Stoneham et al 2003). 
Similarly, the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the United States, with its 
motivation having certain parallels with the situation of the CCFGP in China, 
offers annual rental payments for 10 to 15 years plus cost-sharing to establish 
vegetative cover (grass or trees) on cropland or pasture land (Heimlich 2003). It 
requires that payments to landholders be allocated on a competitive basis to 
achieve broad environmental objectives. Under the CRP, farmers bid for public 
funds based on an environmental benefits index (EBI) as a relative preference 
measure for the different environmental goods and services arising from the land 
use changes. The EBI scores are based on six environmental factors and a cost 
factor. The environmental factors include wildlife, water quality, erosion, 
enduring benefits, air quality and conservation priority areas. Bids are ranked 
using the EBI and contracts are selected until the budget is exhausted (Heimlich 
2003). 
However, there are a number of problems that have been identified through the 
implementation of these conservation auction programs. First, there is the 
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possibility of strategic bidding and collusion between landholders bidding in an 
auction. For instance, repeated auctions of the CRP allow bidders to learn from 
previous rounds so that they can adjust their bids using this information. As a 
result, the increased information rent reduces the efficiency of the auction. 
Second, auction and bidding will not be costless. It has been found that 
transaction costs for the first round of Bush Tender, which included on-site 
research, ecological scoring and auction administration costs, amounted to 50 to 
60 per cent of the amount used in the auction (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi 
2005). These problems highlight the need for consideration in the careful design 
of the auctions. 
Auction Design with CCFGP 
A competitive bidding process based on auction principles could be trialed in 
order to allocate the CCFGP funds more efficiently. The auction has a price 
minimization objective, with bidders competing to secure funds to undertake 
land conversion and revegetation activities under the CCFGP. The successful 
implementation of the mechanism would lead to a more efficient outcome if it 
created an environment in which the prices of accepted tenders were likely to 
reflect the cost of undertaking land improvements less the private benefits that 
participating farmers can expect to retain. 
The implementation of the auction mechanism would require clearly defined 
property rights for land holders. Unlike in the United States and Australia where 
private property rights of farmland owners are strong, all the land in China is 
owned by the state or the collectives represented by local governments. Farmers 
have only the use rights to the land and very often these rights are incomplete or 
insecure. This would impose risks for participating farmers if they entered into 
the bidding scheme as individuals because their payments would not be 
guaranteed. Moreover, landholders in China are normally of small scale (Hyde et 
al 2003). This implies high transaction costs that would occur under the auction 
scheme and hence challenges the cost-effectiveness of the scheme. Taking these 
into consideration, it is likely to be more practical for local governments at the 
township level to enter into the bidding for available funds for the 
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implementation of the CCFGP on behalf of small landholders. This would reduce 
transaction costs and also secure the property rights to the land entering into the 
long-term contracts. 
As the first step, information should be made available on the broader 
environmental goals that the central government aims to achieve with the 
CCFGP funds. These can be described in terms of the environmental attributes 
used in the CM studies, namely sandstorm and sediment discharge reductions, 
and improved landscape and biodiversity. The priority list of the preferences of 
these environmental attributes, however, should not be revealed to the public to 
avoid the strategic behaviour in the bidding process at the township level. 
Applicant bids should include details of their revegetation plans such as the 
selection of tree/ grass species and land areas to be converted as well as their bid 
prices which include both their inputs into the Program and the opportunity costs 
of land. 
The impact on these attributes of farm level changes in land use (expected 
environmental outcomes) could be predicted either by the township governments 
in their bids or could be assessed by governments at higher levels. Land 
improvements in different locations are likely to yield a different set of 
environmental benefits, and resource management agencies at county or 
provincial level are likely to hold such information. The availability of the 
implicit prices of the environmental attributes derived from the CM study will 
then make it possible to work out the value of the potential environmental 
benefits of each bid. 
Once the environmental benefits of land improvements and the costs of these 
contracts are available, those bids that produce a benefit cost ratio less than one 
will be rejected because it is not economical to undertake any land improvement 
activities when the costs exceed the benefits. Applicant township governments 
will then be ranked by the ratio of environmental benefits over the prices that 
they bid for the revegetation contracts. Those with higher benefit cost ratios will 
be selected into the Program and funds will be allocated based on their bid prices 
until the CCFGP budget is exhausted. 
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This bidding process would allow applicant township governments to identify the 
revegetation activities applicable to their agronomic systems and enable them to 
deal with the uncertainty about the value of the action required to secure the 
desired outcome (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 1997). It is expected 
that through such a mechanism, the lowest cost providers for the environmental 
goods and services desired by the society could be selected into the CCFGP, and 
hence the cost-effectiveness of the Program can be achieved. In addition, with 
the environmental index (for example, EBI) converted to a measure of benefits 
through the use of the implicit prices of environmental attributes, the efficiency 
of government intervention through the CCFGP can be secured. This is because 
only those bids with their marginal benefits outweighing marginal costs will be 
selected. 
It is important to note that the auction mechanism should be based on sound 
scientific information. Even though the government holds site specific 
information on the environmental impacts of land improvements under the 
CCFGP, the transformation function that maps the revegetation actions (inputs) 
into outcomes may not be known with certainty. Hence the assessment of 
environmental impacts at the bidding stage and compliance monitoring during 
the implementation need to be supported by increased investment in research 
specifically on biophysical modelling of site-specific revegetation and its 
consequent environmental impacts. Good information on the impacts of land 
improvements on the environment is necessary for cost effective policy outcomes, 
regardless of the mechanism used to allocate funding. 
A well thought out design of the auction process is critical to ensure the effective 
operation of the scheme. For instance, Heaney and Beare (2002) argue that 
several issues need to be considered in competitive tendering for public 
investment in improving water use efficiency in Australia. These include 
attractiveness and simplicity of participation, setting the reserve price, bid 
assessment and the specification of management contracts. It is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to look into details of these issues. However, they have implications 
for the proposed auction scheme under the CCFGP. For instance, it will be 
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important to stipulate in the management contracts the rights and conditions 
necessary to implement land improvements, conditions of payment and 
compliance, and penalty for non-compliance. Different designs of the contracts 
will have different implications for monitoring, compliance and payment. The 
term of contracts is another important issue that needs to be considered for the 
design of the auction process. Contracts may be for the long term to create 
sufficient incentives for the participants but may also have limited terms to 
maintain flexibility to respond to changes in the market for environmental goods 
and services. 
The success of the mechanism would also be heavily reliant on the appropriate 
institutional arrangements to provide the rights and legal framework to make the 
process operational. Throughout the process a consultation mechanism would 
need to be put in place between the township governments and participating 
farmers so that concerns of the farmers could be taken into account. This would 
protect the interests of participating farmers so that an incentive mechanism 
could be built into the system. Once the bidding is successful and the contract is 
approved, cost and benefit sharing between the township governments and 
participating farmers need to be arranged and rights and responsibilities of each 
need to be specified in sub-contracts. 
Finally the property rights structure is a key factor in the success of any payment 
system. It is important to define the rights and responsibilities of service 
providers and beneficiaries to ensure that the person paying for ecosystem 
services will actually receive these services and that the party being paid actually 
has the right to receive payments. The property rights structure needs to create 
conditions where farmland owners have unquestionable rights to decide their 
land use. The ambiguity and insecurity in China's land tenure arrangement as 
well as the ownership over trees and grasses growing on that land will prevent 
the establishment of the auction mechanism or any other market instruments 
(private deals, etc.) to internalise the environmental externalities. Further, the ill-
defined property rights will undermine farmers' incentives to undertake/ 
maintain CCFGP once the government stops the payment. 
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10.S Conclusions 
This chapter provides a policy analysis of the CCFGP based on a partial cost 
benefit analysis of the implementation of the Program in North West China over 
a 20-year time period. Government intervention through the CCFGP has been 
justified on the ground that the Program is found to improve the social welfare of 
the Chinese people in the region, and moreover it has initiated land use changes 
especially in the ecologically fragile area. Even so, sustainable land use changes 
under the Program are not guaranteed. The sustainability of the CCFGP will 
depend on the implementation and design of the Program as well as the future 
financing of the Program. 
The cost-effectiveness of the CCFGP has also been examined in this chapter. 
Similar to the findings from other research studies (Uchida et al 2005; Xu et al 
2005), it has been found that the Program has not been cost-effective in 
achieving its environmental goals. The cost-effectiveness of the Program can be 
improved through better targeting of the Program sites, with the development of 
environmental service market being one solution. The potential of instituting an 
auction mechanism to allocate CCFGP funds has been discussed in detail in this 
chapter. In addition, the potential of drawing in private investment to fund the 
CCFGP has also been briefly explored. 
This chapter provided policy directions for the future implementation of the 
CCFGP which have not yet been fully considered in the Chinese context. Taking 
into account the national circumstances, policy environment and political 
economy of China, it is more feasible to undertake the CCFGP mainly through 
the public payment scheme, but better policy design is called for to minimise the 
costs associated with Program implementation. Market-based approaches could 
be introduced in allocating government funds to improve the cost-effectiveness 
of the CCFGP, with the auction mechanism being one of the potential options. In 
addition, self-organised private deals and open trading schemes can be trialled 
for some specific environmental services provided by the CCFGP where the bio-
economic linkages are well established, the user groups are more easily identified, 
and where transaction costs are lower. 
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Following this chapter, some final conclusion will be drawn from this research 
thesis, and suggestions on future research topics around the CCFGP will be put 
forward. 
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Conclusion 
With a total budget of CNY 337 billion, the CCFGP is one of the world's largest 
government initiatives to provide environmental goods and services. Upon 
successful completion, it will represent an almost 10 per cent increase in current 
national forest area. However, with government funding for the CCFGP drawing 
to an end in 2007, increasing attention amongst Chinese policy makers, as well 
as the wider Chinese and international communities, has been devoted to the 
long-term sustainability of the land use changes triggered by the CCFGP. This, 
coupled with growing public deficits and increasing frustration with government 
inefficiencies, has called for the justification of government intervention through 
the implementation of the program. 
A partial cost benefit analysis (CBA) is set out in this thesis to show the long-
term impact of the CCFGP on the social welfare of people living in North China. 
Due to the lack of sufficient scientific information to establish the links between 
biophysical changes and economic impacts of the Program, some environmental 
costs and benefits are not included in the analysis and hence a full CBA could 
not be conducted. Even so, the CBA reported in this research represents the first 
of its kind in the CCFGP literature, especially with the comprehensive 
environmental valuation component included in the analysis. Non-market 
valuation of environmental benefits has never been attempted in other CCFGP 
studies and remains rare in Chinese policy evaluations more generally. The 
inclusion of related benefits and costs associated with the CCFGP in this research 
gives the policy assessment of the Program more scientific rigor and better 
justification. 
To guide the research process, an overarching hypothesis which states 'The 
CCFGP improves the social welfare of people in North China' has been set up. 
Several sub-hypotheses have been developed consequently to include various 
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components of the CBA. The costs and benefits that are included in the partial 
CBA encompass the on-site agricultural production impacts of the CCFGP, the 
non-market environmental impacts of the Program, and the hydrological impacts 
of runoff reductions on agricultural production. However, other environmental 
benefits and costs arising from runoff reductions, such as the impacts of runoff 
reductions on hydropower generation, aquaculture and coastal fishery production 
as well as benefits and costs associated with flood control efforts are not included 
in the partial CBA. Therefore, the results of the CBA should be interpreted 
bearing this in mind. 
It has been found through this research that overall the CCFGP improves the 
social welfare of people across Northern China over a 20-year time period since 
its implementation. Hence the overarching hypothesis of this research thesis is 
accepted. The testing of sub-hypotheses relating to the welfare impact of the 
CCFGP on agricultural production (Hypotheses 1 and 2) has found that the 
Program, in general, makes participating farm households better off and it 
initiates land use changes especially in the ecologically fragile area in North 
West China. However, the results are mixed in the sense that they are sensitive to 
revenues from forest and grass products and off-farm employment. Moreover, 
the results vary across counties, with farm households of some counties 
(especially those that are ecologically fragile) actually being made worse off by 
the Program. Testing sub-hypotheses around the welfare impact of biophysical 
changes arising from the CCFGP (Hypotheses 3 to 6) has revealed that the 
Program brings about significant biophysical changes and there are both market 
and non-market benefits and costs associated with these biophysical changes. 
The non-market valuation conducted in this research has found that there is 
significant demand among the wider Chinese community for the environmental 
goods and services provided by the CCFGP. 
With these research findings, the unresolved policy issues around the 
implementation of the CCFGP can be answered. First, as the CCFGP brings 
about efficiency gains to the Chinese people, government intervention through 
the Program is justified and the Program should be supported by the Government. 
Second, the livelihoods of participating farm households are improved by the 
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CCFGP in general, and hence theoretically the sustainability of the Program can 
be achieved. However, sustainable land use changes and consequential 
environmental improvements will also depend on the implementation and design 
of the Program. Third, future financing of the Program is needed especially for 
areas where the CCFGP is found to decrease the financial well-being of the local 
communities. Findings from this research that there is demand among the wider 
Chinese community for environmental goods and services provided by the 
CCFGP offer a potential solution for future program finance. Fourthly, the 
program payment is found to have various impacts on land use changes in 
different localities. This indicates there is room for better environmental 
targeting of the Program. All these policy implications provide guidance for 
future implementation of the CCFGP. Attention should be given to drawing in 
private investments for future implementation of the CCFGP and the institution 
of market mechanisms (for example, an auction mechanism) to allocate CCFGP 
funds more efficiently. 
One of the highlights of this research thesis is the application of the CM 
technique to estimate the non-market environmental values derived from the 
implementation of the CCFGP. The CM study not only demonstrates that this 
innovative non-market valuation technique is applicable and works well in the 
developing country (specifically, China) context, but its results also have 
important implications for the policy design of the CCFGP. The CM technique 
allows environmental changes to be disaggregated into relevant 'attributes', such 
as landscape aesthetics and biodiversity, and marginal values for each attribute to 
be estimated. Therefore, the value estimates of the multidimensional situational 
changes thus derived are useful in achieving the better 'targeting' of land to be 
revegetated. In particular, plots that have the highest environmental marginal 
benefits and the lowest marginal opportunity costs should be selected. With 
information on the values of each attribute, different environmental changes 
arising from specific areas of revegetated land can be evaluated. This allows a 
more precise estimation of the environmental benefits compared to that under the 
environmental benefit index of the Conservation Reserve Program and facilitates 
the proposed auction mechanism to be carried out on a more scientific basis. The 
flexibility of the CM technique has also been demonstrated through the benefit 
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transfer exercise undertaken in this research when sample value estimates were 
extrapolated to the wider population. 
This research study also highlights some important issues for further research. 
First, a full cost benefit analysis should be conducted to include other marketed 
environmental benefits in addition to foregone agricultural production due to 
reduced runoff. Consultations with people working in the water and soil 
conservation area indicate that the offsite benefits and costs associated with the 
runoff reductions in the Yellow River are significant. These include the impacts 
of reduced runoff on hydropower generation, aquaculture and coastal fishery 
production as well as benefits and costs associated with flood control efforts. 
These marketed environmental benefits and costs are potentially important in the 
social cost benefit analysis of land use changes, in particular benefits from flood 
damage alleviation are crucial especially in upland watersheds. Hence the 
derivation of estimates of at least the broad magnitudes of the values involved 
are needed to justify the CCFGP on a more scientifically sound basis. To achieve 
this goal, ecological monitoring of the biophysical changes arising from the land 
use changes under the CCFGP should be strengthened. 
Second, while extrapolation of the non-market environmental benefits conducted 
in this research provides an input to the CBA of the CCFGP at the region level, 
its validity and reliability is challenged. The extrapolation exercise could be 
improved in order to facilitate more meaningful estimates. There are two aspects 
to this problem. First, sample sites can be selected to represent the regional 
population better. In this research, Xi'an, Ansai and Beijing are selected as the 
sample sites to represent population both on-site and off-site of the land use 
changes arising from the CCFGP. Even though Beijing is representative of the 
regional capital cities off-site in the more developed eastern area, its 
representation of the rural town centres in this area is limited. Hence the non-
market value of the urban households in the off-site rural town centres is not 
included in this research. This 'missing-out' value could be captured by 
including another off-site sample to represent rural town centres in the region 
based on which further extrapolation can be conducted. The second problem is 
associated with the benefit function transfer process undertaken in this research. 
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Even though the differences in socio-economic characteristics and environmental 
outcomes between the source and target sites can be adjusted with benefit 
function transfer, the parameter coefficients remain constant which implicitly 
assumes all the context factors within which the benefit function derives are the 
same across the source and target sites. A more systematic method, such as meta-
analysis could be explored for calibrating benefit functions and value estimates 
so that they are applicable across different contexts (Rolfe 2006). 
Third, the inception of an innovative auction and bidding program has been 
proposed in allocating government funds more efficiently in order to achieve the 
cost-effectiveness of the CCFGP. One component of the proposal involves 
institutional arrangements (sub-contracts) between township governments and 
participating farm households, which imply transaction costs associated with the 
new mechanism. The feasibility of the auction mechanism, therefore, depends on 
the magnitude of the transaction costs and whether this will undermine the 
potential benefits from such market mechanism. Some experimental programs 
could be developed at a small scale (for example, at provincial or even county 
level) to compare the two alternatives of the command and control public finance 
by the government vis-a-vis the market mechanism of auction and bidding. This 
will help to find out whether the proposed auction mechanism is feasible in the 
Chinese context and at what scale the auction mechanism should be implemented 
to achieve the cost-effectiveness of the CCFGP. 
Fourth, a similar CBA of program implementation in South China along the 
Yangtze River could be conducted to facilitate a comparative study of program 
implementation in different regions in China. Major environmental issues and 
concerns differ in the North and in the South, and socio-economic conditions in 
the two regions are also different. For instance, while sandstorms and water 
shortage is more of a problem to North China, the flooding risk is more likely to 
be of a concern to South China. Therefore the implementation of the CCFGP is 
likely to have different policy implications in different regions and also to have 
different impacts on the environment in the North and in the South. A 
comparative study would therefore help with future policy design which target 
specific environmental issues in different regions. 
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Appendix I: Change in Sandification Area and Sandstorm 
Frequency on the Loess Plateau 
Year Soil erosion area Sandification Decrease in Decrease in 
(1,000 sq km) area (1,000 sq sandification ( % ) sandstorm 
km) frequency ( % ) 
1999 411.1 60.6 
2010/2020 411.1-121 = 60.6 I 411.1 * (60.6 - 42.7) I 60.6 29.5% * 59.7% = 
290.1 290.l = 42.7 = 29.5% 17.6% 
278 
Appendix II: Annual Household Revenues and Costs in Four 
Sampled Counties 
Annual Household Revenues 
Average farm household revenue Ere- and EOSt-CCFGP (Binxian) 
Revenue in Proportion Revenue in Proportion 
1998 of revenue in 2003 of revenue in 
(CNY) 1998 (CNY) 2003 
(%) (%) 
Crop 1388.l 37.2 1359.4 23.2 
Livestock 241.6 6.5 435.6 7.4 
Other business 847.5 22.7 1070.3 18.3 
Off farm work 1253.5 33.6 2438.6 41.6 
Land rent 0 0 0 0 
Forest products 0 0 147.5 2.5 
Grass products 0 0 65.3 1.1 
Subsidy 0 0 338.6 5.8 
Total 3730.7 5855.3 
Average farm household revenue pre- and post-CCFGP (Ansai) 
Revenue in Proportion Revenue in Proportion 
1998 of revenue 2003 (¥) of revenue 
Change in 
total 
revenue(%) 
-2.1 
80.3 
26.3 
94.5 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
56.9 
Change in 
total 
(¥) in 1998 in 2003 revenue(%) 
(%) (%) 
Crop 1578.4 31.5 830.6 10.2 -47.4 
Livestock 2232.7 44.5 938.4 11.5 -58.0 
Other business 275.1 5.5 643.3 7.9 133.8 
Off farm work 920.2 18.4 1741.2 21.4 89.2 
Land rent 5.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 -100.0 
Forest products 0.0 0.0 1222.8 15.0 NIA 
Grass products 0.0 0.0 162.l 2.0 NIA 
Subsidy NIA NIA 2591.6 31.9 NIA 
Total 5012.l 100.0 8130.0 100.0 62.2 
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Average farm household revenue pre- and post-CCFGP (Gonghe) 
Revenue Revenue in Proportion of Revenue in Proportion of Change in total 
1998 (CNY) revenue in 2003 (CNY) revenue in revenue(%) 
1998 (%) 2003 (%) 
Crop 10108.7 43.4 6775.5 24.1 -33 
Livestock 11021.9 47.3 13681.8 48.7 24.1 
Other 
business 2.5 0.0 78.9 0.3 3026.4 
Off farm work 1053.5 4.5 1257.6 4.5 19.4 
Land rent 1102.6 4.7 48.8 0.2 -95.6 
Forest 
products 0.0 0.0 724.4 2.6 NIA 
Grass 
products 0.0 0.0 4752.7 16.9 NIA 
Subsidies 0.0 0.0 785.4 2.8 NIA 
Total 23289.3 100 28105.2 100 20.7 
Average farm household revenue Ere- and EOst-CCFGP (Minhe) 
Revenue Revenue in Proportion of Revenue in Proportion of Change in total 
1998 (CNY) revenue in 2003 (CNY) revenue in revenue(%) 
1998 (%) 2003 (%) 
Crop 2026.6 36.4 1158.4 10.3 -42.8 
Livestock 978.9 17.6 1153.1 10.2 17.8 
Other 
business 841.5 15.1 891.6 7.9 6 
Off farm 
work 1715.6 30.8 1916.3 17.0 11.7 
Land rent 0.0 0 0.0 0 NIA 
Forest 
products 0 0 4262.6 37.8 NIA 
Grass 
products 0 0 944.4 8.4 NIA 
Subsidies 0 0 961.9 8.5 NIA 
Total 5562.7 100.0 11288.4 100.0 102.9 
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Annual Household Costs 
Average annual cost per farm household pre- and post-CCFGP (Binxian) 
Cost in percentage Cost in Percentage Change in 
1998 in 1998 2003 in 2003 cost 
(CNY) (%) (CNY) (%) 98-03(%) 
1. Hire Labor 23.4 1 18.7 0.8 -19.9 
2. Material 1455.5 62.3 1401.0 58.8 -3.7 
Pesticide 186.8 8 220.9 9.3 18.2 
Fertilizer 691.7 29.6 728.3 30.5 5.3 
Seeds 59.5 2.5 35.7 1.5 -40 
Rent for agriculture machines 255.0 10.9 236.0 9.9 -7.5 
Rent for animal 33.1 1.4 16.7 0.7 -49.6 
Other input for crop production 119.6 5.1 45.2 1.9 -62.2 
Electronic power and irrigation 
water 3.7 0.2 4.8 0.2 29.7 
Feed 22.9 1 16.6 0.7 -27.3 
Animal breeding 5.2 0.2 7.0 0.3 36.1 
Livestock medicine 9.5 0.4 9.2 0.4 -2.9 
Payment for buying animal and 
poultry 47.3 2 39.0 1.6 -176 
Stable depreciation 14.9 0.6 31.9 1.3 113.4 
Others 6.4 0.3 9.8 0.4 52.5 
3.Rent for land 6.6 0.3 0.0 0 -100 
4. Agriculture fee or tax 849.8 36.4 592.1 24.8 -30.3 
5. Ex~enditure for CCFGP 0 0 372.3 15.6 NIA • 
Total 2335.2 2384.1 9.8 
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Average annual cost per farm household pre- and post-CCFGP (Ansai) 
Cost in Percentage Cost in Percentage Change in 
1998 in 1998 2003 in 2003 cost 
98-03 
(CNY) (%) (CNY) (%) ( % ) 
1. Hire Labor 32.5 1.8 226.3 5.5 595.9 
2. Material 1415.6 77.7 3107.3 75.3 119.5 
Pesticide 39.2 2.2 145.9 3.5 271.7 
Fertilizer 406.9 22.3 548.2 13.3 34.7 
Seeds 53.9 3.0 7.5 0.2 -86.0 
Rent for agriculture 
machines 21.9 1.2 32.5 0.8 48.0 
Rent for animal 60.5 3.3 49.7 1.2 -17.8 
Other inputs, power, 23.1 1.3 1347.7 32.7 5739.5 
Water 46.2 2.5 29.7 0.7 -35.6 
Feed 142.6 7.8 220.8 5.4 54.9 
Animal breeding 72.4 4.0 124.7 3.0 72.2 
Livestock medicine 18.8 1.0 80.6 2.0 328.2 
Animal and poultry 
purchases 391.3 21.5 234.9 5.7 -40.0 
Stable depreciation 17.4 1.0 24.3 0.6 39.5 
Others 121.3 6.7 260.9 6.3 115.0 
3.Rent for land 10.4 0.6 5.0 0.1 -51.7 
4. Agriculture fee or tax 363.7 20.0 121.7 3.0 -66.5 
5. Ex~enditure for CCFGP 0.0 0.0 663.6 16.l NIA 
Total 1822.2 100 4124.0 100 126.3 
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Average annual cost per farm household pre- and post-CCFGP (Gonghe) 
Cost in 1998 Percentage Cost in 2003 Percentage Change in 
in 1998 in 2003 cost 
98-03 
(CNY) (%) (CNY) (%) ( %) 
1. Hire Labor 378.8 5.2 73.9 0.9 -80.5 
2. Material 6413.2 88.6 4639.1 55.7 -27.7 
Pesticide 120.3 1.7 63.9 0.8 -46.9 
Fertilizer 1239.2 17.1 570.4 6.8 -54.0 
Seeds 326.l 4.5 136.5 1.6 -58.1 
Rent for agriculture 
machines 1012.8 14.0 297.7 3.6 -70.6 
Rent for animal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other input for crop 
production 494.9 6.8 64.6 0.8 -86.9 
Electric power and 
irrigation water 47.7 0.7 40.7 0.5 -14.7 
Feed 2324.5 32.l 2298.2 27.6 -1.1 
Animal breeding 6.7 0.1 7.2 0.1 7.5 
Livestock medicine 157.3 2.2 163.9 2.0 4.2 
Payment for buying animal 
and poultry 366.4 5.1 452.9 5.4 23.6 
Stable depreciation 287.9 4.0 490.3 5.9 70.3 
Others 29.4 0.4 52.6 0.6 79.1 
3.Rent for land 511.0 7.1 352.l 4.2 -31.l 
4. Agriculture fee or tax 310.7 4.3 132.2 1.6 -57.5 
5. ExJ!enditure for CCFGP 0.0 0.0 3131.3 37.6 NIA 
Total 7613.7 100.0 8328.6 100.0 9.4 
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Average annual costs Eer farm household Ere- and ,EOSt-CCFGP (Minhe) 
Cost in 1998 Percentage Cost in 2003 Percentage Change in 
in 1998 in 2003 cost 
98-03 
(CNY) (%) (CNY) (%) (%) 
1. Hire Labor 31.9 1.8 12.3 0.6 -61.6 
2. Material 1561.8 85.9 1331.0 63.6 -14.8 
Pesticide 92.0 5.1 57.9 2.8 -37 
Fertilizer 554.8 30.5 321.l 15.3 -42.1 
Seeds 245.2 13.5 33.1 1.6 -86.5 
Rent for agriculture 
machines 98.7 5.4 38.9 1.9 -60.6 
Rent for animal 29.4 1.6 13.8 0.7 -53.2 
Other inputs for crop 
production 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0 
Electronic power and water 25.5 1.4 20.4 1.0 -19.9 
Feed 359.4 19.8 495.8 23.7 37.9 
Animal breeding 6.0 0.3 9.1 0.4 50.8 
Livestock medicine 16.1 0.9 23.5 1.1 45.6 
Buying animal and poultry 117.9 6.5 272.6 13.0 131.2 
Stable depreciation 14.9 0.8 42.6 2.0 185.6 
Others 1.8 0.1 2.0 0.1 13.2 
3.Rent for land 11.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 -100 
4. Agriculture fee or tax 213.3 11.7 84.6 4.0 -60.3 
5. ExJ!enditure for CCFGP 0.0 0 665.6 31.8 NIA 
Total 1818.6 100 2093.4 100 15.1 
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Appendix III: Preliminary Choice Modelling Survey 
Questionnaire Used for the Face-to-face Interview 
Code of Informant: 
Beijing-1, Xi'an -2, Ansai -3 D 
Code of Interviewer: D 
Hello, my name is ___ . This is my name card (presenting name card). We 
want to know your views on land use options in the Loess Plateau Region. This 
is part of an independent university research project regarding land use 
management on the Loess Plateau. You were chosen to be asked these questions 
at random from people in your occupation type. Answering this survey is 
voluntary. You don't need to know about land use management and there are no 
right or wrong answers - we are interested in your views. Your input will help to 
decide the future land use management on the Loess Plateau. 
This survey should take about 20-30 minutes to complete. Your answers will be 
treated as completely confidential. 
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We will start this survey by first of all presenting you with some information 
about the Loess Plateau. 
The Loess Plateau 
The Loess Plateau lies in the north and central west of China. The Yellow River 
flows through the Plateau. It covers large parts of Gansu, Shaanxi and Shanxi 
Provinces as well as Ningxia Autonomous Region (see the map). 
The Loess Plateau has an area of 630,000 sq km. It is a dry area with only 150 -
650 mm of rainfall every year. About 874,200 people live in the Loess Plateau 
region, with 79 per cent living in rural areas . 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
To start, we want to ask you about your experience of the Loess Plateau. For 
Beijing and Xi'an respondents: 
1. Have you visited the Loess Plateau region? 
Yes D 1 NoD 2 
2. Do you think you will visit the Loess Plateau in the future? 
Yes D 1 NoD 2 
3. What was/ will be the purpose for your visit? 
For Ansai respondents only: 
4. Do you like living on the Loess Plateau? 
Yes D 1 NoD2 NotsureD 3 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
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The problem in the Loess Plateau region 
Now let's tum to the problems in the Loess Plateau region. You may refer to the 
information sheet while I am talking about these problems. 
~ Clearing trees and shrubs, growing crops on steep slopes and grazing too 
many animals on the Plateau have caused environmental damage. The main 
environmental problems include: 
Sandstorms 
Soils on the Loess Plateau are easily blown away. Strong winds can cause 
sandstorms. If current land use practices continue, the region will have 22 
sandstorm days every year by 2020, compared to 20 sandstorm days at present. 
Increasing sandstorm frequency in the region will also have an impact on eastern 
areas including Beijing. 
Landscape 
The area of forest and grass will drop from the current level of 14 per cent of the 
area to 10 per cent by 2020 if current land use practices continue. 
Water quality (1) 
Some of the water in the Fen, Wei and Huangshui Rivers in the region can still 
be used for irrigation at present. If current land use practices continue, the quality 
of water in these rivers will decline by 2020 to being unusable. 
Water quality (2) 
If current land use practices continue, the sediment discharge from the Loess 
Plateau region into the Yellow River will increase from the current level of 1.6 
billion tons per annum to 1.7 billion tons by 2020. 
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Plant species 
If current land uses continue, the number of plant species on the Plateau would 
fall from the current number of 2046 species to 1637 species by 2020. Some 
herbs used for traditional Chinese medicine would then be in the danger of 
extinction. 
~ Land use change, specifically stopping growing crops on steep slopes and 
planting more trees and grass, could improve the environment in the region. 
There could be: 
fewer sandstorms 
more area of trees and grass 
better water quality 
more plant species 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
5. How interested are you in land use change in the Loess Plateau region? 
Very interested D 1 Moderately interestedD 2 
Slightly interested D 3 Not at all interested D 4 
For Beijing respondents only: 
6. Do you think growing trees and grass in the Loess Plateau will decrease the 
sandstorm frequencies in Beijing? 
Yes D 1 NoD 2 Don't knowD 3 
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Options for land use change in the Loess Plateau region 
Now let's have a look at the options for land use change in the Loess Plateau 
region. 
~ The Central Government introduced the Conversion of Cropland to Forest 
and Grassland Program (CCFGP) in the region in 1999. The Program aims 
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to reduce crop production and grazing on steep lands while encouraging 
farmers to grow more trees and grass. 
~ Farmers participating in the Program lose income from reduced crop 
production and grazing. The Central Government has provided grain and 
cash to compensate farmers for their losses. The financial support from the 
government will cease in 2007. 
~ In order to keep farmers growing trees and grass on the Loess Plateau, 
financial support for 10 years beyond 2007 will be needed. After 2017 it is 
expected that other sources of income will become available for the farmers. 
How these options could affect you 
These options could affect you in the following way: 
~ Governments are now using tax revenue to compensate the farmers. 
However, governments do not have enough money to support the CCFGP 
beyond 2007. 
~ The Central Government could collect an annual "Environmental Levy" on 
all income tax payers - including your household - from the 2007-2008 
taxation year for a period of 10 years to pay for the CCFGP in the Loess 
Plateau region. 
~ The size of the levy would depend on the degree of environmental 
improvement that the CCFGP aims to achieve in the Loess Plateau region. 
~ The money from the levy would go into a special fund. It would be used 
only for CCFGP in the Loess Plateau region. 
~ An independent body would make sure the money was spent properly. 
7. Is the "Environmental Levy" used specifically for the CCFGP in the Loess 
Plateau region a good idea? 
Yes D 1 NoD 2 Don't knowD 3 
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What do you think? 
We want to know what you think about possible ways of using the environmental 
levy money to keep farmers growing trees and grass in the Loess Plateau region. 
To do this we have prepared five sets of possible land use options. We will 
describe each option by giving you information about what it will do to the 
condition of the environment on the Loess Plateau by 2020. You will be told: 
~ The number of sandstorm days each year 
~ The percentage of the land planted to trees and grass 
~ The quality of water in the rivers 
~ The number of plant species 
~ The cost to you of an annual environmental levy on your income for 10 
years 
Different land use options under the CCFGP will result in different 
environmental improvements in the Loess Plateau region. Because there are 
altogether 11 land use options, we ask you to consider only three at a time in 
each of the following questions. One of the options (Option 1) in each question 
remains the same. That option is a 'continuation of current land uses' option. 
For each set of three options, choose your preferred option by looking at the levy 
amount and the effects the options will have on the environment. Some of these 
effects may seem strange, for instance, vegetation cover is increasing while water 
quality is decreasing. However, remember that all these environmental effects 
(i.e. sandstorms, plant species, water quality, vegetation cover) are impacted 
differently by different land use options. Effects that may seem strange are quite 
possible. 
Also, you might think that it is the change of vegetation cover that leads to 
changes in sandstorm days, water quality and the number of plant species. 
However, vegetation cover is only one factor. The distribution and type of tree 
also has an impact. 
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When deciding on the options you prefer, keep in mind your available income 
and all other things you have to spend money on. 
Choice Sets (Each choice set on one piece of paper) 
Q8-Ql2 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
We would now like to ask you some further questions about the way you make 
your choices. 
13. When answering Questions 8 to 12, did you always choose "Option 1: 
continue current practices"? 
lO Yes 20 No 
If you answered "Yes", which statement most closely describes your reason 
for doing so? 
1 O I support the implementation of land use change in areas other than in the 
Loess Plateau region (please specify the area). 
2 O I support land use change in the Loess Plateau region but cannot afford 
any of the levies mentioned. 
3 O I did not know which option was best so I stuck to the continuation of 
current practices option. 
4 0 Some other reason (please specify) 
14. How certain are you of your answers in the proceeding section? 
lO Absolutely certain 20 Very certain 30 Rather certain 
40 Uncertain 50 Very uncertain 
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15. Think about the information presented earlier, please indicate whether you 
agree or disagree with EACH of the following statements. 
I understand the information in the survey 
1 O Yes 20 No 30 Maybe 
I needed more information than was provided 
1 O Yes 20 No 30 Maybe 
The information in the survey was biased in favour of implementing 
CCFGP 
10 Yes 20 No 30 Maybe 
I found answering Questions 8 to 12 confusing 
1 O Yes 20 No TI Maybe 
You and your background 
In this section of the survey, we ask you a few questions to make sure the people 
we are surveying are from a wide range of backgrounds. 
16. Sex __ (simply fill in the form) 
17. City/ town (simply fill in the form) 
10 Beijing 
2[J Xi'an 
30 Ansai 
18. What is your age? __ 
19. What is the highest level of education that you have obtained or are obtaining? 
1 0 Illiterate 
2 0 Primary school 
3 0 Junior high school 
4 0 Technical secondary school 
5 0 Senior high school 
6 0 University 
292 
20. What is your occupation? (simply fill in the form) 
10 Government employee 
20 Manager 
30 Private entrepreneur 
40 Professional and technician 
50 Clerk 
60 Small family business owner 
70 Employee in the service sectors 
80 Worker/ labour 
90 Farmer 
HO Unemployed 
21. When thinking about issues where there are trade-offs between conservation 
and development, do you 
1 0 Favour development 
2 0 Favour conservation 
3 0 Favour development and conservation equally 
22. Which of the following categories does your total annual household income 
(after tax) fall into, that is, the total income of all people in the household? 
10 Under ¥5,000 
20 ¥5,000 - ¥10,000 
30 ¥10,000 - ¥15,000 
40 ¥15,000 - ¥20,000 
50 ¥20,000 - ¥30,000 
60 ¥30,000 - ¥50,000 
70 ¥50,000 - ¥70,000 
80 More than ¥70,000 
90 Don't know 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
That's all about the survey. Thank you very much for your cooperation. If you 
have any questions about this survey or if you have any suggestions, please 
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kindly contact China National Forestry Economics and Development Research 
Centre of the State Forestry Administration. 
Contacts and Telephone Numbers: 
Zhao Jincheng: (010) 84239024/ 84239187 
Liang Dan: (010) 84239025 
Xie Chen: (010) 84239024 
Mail Address: No. 18 Hepingli Dongjie, Beijing 
Post Code: 100714 
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INFORMATION SHEET 
Environmental conditions of the Loess Plateau 
under current land use practices: now and in the future 
Sandstorms Sandstorm days per year 
Landscape 
Water quality Water use 
(1) 
Water quality Annual sediment discharge 
(2) into the Yellow River 
Plant species The number of species 
rotected from extinction 
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Presf!ri'f:tevel .. :,:; :'.::Fufure Level 
22' .·. ::Qi,~ (B ear 2020) 
20 days 22 days 
14% 
Some is suitable 
for irri ation 
1.6 billion tons 
2046 
10% 
Completely 
unusable 
1.7 billion tons 
1637 
Appendix IV: Final Choice Modelling Survey Questionnaire Used 
for the Face-to-face Interview 
Code of Informant: 
Beijing-I, Xi'an -2, Ansai -3 D 
Code of Interviewer: D 
Hello, my name is ___ . I'm an interviewer appointed by the State Forestry 
Administration. This is my ID and Proof Letter. We want to know your views on 
the environmental impacts of land use options in the Loess Plateau Region. This 
is part of a cooperative project between the Chinese Forest Economics 
Development and Research Centre of the State Forestry Administration, the 
Australian National University and the Provincial Forestry Departments. You 
were chosen to be asked these questions at random. Answering this survey is 
voluntary. You don't need to know about land use management and there are no 
right or wrong answers - we are interested in your views. Your input will help to 
decide the future land use management on the Loess Plateau. 
This survey should take about 15-20 minutes to complete. Your answers will be 
treated as completely confidential. 
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There are four sections in this survey. In the first section, we will present you 
with some information about the Loess Plateau. The second section is about 
environmental problems in the Loess Plateau region. After that we will ask you 
for your opinions in the third section about possible changes to land management 
that could help solve these problems. In the last section, we will ask you some 
questions about you and your background. 
SECTION I 
The Loess Plateau lies in the north and central west of China. The Yell ow River 
flows through the Plateau. It covers large parts of Gansu, Shaanxi and Shanxi 
Provinces as well as Ningxia Autonomous Region. The Loess Plateau has an area 
of 630,000 sq km. About 87 million people live in the Loess Plateau region, with 
79 per cent living in rural areas. It is a dry area with only 150 - 650 mm of 
rainfall every year . 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
To start, we want to ask you about your experience of the Loess Plateau. For 
Beijing and Xi'an respondents: 
1. Have you visited the Loess Plateau region? FOR ANSAI, CODE I 
Yes D 1 NoD 2 
If the answer is "Yes", go directly to Q 3. If the answer is "No", go to Q2 and 
Q3. 
2. Do you think you will visit the Loess Plateau in the future? 
Yes D 1 NoD 2 
3. What was/ will be the purpose for your visit? 
__________ FOR ANSAI, RECORD 'RESIDENT' 
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•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
SECTION II 
Now let's turn to some problems in the Loess Plateau region. You may refer to 
the infonnation sheet while I am talking about these problems. 
~ Under previous land use practices, trees and shrubs have been cleared, crops 
have been grown on steep slopes and too many animals have been grazed on 
the Plateau. These practices have caused environmental damage. 
~ To reverse the environmental damage, the Central Government introduced 
the Conversion of Cropland to Forest and Grassland Program (CCFGP) in the 
region in 1999. The Program aims to reduce crop production and grazing on 
steep lands while encouraging farmers to grow more trees and grass. 
~ Farmers participating in the Program lose income from reduced crop 
production and grazing. The Central Government has provided grain and 
cash to compensate farmers for their losses. Based on the current plan, the 
financial support from the government will cease in 2007. 
~ If without the financial support, farmers may revert to their previous land use 
practices. 
~ According to scientific research conducted and projections made by experts 
from the State Forestry Administration and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 
the main environmental problems of this would include: 
Sandstorms 
Soils on the Loess Plateau are easily blown away. Strong winds can cause 
sandstorms. If previous land use practices were reintroduced, the region will 
have an average of about 22 sandstorm days every year by 2020, compared to 20 
at present. Increasing sandstorm frequency in the region would have an impact 
on eastern areas including Beijing. 
Landscape 
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The area of forest and grass would drop from the current level of around 14 per 
cent of the area to 10 per cent by 2020 if farmers reverted to previous land use 
practices. 
Water quality 
Currently the sediment in the Yellow River coming from the Loess Plateau 
region totals 1.6 billion tons per year. If this amount of sedimentation were filled 
in the Three Gorges Dam, it would take 1/ 27 of the capacity of Dam. If the 
previous land use practices were reintroduced, the level of sediment discharge 
would increase to 1.9 billion tons by 2020. 
Plant species 
If previous land use practices were reintroduced, the number of plant species on 
the Plateau would fall from the current number of around 2000 species to 
approximately 1600 species by 2020. Some herbs used for traditional Chinese 
medicine would then be in the danger of extinction. 
~ Continuation of the CCFGP would improve the environment in the region. 
There would be. 
fewer sandstorms 
more area of trees and grass 
better water quality 
more plant species 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
4. How interested are you in the environmental impacts of land management 
in the Loess Plateau region? 
Very interested D 1 Moderately interestedD 2 
Slightly interested D 3 Not at all interested D 4 
For Beijing respondents only: 
299 
5. Do you think growing trees and grass in the Loess Plateau will decrease 
the sandstorm frequencies in Beijing? 
Yes D 1 NoD 2 Don't knowD 3 
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
SECTION III 
Continuation of the CCFGP in the Loess Plateau region could affect you in the 
following way: 
~ To keep farmers growing trees and grass on the Loess Plateau, financial 
support for the farmers involved in the Program will be needed for 10 years 
beyond 2007. After 2017 it is expected that other sources of income will 
become available for the farmers such as from forest and grass products, 
township enterprises and other off-farm employment. 
~ To provide for this financial support, a compulsory payment from urban 
households across China including yours for a 10-year period would be 
required. 
~ The size of the payment would depend on the extent of the environmental 
improvements that the CCFGP aims to achieve. 
~ The money from the payment would go into a special fund. It would be used 
only for the continuation of the CCFGP in the Loess Plateau region. 
~ For the collection, use and administration of the fund, a complete system 
would be put in place and would be monitored by the State Auditing 
Administration. 
6. Is the payment for the continuation of the CCFGP in the Loess Plateau 
region a good idea? 
Yes D 1 NoD 2 Don't knowD 3 
We want to know what you think about possible ways of using the money raised 
to continue the CCFGP in the Loess Plateau region. To do this we have prepared 
five sets of possible land use options. We will describe each option by giving you 
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information about what it will do to the condition of the environment on the 
Loess Plateau by 2020. You will be told: 
~ The average number of sandstorm days each year 
~ The percentage of the land planted to trees and grass 
~ The quality of water in the rivers 
~ The number of plant species 
~ The amount of the payment your household would make each year for 10 
years 
Now we are going to ask your preferred option. Please look at this card that sets 
out some instructions for answering the next 5 questions. 
We ask you to consider three options at a time in each of the following questions. 
One of the options (Option 1) in each question remains the same. That option is a 
'reversion to previous land uses'. 
For each set of three options, choose your preferred option by looking at the 
payment amount and the effects the options will have on the environment. Some 
of these effects may seem strange, for instance, vegetation cover is increasing 
while water quality is decreasing. However, remember that all these 
environmental effects (i.e. sandstorms, plant species, water quality, vegetation 
cover) are impacted differently by different land use options. Effects that may 
seem strange are quite possible. 
Also, you might think that it is the change of vegetation cover that leads to 
changes in sandstorm days, water quality and the number of plant species. 
However, vegetation cover is only one factor. For instance, the distribution and 
type of tree also has an impact. 
When deciding on the options you prefer, keep in mind your available income 
and all other things you have to spend money on. 
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Choice Sets (Each choice set on one piece of paper) 
Q7-Qll 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
In this section, we would now like to ask you some questions about the way you 
made your choices. 
12. When answering the 5 choice questions, did you always choose "Option 1: 
revert to previous land use practices"? (fill in by the interviewer) 
lO Yes 20 No 
If you answered "Yes", which statement most closely describes your reason 
for doing so from this card? 
I 0 I support the continuation of the CCFGP in areas other than in the Loess 
Plateau region (please specify the area). 
2 0 I support the continuation of the CCFGP in the Loess Plateau region but 
cannot afford any payment mentioned. 
3 0 I did not know which option was best so I stuck to making no payment. 
4 0 Some other reason (please specify) 
13. Think about the information presented earlier, please indicate whether you 
agree or disagree with EACH of the following statements. 
I understood the information in the survey 
1 O Yes :O No 30 Maybe 
I needed more information than was provided 
1 O Yes 20 No 30 Maybe 
The information in the survey was biased in favour of continuing the 
CCFGP 
10 Yes 20 No 30 Maybe 
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I found answering the 5 choice questions confusing 
10 Yes 20 No :{] Maybe 
- I am sure of my answers to the 5 choice questions 
10 Yes 20 No 30 Maybe 
SECTION IV 
Finally, we ask you a few questions to make sure the people we are surveying are 
from a wide range of backgrounds. 
14. Sex __ (simply fill in the form) 
15. City/ town (simply fill in the form) 
10 Beijing 
2[] Xi'an 
30 Ansai 
16. What is your age? __ 
17. From this card, what is the highest level of education that you have obtained 
or are obtaining? 
10 None 
20 Primary school 
30 Junior high school 
40 Technical secondary school 
50 Senior high school 
60 University or higher 
18. From this card, what is your occupation? 
1 0 Senior government employee 
2 0 Senior manager 
3 0 Private entrepreneur 
4 0 Professional and technician 
5 0 Clerk (governments, enterprises, companies) 
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6 0 Small family business owner 
7 0 Employee in the commercial and service sectors 
8 0 Worker/ labour 
9 0 Unemployed (including those re-employed) 
19. When thinking about issues where there are trade-offs between 
environmental protection and economic development, do you 
1 0 Favour economic development 
2 0 Favour environmental protection 
3 0 Favour economic development and environmental protection equally 
20. From this card, which of the following categories does your total annual 
household income (after tax) fall into, that is, the total income of all people in 
the household? 
10 Under ¥5,000 
20 ¥5,000 - ¥10,000 
30 ¥10,000 - ¥15,000 
40 ¥15,000 - ¥20,000 
50 ¥20,000 - ¥30,000 
60 ¥30,000 - ¥50,000 
70 ¥50,000 - ¥70,000 
80 More than ¥70,000 
90 Don't know 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
That's end of the survey. Thank you very much for your cooperation. If you 
have any questions about this survey or if you have any suggestions, please 
contact China National Forestry Economics and Development Research Centre 
of the State Forestry Administration. 
Contacts: 
Liang Dan and Xie Chen 
Tel: (010) 84239025/ 84239024 
Email: danliangcn@yahoo.com.cn, xiechen@forestry.gov .en 
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Mail Address: No. 18 Hepingli Dongjie, Beijing 
Post Code: 100714 
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The area of forest and grass would drop from the current level of around 14 per 
cent of the area to 10 per cent by 2020 if farmers reverted to previous land use 
practices. 
Water quality 
Currently the sediment in the Yellow River coming from the Loess Plateau 
region totals 1.6 billion tons per year. If this amount of sedimentation were filled 
in the Three Gorges Dam, it would take 1/ 27 of the capacity of Dam. If the 
previous land use practices were reintroduced, the level of sediment discharge 
would increase to 1.9 billion tons by 2020. 
Plant species 
If previous land use practices were reintroduced, the number of plant species on 
the Plateau would fall from the current number of around 2000 species to 
approximately 1600 species by 2020. Some herbs used for traditional Chinese 
medicine would then be in the danger of extinction. 
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SUMMARY TABLE 
Sandstorms 
Landscape 
Water quality 
Plant species 
Description: 
best estimate of 
Average number of 
sandstorm da s er 
Annual sediment discharge 
into the Yellow River 
The number of species 
rotected from extinction 
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Present 
20 days 
14% 
1.6 billion tons 
2000 
under previous · 
land'use 
:p~8tjces .. 
(B · ear2@2Q), 
22 days 
10% 
1.9 billion tons 
1600 
INSTRUCTION SHEET 
);> Different options have different environmental impacts. 
);> Each choice question has three options. Choose your most preferred option. 
);> Option 1 is always the same. 
);> Environmental effects that may seem strange are actually quite possible. 
);> Vegetation cover is only one factor. 
);> Keep in mind your income and other spending. 
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